The death of the 6th company. The sixth company: "For your friends

The battle at height 776 is an episode of the Second Chechen War, during which the 6th company of the 2nd battalion of the 104th parachute regiment of the 76th (Pskov) airborne division (lieutenant colonel M. N. Evtyukhin) entered into battle with a detachment of Chechen militants led by Khattab, near Argun in Chechnya, at the Ulus-Kert-Selmentauzen line, at an altitude of 776 (Coordinates: 42 ° 57′47 ″ N 45 ° 48′17 ″ E).

After the fall of Grozny in early February 2000, a large group of Chechen fighters retreated to the Shatoi region of Chechnya, where on February 9 it was blocked by federal troops. Airstrikes were carried out on the positions of the militants using one and a half ton volumetric detonating bombs. Then, on February 22-29, a ground battle for Shata followed. The militants managed to break out of the encirclement: the group of Ruslan Gelaev broke through in the north-western direction to the village of Komsomolskoye (Urus-Martan district), and the Khattab group - in the north-eastern direction through Ulus-Kert (Shatoy district), where the battle took place.

The federal forces were represented by:
- 6th company of the 2nd battalion of the 104th parachute regiment of the 76th (Pskov) airborne division (guard lieutenant colonel M. N. Evtyukhin)
- a group of 15 soldiers of the 4th company (Guards Major A.V. Dostavalov)
- 1st company of the 1st battalion of the 104th parachute regiment (guard major S. I. Baran)
Artillery units also provided fire support to the paratroopers:
- artillery battalion of the 104th paratrooper regiment

Among the leaders of the militants were Idris, Abu Walid, Shamil Basayev and Khattab, the units of the last two field commanders in the media were called the White Angels battalions (600 fighters each).
According to the Russian side, up to 2,500 militants participated in the battle, according to the militants, the detachment consisted of 70 fighters

84 servicemen of the 6th and 4th companies, including 13 officers, were killed in the battle.

Accurate data on losses in the ranks of the militants are not available. According to federal forces, their losses amounted to 400 or 500 people. According to the Chechen side, only 20 people died.

According to the militants, a clash occurred in the vicinity of the mountain village of Ulus-Kert, in which 70 militants who were advancing towards Vedeno, through the gorge of the Vashtar (Abazulgol) river, collided with the paratroopers. As a result of a fierce oncoming battle, a company of paratroopers was completely destroyed, and the militants lost more than 20 people.

By decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 22 paratroopers were presented with the title of Hero of Russia (21 of them posthumously), 69 soldiers and officers of the 6th company were awarded the Order of Courage (63 of them posthumously).
In April 2001, VV Putin visited the battlefield during his visit to Chechnya.
On January 23, 2008, at the initiative of Ramzan Kadyrov, the ninth line of Grozny was renamed the street of 84 Pskov paratroopers.
The book “Rota” was written about the feat of the paratroopers, the film “Breakthrough” (2006), “Russian Victim”, the series “I have the Honor” and “Storm Gates”, the musical “Warriors of the Spirit” were shot. They erected monuments in Moscow and Pskov. In Kamyshin, in the small homeland of Senior Lieutenant A. M. Kolgatin, an annual festival of soldiers' songs is held, named after him. The heroic death of the 6th company was reflected in the work of a number of musical groups and performers

On March 2, 2000, the military prosecutor's office of Khankala launched an investigation into the case against members of illegal armed groups, which was then sent to the Directorate of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation to investigate crimes in the field of federal security and interethnic relations in the North Caucasus. In doing so, it was found that "The actions of military officials, including the command of the Joint Group of Troops (Forces) ... in the performance of duties for the preparation, organization and conduct of combat by units of the 104th Parachute Regiment do not constitute a crime."
Soon the case was closed by Deputy Prosecutor General S. N. Fridinsky

As of 2009, there are still many ambiguities in the official version of the story of the death of the 6th company. According to journalist E. Polyanovsky, there were many criminal oddities in the history of this battle.

In July 2003, an open appeal was published by a regional public organization of the families of fallen servicemen to President Vladimir Putin. In it, relatives asked a number of questions to acting. commander of the OGV, General Gennady Troshev, Chief of the General Staff, General A.V. Kvashnin, and to the command of the Airborne Forces:

1. Why was the exit of the company delayed by the command for a day?
2. Why couldn't the company's property be dropped by helicopter?
3. Why did the company move into an ambush prepared in advance for it?
4. Why didn't long-range artillery support the company?
5. Why was the company commander not warned about the presence of the main enemy forces on the route? How did the information about the movement of the company become known to the militants?
6. Why did the regiment commander demand to hold on and promise help, although the company could be withdrawn at any moment, and the company sent to help went along the most inconvenient route?
7. Why did the military leave the battlefield to the militants for three days, allowing them to bury their dead and gather the wounded?
8. Why did the information of the Pskov journalists, published five days later, take the generals by surprise?

The battle began just hours after Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev announced that the war in Chechnya was over. Vladimir Putin was reported "on the fulfillment of the tasks of the third stage" of the operation in the North Caucasus. The reason for this statement is the capture of Shatoi, which the federal command interpreted as a signal that the "Chechen resistance" was finally broken.
On the afternoon of February 29, 2000 and. about. Gennady Troshev, commander of the OGV, noted that for another two to three weeks, operations would be carried out to destroy the "escaped bandits", but the full-scale military operation was completed.
According to some media, during the week the fact of the battle at height 776 was hushed up, as well as the number of losses .. Although a major battle near Ulus-Kert was reported on March 2, 2000 late. On March 9, Obshchaya Gazeta wrote:

A. Cherkasov:
What actually happened in the Ulus-Kert area?

The tactical group of the 104th PDP was tasked by the command of the Vostok grouping to withdraw the 2nd battalion to a line four kilometers southeast of Ulus-Kert by 14.00 on February 29, 2000, to block the area and prevent the militants from breaking through in the direction of Makhketa - Kirov-Yurt - Elistanzhi - Selmentauzen - Vedeno.

In the early morning of February 28, the 6th company, the 3rd platoon of the 4th company and the reconnaissance platoon began a foot march. The vanguard - the 1st platoon of the 6th company and the reconnaissance platoon - reached the height of 776.0 by 16:00. But the dense fog forced the rest to stop the advance and spend the night on Mount Dembayirzy - they reached the height of 776.0 only at 11:20 on February 29. At 12:30, scouts noticed a detachment of two dozen militants, a battle ensued, and artillery fire was called. The militants pulled up more and more forces, tried to bypass the positions of the paratroopers, attacked in the forehead - to no avail. The battle subsided only in the dead of night on March 1, around 1:50. In the meantime, at 0:40 on March 1, the first company and a platoon of reconnaissance tried to break through to the aid of the sixth company, but by 04:00 they were forced to stop these attempts and return to Mount Dembayirzy. At about 3:00 from a height of 787.0, the 3rd platoon of the 4th company moved to help the paratroopers, by 3:40 they succeeded. Around 5:00 am, the militants resumed their attacks. In the end, the paratroopers called the artillery fire on themselves. At about 6:50, having lost up to 400 men, the attackers captured the hill.

How did this fight look from the other side? We have at our disposal the story of the GRU special forces officer Alexei Galkin, who was taken prisoner together with his colleague Vladimir Pakhomov and was at that time in one of the detachments breaking through to Ulus-Kert. Aleksey Galkin, by the way, is the prototype of the protagonist of the film "Personal Number", another Russian action movie "about Chechnya" ...

“I was constantly monitored. Two or three people were responsible for me, as, indeed, for Vladimir in another group. They didn’t move a single step. If the gang stopped somewhere for a long time, we were forced to hug a tree with our hands and put on handcuffs.

Near Ulus-Kert[apparently on the afternoon of February 29th] came under artillery fire. The field commander, who was responsible for me and Vladimir, was wounded by a shell explosion. The militants were most concerned about the health of their field commander and lost control over us. At night[on March 1] When they had to break through, Vladimir and I found the right moment to leave the path, take cover in a funnel. Maybe they tried to find us, but they didn't find us. <...>

In the funnel we found ourselves in the predawn twilight, and when we went in the opposite direction, the sun was already high. We moved towards Ulus-Kert along the same path trodden by bandits, but in the opposite direction. To be honest, I did not imagine how you can get to your own. Of course, we still had the same look - for six months we did not wash, do not cut our hair, do not shave. We were no different from the militants. To be honest, we were even afraid to go out to our own. They could have killed, mistaking them for militants.

On the way, we managed to get hold of weapons. We didn’t know how long we would have to go out to our own people, we just tried to survive. We needed warm clothes, food, weapons. We collected all this from the dead militants, whom we did not have time to bury.

When they made their way to Ulus-Kert, they met a group of militants. They were burying someone. We had nothing to lose, and we opened fire from the weapons that we picked up. During this skirmish, I was wounded. Shot in both hands...

On the second or third day of our journey, we noticed a fire and traces of our soldiers: cigarette butts, dry ration wrappers. So we realized that it was our fire, not the militants. And so that our own people would not shoot us, we found a stick, made a flag out of footcloths. Weapons, ammunition and everything that they picked up were piled in a secluded place. Vladimir stayed there, and I, with a bandaged hand and with this flag, went along the path. Our sentry called me, I explained everything to him, we were reported to our command."

It does not follow from this story that the militants were stopped near Ulus-Kert. Moreover, the battlefield was left behind them. After the bodies of the dead paratroopers were evacuated from the height of 776.0, at least three of these places were not controlled by the federal forces. Now the militants could bury their dead. And those who survived calmly marched east. They did not go to Dagestan, of course. But their main task was completed.

First, in two waves - on the night of January 31 and February 1 - they left the encircled Grozny in Alkhan-Kala, on the "mine trawl". The federal command belatedly tried to pursue them. Generals Kazantsev and Shamanov even declared their own initial failure and subsequent "situational design" as a cunning "Wolf Hunt" operation.

As a result, having suffered losses, the militants retreated to the mountains. Detachments totaling at least four thousand people concentrated in the valley of the Argun River, between Shatoi in the south and Duba-Yurt in the north. It was a new environment: instead of a city, mountains, but there was neither housing nor provisions.

A month later, the second breakthrough will begin: detachments under the general command of Khattab moved eastward, to Ulus-Kert, where, as a result of an eighteen-hour battle, they passed through the battle formations of the sixth company of the Pskov paratroopers. Four hundred people - huge losses on the Chechen scale. But the rest disappeared into the mountainous and wooded area of ​​Ichkeria - eastern Chechnya. Khattab, the "chegevara" of the "world Islamic revolution", ran for two more years through the mountains and forests - he was killed only in April 2002. And Basayev, who lost his leg in a minefield while leaving Grozny, is still somewhere in the Caucasus, commanding detachments not only in Chechnya, but also abroad. But filmmakers will not tell us about this either: a myth about the Chechen war is being built on the screens, in which we have long defeated everyone and everything ...

The Pskov paratroopers did everything they could. It was simply impossible for one company to hold this passage with such a balance of forces, at most - to die.

But why did it happen?

The fact is that the war has already been declared over several times. This has already been reported. And about "Hunting for wolves." And, just the day before, - about the fact that Shata is busy. And thousands of militants in the mountains, between Shatoi and Duba-Yurt, did not seem to exist. No, they "silently" knew about them - then they moved the sixth company to block possible escape routes. But for the public and for the authorities, it was as if they did not exist. Victory reports reigned on the plain, and just in time - just before the presidential elections. The authorities flew here to look at the victory. On the plain, the reality of the war lurking in the mountains was not felt.

There were, as it were, two worlds - the world of being and the world of due. In the second, the war had already been won. And quickly. Faster than in the first war. Then, from the introduction of troops in December 1994 to their stop in the mountains in June 1995, half a year passed. But even here, about the same amount has passed since the start of hostilities! Nevertheless, "now" there was another war - impetuous, victorious and without losses. And all this happened on the eve of the presidential elections, the triumph of which was predetermined by this smallest victorious war.

The gap between reality - a group of many thousands of tired, hungry, but retained controllability and morale of militants, hanging over a chain of units of the federal group stretched along the mountains - and the "truth of reports", in which these militants had already been defeated and destroyed more than once, could not but lead to such a tragedy. A lie, worked out for the most respectable public and the highest authorities, from some moment becomes "working material" and is used in decision-making.

In this case, it remained either to admit that the war was not over as long as the "Argun cauldron" existed, or to write a victory report with one hand, and try to prevent a breakthrough with the other.

This dilemma had to be solved by both the western and eastern factions. Only in the west, General Shamanov had already managed to report on a successful "hunt for wolves" and now he calmly laid a trap in a foothill village, where, as he assumed, the militants would go. Here the fighting will begin around March 5...

But in the east it was different. Mountainous wooded area. It is impossible to form a solid front or even control the flanks. At this time of the year, when due to fogs, the weather is most likely non-flying and not only air support is impossible, but sometimes even a foot march ...

The sixth company was doomed when it left for the mission. But after her death, the same people who sent the paratroopers to their death wrote in their headquarters that the task was completed and the militants were not allowed through. The tragedy at Ulus-Kert was hidden as much as possible, because the day of the presidential elections was approaching. Four years later, the memory of the dead was again used in the next presidential campaign.

And now the political marauders - the authorities in uniform and in civilian clothes - are talking about the dead in order to cover up their shame with someone else's glory.
(PR on the blood of paratroopers)

As you can see, opinions about what happened are different. Legends are created both by the official propagandists of the Russian Federation and from the Kavkaz Center. And the full truth, apparently, is no longer known: "The investigation is over, forget it" (c)

One thing is certain - 84 servicemen of the 6th and 4th companies, including 13 officers, were killed in this battle.
Eternal memory to them.

Forever in the memory of the inhabitants of Pskov, and indeed of all Russians who know their history, the feat of the Pskov paratroopers at the beginning of March 2000 will remain. Airborne Forces from Pskov. At such a price, the way was blocked for Chechen fighters who intended to break out of the Argun Gorge.

A total of 84 paratroopers were killed. Only six ordinary soldiers survived. It was according to their stories that it became possible to restore the course of events of that bloody drama. Here are the names of the survivors: Alexander Suponinsky, Andrei Porshnev, Evgeny Vladykin, Vadim Timoshenko, Roman Khristolyubov and Alexei Komarov.

How it was?

On February 29, 2000, Shatoi was finally taken, which allowed the federal command to interpret this as a signal of the final defeat of the "Chechen resistance".

President Putin listened to a report that "the tasks of the third stage of the North Caucasian operation have been completed." Gennady Troshev, who was then acting commander of the United Forces, noted that the full-scale military operation had come to an end, only a few local measures were to be taken to destroy the hiding "stolen militants."

By this time, the Itum-Kali-Shatili road had been cut by a tactical assault landing, as a result, several bandit formations in Chechnya fell into a strategic bag. The troops of the central task force methodically pushed the bandits back along the Argun Gorge to the north of the Georgian-Russian border.

According to intelligence, Khattab's militants were moving in a northeasterly direction towards Vedeno, where they had prepared mountain bases, warehouses and shelters. Khattab planned to capture a number of villages in the Vedensky district in order to secure a foothold for himself in order to make a breakthrough into Dagestan.

peaceful life

After demobilization, the paratroopers who survived in this terrible meat grinder gradually found themselves in a peaceful life.

Roman Khristolyubov, whose biography "in civilian life" is similar to many of his peers, considers himself a member of the middle class. He, like many, has his own apartment and car. He lives in the city of Kirov.

An eleven-year-old son named Yegor is growing up in his family. There is an interesting job. Roman Khristolubov is an executive director in one of the companies engaged in construction and finishing work.

Eighteen years ago, on February 29, 2000, in the Argun Gorge of Chechnya, the 6th company of the 104th regiment of the 76th Pskov airborne division entered into battle with the cutthroats Khattab, Basayev and Idris. This clash is known as the battle at Hill 776. The aspect ratio is one to twenty-seven, 90 paratroopers against 2,500 terrorists. As a result, 84 fighters died while doing their military duty. The oldest of them was 37 years old, the youngest was 18.

Night, fog

Second Chechen war. In February 2000, the militants were driven out of Grozny and surrounded in the Argun Gorge. They were bombed, causing great damage to manpower and equipment, the "shaitans" begged the "brothers" to buy out the corridor in order to leave for Dagestan. The media later reported that Khattab's group paid $500,000 to get out of the cauldron. This amount was heard during his conversation with Basayev, which was intercepted by Russian special services. According to Khattab, "These jackal-goblins were set up by the bosses to cover their tracks." Bandits called paratroopers goblins.

As journalist Vladimir Malyshev writes, it is not known for certain whether the accusations against the top commanders are true, but it has been established that on the route of the Khattab column along the road to Vedeno, all police checkpoints were removed and the militants did not at all expect to meet scouts of the 6th company.

The bandits contacted the battalion commander Mark Evtyukhin by radio: “There are a lot of us here, ten times more than you. Why are you in trouble, Commander? Night, fog - no one will notice, and we will pay very well. In response, a checkmate was heard, and the militants realized that there would be no deal. After that, the paratroopers covered the fire, hand-to-hand fights began. The attacks came in waves.

The soldiers were able to hold out for about 20 hours. Captain Viktor Romanov, who was left without legs due to a mine explosion, continued to correct artillery fire, and corporal Alexander Lebedev blew himself up along with the militants.

Fire on yourself

On the night of March 1, Major Alexander Dostavalov came to the aid of the paratroopers along with the third platoon of the 4th company. At the same time, Dostavalov arbitrarily left the defensive positions of the 4th company.

According to some reports, the paratroopers did not receive any other help (except for the support of regimental artillery), although the battalion commander asked for reinforcements more than once. Allegedly, soldiers from neighboring heights wanted to come to the rescue, but the command forbade this. Federal troops appeared on the battlefield only a day later.

Apparently, because of this, when on the morning of March 1, Evtyukhin called fire on himself, as his colleagues noted, he said: “You betrayed us, bitches.”

The militants who occupied the height finished off the wounded, shot in the face - because of this, difficulties arose with identification. The terrorists, according to witnesses, slowly laid down the bodies of the dead, placed Yevtyukhin's corpse on top, hung headphones around his neck and placed a walkie-talkie in front of him. This symbolized the fact that, despite the requests, no one came to help the paratroopers.

Andrei Lobanov, who carried out the task set on the afternoon of March 1 to come to the rescue of the 6th company, said: “The question constantly sat in my head: why was there no information that such a horde of militants was breaking through? Why was the 3rd battalion, which was nearby, withdrawn? If there had been timely intelligence, such huge losses could have been avoided. And our help could not change anything in that battle.

And then the smoke cleared

In total, six servicemen survived: sergeants Alexander Suponinsky and Andrey Porshnev, privates Alexei Komarov, Vadim Timoshenko, Roman Khristolyubov, Evgeny Vladykin. How many were killed among the militants is not exactly known. The maximum figure that was called was about 700 people.

Twenty-two paratroopers were awarded the title of Hero of Russia, 68 fighters were awarded the Order of Courage (almost all posthumously).

At first they decided to keep silent about their feat. On March 9, 2000, the military observers of Obshchaya Gazeta wrote: “Fragmentary information that<...>near the settlement of Ulus-Kert on the night of March 1, an entire company of the 104th regiment of the Pskov airborne division was killed in a battle with bandits, the media leaked. Yes, no one could tell about what happened there. Journalists were not allowed into the area for several days. And the soldiers themselves were ordered to keep quiet. Unless, on the 5th, Colonel-General Gennady Troshev finally allowed himself to admit: “The 6th paratrooper company, which was at the forefront of the bandits’ attack, lost 31 people killed, there are also wounded.” At the same time, the headquarters of the Airborne Forces knew that the data on losses were not true. There was an instruction not to disclose information about the events at the height of 776, the journalists point out.

They link this to the fact that the battle began just a few hours after Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev reported to the Russian leadership on the completion of the military phase of the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) in Chechnya, since there is no more organized resistance from the bandits.

Inevitable Punishment

The surviving terrorists still suffered punishment. Some were killed during the CTO. Others are captured and sentenced to long prison terms. Moreover, this crime has no statute of limitations. In January 2018, residents of the Stavropol Territory Arslan Valiev and Faizbek Amangaziyev received 15.5 and 16 years in a strict regime colony. As the investigation established, they conducted aimed fire at the paratroopers from Kalashnikov assault rifles.

Prior to this, Ayub Tuntuev, a resident of Chechnya, was sentenced to 24 years and 11 months in prison, and Maxim Ponaryin was given a life sentence.

Among the convicts is also a citizen of Ukraine - a member of the extremist organization UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia) Alexander Malofeev. He was sentenced to 24 years and six months in prison.

Two more suspects, Artur Ushaev and Ruslan Namatov, are to appear before the court.

The battle at height 776 is an episode of the second Chechen war, during which a large detachment of Chechen fighters (Khattab) on March 1, 2000 managed to break out of the encirclement through the positions of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the 76th (Pskov) airborne division (lieutenant colonel Mark Evtyukhin) near Argun in Chechnya, at the Ulus-Kert-Selmentauzen line, at an altitude of 776.

After the fall of Grozny (January 30), a large group of Chechen fighters retreated to the Shatoisky district of Chechnya, where on February 9 it was blocked by federal troops. Then, on February 22-29, a ground battle for Shata followed. The militants managed to break out of the encirclement. Ruslan Gelaev's group broke through in the north-western direction to the village of Komsomolskoye (Urus-Martan district), and Khattab's group - in the north-east direction through Ulus-Kert (Shatoi district), where the battle took place.

By decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 22 paratroopers were presented with the title of Hero of Russia (21 of them posthumously), 69 soldiers and officers of the 6th company were awarded the Order of Courage (63 of them posthumously).

On the afternoon of February 29, 2000, the federal command hurried to interpret the capture of Shatoi as a signal that the "Chechen resistance" had finally been broken. President Putin was reported "on the fulfillment of the tasks of the third stage" of the operation in the North Caucasus, and. about. Gennady Troshev, Commander of the United Forces, noted that for another two to three weeks, operations would be carried out to destroy the "escaped bandits", but the full-scale military operation was completed.

Colonel of the reserve Vladimir Vorobyov, a former paratrooper who went through Afghanistan (at one time he commanded the 104th “Cherekhinsk” regiment), will help us in the investigation. Father of Senior Lieutenant Alexei Vorobyov, who died near Ulus-Kert. Two years after the tragedy, he compiled a complete picture of what happened, which is somewhat at odds with the official version.

Gangs of Chechen warlords found themselves in a strategic bag. This happened after the landing of a tactical landing force, which, as if with a sharp knife, cut the Itum-Kale-Shatili mountain road, built by the slaves of "free Ichkeria". The operational group "Center" began to methodically shoot down the enemy, forcing him to retreat down the Argun Gorge: from the Russian-Georgian border to the north.

Intelligence reported: Khattab moved to the northeast, to the Vedeno region, where he had an extensive network of mountain bases, warehouses and shelters. He intended to capture Vedeno, the villages of Mekhkety, Elistanzhi and Kirov-Yurt and secure a springboard for a breakthrough into Dagestan. In the neighboring republic, the "mujahideen" planned to take a large number of civilians hostage and thereby force the federal authorities to negotiate.

Restoring the chronicle of those days, one must clearly understand: talking about “securely blocked gangs” is a bluff, an attempt to wishful thinking. The strategically important Argun Gorge is over 30 kilometers long. The units not trained in mountain warfare were unable to establish control over the branched and perfect mountain system unfamiliar to them. Even on the old map, you can count more than two dozen trails in this area. And how many of those that are not marked on any maps at all? To block each such path, you need to use the company. It turns out an impressive number. With the forces that were at hand, the federal command could not only destroy, but reliably block the gangs going to break through only on paper.

On the most dangerous, as it turned out later, direction, the command of the United Forces deployed fighters of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division. Meanwhile, Khattab chose a simple but effective tactic: after reconnaissance of the battles, he intended to find the weakest points, and then, leaning on his whole mass, escape from the gorge.

February 28 "mujahideen" went ahead. The paratroopers of the 3rd company, led by senior lieutenant Vasilyev, were the first to take the blow. They occupied the dominant heights five kilometers east of Ulus-Kert. Khattab's detachments unsuccessfully tried to break through a well-organized fire system and retreated, suffering significant losses.

The divisions of the 2nd battalion kept the dominant heights over the Sharoargun gorge under control. There was a passage between the channels of the Sharoargun and Abazulgol rivers. To rule out the possibility of militants "leaking" here, the commander of the 104th regiment ordered the commander of the 6th company, Major Sergei Molodov, to occupy another dominant height 4-5 kilometers from Ulus-Kert. And since the company commander was literally transferred to the unit the day before and did not have time to thoroughly understand the operational situation, to get acquainted with the personnel, the commander of the 2nd battalion Mark Evtyukhin secured him.

The paratroopers set off on their way still dark. They had to make a fifteen-kilometer forced march in a few hours to a given square, where they would set up a new base camp. We went with a full combat gear. They were armed only with small arms and grenade launchers. The prefix for the radio station, which provides covert radio exchange, was left at the base. They carried water, food, tents and potbelly stoves, without which it is simply impossible to survive in the mountains in winter. According to the calculations of Vladimir Vorobyov, the unit stretched for 5-6 kilometers, no more than a kilometer passed per hour. We also note that the paratroopers went to the heights immediately after a difficult throw along the Dombay-Arzy route, that is, without proper rest.

Helicopter assault was ruled out, since aerial reconnaissance did not find a single suitable site in the mountain forest. The paratroopers went to the limit of their physical strength - this is a fact that no one can dispute. From the analysis of the situation, the following conclusion suggests itself: the command was belated with the decision to transfer the 6th company to Ista-Kord, and the latter, having realized it, set obviously impossible deadlines.

Even before sunrise, the 6th company of the 104th Guards Airborne Regiment, reinforced by a platoon and two reconnaissance groups, was at the target - the interfluve of the Argun tributaries south of Ulus-Kert. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtukhin, led the actions of the paratroopers.

As it later became known, 90 paratroopers, on an isthmus of 200 meters, blocked the path of the 2,000-strong Khattab group. As far as one can judge, the bandits were the first to discover the enemy. This is evidenced by radio intercepts.

At that moment, the Mujahideen were moving in two detachments along the Sharoargun and Abazulgol rivers. Height 776.0, where our paratroopers took a breath after the hardest forced march, they decided to bypass from two sides.

Two reconnaissance groups, 30 people each, were moving ahead of both gangs, followed by two combat security detachments of 50 militants each. One of the head patrols was discovered by Senior Lieutenant Alexei Vorobyov with his scouts, which saved the 6th company from a surprise attack.

It was noon. The scouts found the militants at the foot of the height 776.0. Opponents were separated by tens of meters. In a matter of seconds, with the help of grenades, the vanguard of the bandits was destroyed. But dozens of Mujahideen poured in after him.

The scouts with the wounded on their shoulders retreated to the main forces, and the company had to take on the oncoming battle. While the scouts could hold back the onslaught of the bandits, the battalion commander decided to gain a foothold on this forested height of 776.0 and not give the bandits the opportunity to get out and the blocked gorge.

Before the start of the assault, the Khattab field commanders Idris and Abu Walid went on the radio to the battalion commander and suggested that Yevtukhin let the “mujahideen” through:

There are ten times more of us here. Think, commander, is it worth risking people? Night, fog - no one will notice ...

What the battalion commander answered is not difficult to imagine. After these "negotiations", the bandits unleashed a flurry of fire from mortars and grenade launchers on the positions of the paratroopers. By midnight, the battle reached its highest intensity. The guards did not flinch, although the enemy outnumbered them by more than 20 times. The bandits advanced to positions to throw grenades. In some areas, the paratroopers met in hand-to-hand combat. One of the first in the 6th company was killed by its commander Sergei Molodov - a sniper's bullet hit him in the neck.

The command could only support the company with artillery fire. The fire of the regimental gunners was corrected by the commander of the self-propelled battery, Captain Viktor Romanov. According to General Troshev, from noon on February 29 until the early morning of March 1, regimental gunners poured 1,200 shells into the Ista-Korda area. They did not use aviation, being afraid to hit their own. The bandits covered their flanks with water streams, which were on the right and left, which made it impossible to freely maneuver and provide effective assistance. The enemy set up ambushes and took up defense on the coast, preventing them from approaching the tributaries of the Argun. Several crossing attempts ended in failure. The 1st company of paratroopers, thrown to the rescue of dying comrades, was able to break through to a height of 776.0 only on the morning of March 2.

From three to five in the morning on March 1, there was a "respite" - there were no attacks, but mortars and snipers did not stop shelling. Battalion commander Mark Evtyukhin reported the situation to the regiment commander, Colonel Sergei Melentiev. He ordered to hold on, wait for help. After a few hours of battle, it became obvious that the 6th company simply did not have enough ammunition to hold back the continuous attacks of the militants. The battalion commander on the radio asked for help from his deputy major Alexander Dostovalov, who was one and a half kilometers from the dying company. He had fifteen men with him.

We like to say various beautiful phrases on any occasion, without particularly thinking about their meaning. The expression "heavy fire" also fell in love. So. Despite the heavy, without quotes, enemy fire, Alexander Dostovalov and a platoon of paratroopers by some miracle managed to get through to their comrades, who for the second hour held back the furious onslaught of the Khattab bandits. For the 6th company, this was a powerful emotional charge. The guys believed that they had not been abandoned, that they were remembered, that they would be helped.

... The platoon was enough for two hours of battle. At 5 o'clock Khattab launched two battalions of suicide bombers - "white angels" into the attack. They completely surrounded the height, cutting off part of the last platoon, which did not have time to rise to the height: it was shot practically in the back. In the company itself, ammunition was already collected from the dead and wounded.

The forces were unequal. Soldiers and officers perished one after another. Alexei Vorobyov's legs were broken by fragments of mines, one bullet hit his stomach, the other pierced his chest. But the officer did not leave the battle. It was he who destroyed Idris, a friend of Khattab, the "chief of intelligence."

On the night of March 1, at an altitude of 705.6, hand-to-hand combat took place, which took on a focal character. The snow at the top was mixed with blood. The paratroopers fought off the last attack with several machine guns. Battalion commander Mark Yevtukhin realized that the life of the company went to the minute. A little more, and the bandits on the corpses of the paratroopers will break out of the gorge. And then he turned to Captain Viktor Romanov. That one, bleeding, with the stumps of legs tied with tourniquets, lay nearby - on the company command post.

- Come on, let's call fire on ourselves!

Already losing consciousness, Romanov handed over the coordinates to the battery. At 6:10 a.m., communication with Lieutenant Colonel Yevtukhin was cut off. The battalion commander fired back to the last bullet and was hit by a sniper's bullet in the head.

On the morning of March 2, the 1st company entered Ista-Kord. When the paratroopers pushed back the militants from a height of 705.6, a terrible picture opened up before them: perennial beeches, "trimmed" by shells and mines, and everywhere - corpses, corpses of "mujahideen". Four hundred people. In the company stronghold - the bodies of 13 Russian officers and 73 sergeants and privates.

Following the “bloody trails”, Udugov posted eight photos of the killed paratroopers on the Kavkaz-Center website. The photographs do not show that many of the bodies were cut into pieces. "Fighters for the Faith" cracked down on any paratroopers in whom life was still glimmering. This was told by those who miraculously managed to survive.

Senior Sergeant Alexander Suponinsky, on the orders of the commander, jumped into a deep ravine. Private Andrei Porshnev jumped next. About 50 militants fired at them from machine guns for half an hour. After waiting, the wounded paratroopers, first crawling, and then full-length, began to leave. The boys miraculously survived.

“There were five of us, the last ones,” Andrei Porshnev later recalled, “battalion commander Yevtyukhin, deputy battalion commander Dostavalov and senior lieutenant Kozhemyakin. Officers. Well, Sasha and I. Evtyukhin and Dostavalov were killed, while Kozhemyakin's both legs were broken, and he tossed cartridges at us with his hands. The militants came close to us, there were about three meters left, and Kozhemyakin ordered us: leave, jump down ... For that fight, Alexander Suponinsky received the star of the Hero of Russia.

On the table of the commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Gennady Shpak, a list of the dead paratroopers lay down. All the circumstances of this fierce battle were reported in the smallest details. Shpak made a report to the Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeev, but in response he received an instruction: data on events near Ulus-Kert should be banned until a separate order for disclosure.

It just so happened that it was on February 29 that Marshal Sergeev reported to Vladimir Putin about the successful completion of the tasks of the “third stage”. Only a few hours passed and - a powerful group of militants hit the positions of the federal troops. What happened near Ulus-Kert did not correlate in any way with the victorious reports about the imminent and final defeat of the militants. And the comrade marshal, probably, felt embarrassed for his last report. In order to somehow smooth out the embarrassment, the military was ordered to keep quiet. Only Gennady Troshev on March 5 dared to tell part of the truth: "The 6th parachute company, which was at the forefront of the attack of the bandits, lost 31 people killed, there are wounded."

In the same days, the country was experiencing another tragedy, which was reported by all television channels of the country - 20 OMON fighters from Sergiev Posad were killed in Chechnya. The military command was afraid to announce the riot police and the paratroopers at the same time. Losses were too great...

Ulus-Kert has become one of the symbols of modern Russian history. How many years have they tried to eradicate the Russian military spirit from us - it did not work out. For years the army has been portrayed as a bunch of drunkards, degenerates and sadists, and the paratroopers, living and dead, have silenced the critics. It was a real feat, on which it is impossible to cast a shadow. Although such attempts have taken place. As well as after the release of the hostages on Dubrovka by the fighters of Alfa and Vympel, an operation in which the FSB special forces could die under the ruins of the Theater Complex. From Ulus-Kert there is a road to Dubrovka. In both cases, Russian soldiers and officers, bearers of our age-old traditions, stood in the way of mercenaries and terrorists.

Pavel Evdokimov. Russian special forces, 2002

Once upon a time I In short, it was necessary to block a certain height (gorge) in the second Chechen one. A company of paratroopers was sent there, who stumbled upon the militants and after many hours of fighting, they all died.

And then recently I came across a slightly different version of the development of events: the 6th company: the story of a tragedy (copied text under the cut)

The truth is, however strange it is in the middle, or rather everywhere - the crap command was at all levels. Well, the soldiers distinguished themselves.

The official version describes the start of the battle at 12.30, when the scouts collided at the foot of Mount Istykort with a small detachment of the enemy.

The beginning of the battle happened a little earlier than it should be considered - around 10.30. Then the forward detachments of spirits came out to the blocks of the 3rd company of Captain Vasiliev (marks 666.0 and 574.9.). Vasiliev had everything ready for the "meeting" - full-profile trenches, minefields, a lined-up fire system and artillery binding in the area.
The spirits went out to Vasiliev on the radio and called him by name (!) Offered money for unhindered passage. However, they were refused. Following this, the assault began. Proofreader Art. Lieutenant Zolotov called in artillery fire. During a short clash, the militants retreated after suffering losses.
Then, again going out to Vasiliev, they offered to disperse for good, otherwise the units allegedly "waited for death." Vasiliev again refused. Even 2 snipers of the 3rd company, originally from Dagestan, took part in the "conversation", who told the militants that "Russians do not surrender!"
The militants never went on the attack again. In front of the positions of the blocks, the soldiers of the 3rd company found the bodies of 4 dead militants.

Around the same time, at 12.30, at the foot of Mount Istykort, a reconnaissance patrol under the command of Vorobyov, at the edge of the forest, discovers several militants. According to some reports, the militants were sitting at a halt by the fire.

I wonder what will happen in 2 years.

Shortly before the re-election of Vladimir Putin in Russia, the 12th anniversary of the military tragedy in the Argun Gorge, where Chechen fighters killed the 6th company of the 104th regiment of the Pskov airborne division, passed little noticed. The senseless death of soldiers was renamed into a feat and the topic was closed on this.

Until now, in our country there is no serious study on this tragedy, which would be publicly open. Therefore, information, often contradictory, has to be collected from open sources, the media, statements by officials, as well as blogs of enthusiasts who have tried to bring together the entire array of confirmed and unconfirmed information about the battle at height 776 at the Ulus-Kert-Selmentauzen line in the Argun Gorge on February 29 - March 1, 2000.

Then, at the end of February, the federal troops were completing the operation to capture the city of Shatoy, and all attention was focused on this theater of operations. By the end of February, the defeat of the militants near Shatoi became obvious, their detachments began to leave the outskirts of the city. Part of the militants led by Ruslan Gelaev left in a northwestern direction and reached the village of Komsomolskoye, where in March they fought fierce battles with federal Russian troops, and several detachments, presumably under the command of Khattab, left in the direction of Vedeno to the east and southeast. Their path just ran through the line Ulus-Kert - Selmentauzen.

In order to prevent the militants from leaving for the Vedeno region, the Russian military command is transferring a grouping there from the forces of the 76th Pskov airborne and 7th airborne divisions. The command post of the first was stationed in the village of Makhety. The soldiers of the Pskov division were supposed to hold the line of Selmentauzen - Makhkety - Tevzana (Kirov-Yurt), blocking the area east of the Abazulgol River, to prevent the militants from breaking through to the east (direction Khatuni-Agishty-Vedeno). Logically, militants from Ulus-Kert could break through here.

From the south and south-west, units of the 1st airborne battalion of the Pskov division, whose command post was moved to Mount Dembairzy (west of Makheta), were supposed to support units of the 7th airborne division of the Novorossiysk division. They blocked the interfluve of the Sharoargun and Abazulgol and blocked the militants from passing through the Sharoargun gorge and the Dargenduk ridge. On this ridge, company strongholds were to be equipped, and part of the soldiers were to take positions east of Ulus-Kert on the heights by February 27. However, the helicopter assault landing on Dargenduk on February 24 turned out to be unsuccessful - due to frost and snowstorms, several dozen soldiers received frostbite, and two fighters even froze to death. As a result, by February 28, the units of the 7th division failed to complete the task.

Here we must make a digression. Immediately after the tragedy of the 6th company, allegations appeared in the Russian media that up to 2.5 thousand militants took part in the battle for height 776, and up to 500-600 died. It is not clear what these data are based on, according to the information of the separatists themselves, there were supposedly only 70 of them, which suggests an underestimation of the number. According to enthusiastic researchers, the maximum number of militants was about 400-600 people, but not all of them took part in the battle.

Meanwhile, the command of the Pskov division and the 1st battalion of the 104th regiment did not have operational information and could not even imagine how many militants would resist them. Special reconnaissance units were generally transferred to the zone of operations of the 7th division. The group of Russian troops in Chechnya had, to put it mildly, few means of aerial or space reconnaissance, and the information received from them hung in the headquarters for a long time. Therefore, the 1st battalion of the Pskov division, which began on February 24 to create company posts on the heights between Selmentauzen and Ulus-Kert, acted almost blindly. We also recall that at that time a command circular was in force, prohibiting reconnaissance operations by companies and battalions outside the range of artillery. The ill-fated height 776 was located at a distance of more than 8.5 kilometers from the artillery positions of the 76th division - just at the limit of the range of the Nona installations.

On February 26, two platoons of the 3rd company of the 1st battalion created a stronghold on the left bank of the Abazulgol. The soldiers dug trenches, and also set up minefields and established contact with divisional artillery.

Then the strangeness begins. On February 26, the command ordered the 76th division to block Ulus-Kert from the east, and initially for these purposes, including the occupation of heights 776 and Ista-Kort, the companies of the 1st battalion of the 104th regiment were intended, as the most trained. In particular, the 1st company of the 1st battalion, reinforced by platoons of the 2nd company, fire support platoons and scouts, was to occupy Hill 776 (and a few more nearby). On the morning of February 27, the plan changes: these units are transferred north of Selmentauzen, and the task of occupying height 776 falls on the 2nd battalion of the 104th regiment, commanded by Major Mark Evtyukhin.

Evtyukhin decided to use the most trained unit of the battalion for this task - the 4th company with added reinforcement (sapper squad, machine gun crew, reconnaissance platoon) and a platoon of the 6th company. The soldiers of these units served at checkpoints in the Vedeno district and had to get to the battalion command post in their armored vehicles and vehicles, from where they would go on foot to occupy the indicated positions. On February 27, it suddenly turned out that out of 10 cars of the 4th company, only three started up! As a result, the battalion commander had to change the plan on the move and make a decision to advance to the height of 776 and the surrounding positions of the 6th company, which was given one platoon from the 4th company.

It is noteworthy that the 6th company was also located at a distance from the gorge of the Abazulgol River - its soldiers served at checkpoints near the village of Elistanzhi near Vedeno. On February 28, in the morning, the company arrived at the regimental command post near Makheta, and then the entire group under the command of Mark Evtyukhin and Major Dostavalov, who, by the way, developed the route of movement, advanced on foot on a mission. The first important point was the command observation post of the 1st battalion of the 104th regiment on Mount Dembairzy. Here, oddities also did not leave the detachment - one of the two aircraft controllers did not have time to join it.

Stretching for more than a kilometer, the column of paratroopers went along muddy mountain roads. The layout for each fighter reached up to 40-50 kilograms - in addition to weapons and ammunition, they had to carry food, tents and potbelly stoves. The speed of movement of the unit was less than 1 kilometer per hour. Therefore, the soldiers of the 6th company finally reached the command post of the 1st battalion of the 104th regiment only by 19:30 on February 28.

According to Yevtyukhin's plan, his unit, first, under the cover of company posts of the 1st battalion on the right bank of the Abazulgol River, crosses it and occupies Hill 776, and with one platoon is fixed on the neighboring Hill 787.

On the morning of February 29, the 6th company resumed its march along the mountain paths. Loaded soldiers of platoons after crossing the river stretched for more than a kilometer. At the same time, the scouts walking in the head of the column reached height 776 already at 10 o'clock in the morning, waited for the arrival of the 3rd platoon of the 4th company following them and left for height 787, where this platoon was supposed to go. Behind them, exhausted soldiers of the 1st, 2nd platoons of the 6th company, a control platoon and machine gunners gradually crawled up to the height. The 3rd platoon of the 6th company, we note specifically, never reached the height - when the battle with the militants began (about 16 hours for height 776), it was destroyed on the slope of the height. According to another version, the battle began already in the evening, when the fighters at the height managed to eat and some even fell asleep, and the soldiers of the 3rd platoon were just climbing it.

In the meantime, the scouts advanced even further to the height of Ista-Kord, where they ran into militants and with a fight retreated back to height 776. And then the company, which did not really gain a foothold on the height, was forced to immediately join the battle. The company did not receive support from attack helicopters (due to the death of the only aircraft controller), the artillery shelling was not accurate. As a result, by the morning of March 1, the entire company was destroyed, and the attempts of the soldiers of the 1st company of the 1st battalion to break through to her aid were unsuccessful. According to one of the alternative versions, the remnants of the soldiers of the 6th company died due to the artillery strike of their own artillery.

Whatever it was, there are several versions about this battle and its outcome. The result, however, is the same - the company was destroyed, 84 people died, only six servicemen survived. Only on March 3 did Russian troops manage to break through to the ill-fated height. But Russian propagandists managed to immediately make a feat according to Soviet patterns out of the tragedy: already on March 4, information appeared in the press about 2.5 and even 3 thousand militants, stabbed and storming heights in close ranks, and also that the Chechens lost up to 350-500 Human.

If you believe the Russian media, the Chechens managed to either bury all their numerous fallen or take them away with them, while managing to simultaneously fight with paratroopers from the 1st battalion, breaking through to height 776. According to other sources, as many as 400 corpses of militants. True, no photo or video with so many destroyed Chechen separatists has ever been seen.

In general, such a version - about the feat of the 6th company, which detained a gigantic detachment of militants and died heroically, completely suited the then Russian authorities. The heroes were honored, a memorial was built, and the question of the quality of command in the Russian army was hidden behind the shadow of a soldier's feat. Moreover, in 2000 there was an election campaign to appoint Vladimir Putin as the second resident of Russia, and at the end of February the generals reported after the capture of Shatoi about the end of the war in Chechnya.

Battle scheme

However, there are still some questions and we will present some.

1. Why was no aerial reconnaissance of the vicinity of the Ista-Kort and 776 heights carried out before the advancement of the 6th company? A detachment of 2.5-3 thousand militants is very difficult not to notice even in the mountains (assuming, of course, that there were just so many of them).

2. Why the paratroopers were not supported by aviation and attack helicopters (some sources claim that there was thick fog, another that it was sunny, and still others that the air strike was canceled due to the death of the air controller, and fourth that they were afraid to hit their own, however at the same time, according to Gennady Troshev, allegedly 1200 artillery shells were poured onto the height).

There are a lot of such questions (up to the point where there are numerous craters from shells and hundreds of corpses of militants), but it is already impossible to answer them - all the officers of the 6th company died. In all likelihood, the main reason for the death of the company was the bad and weak management of the command, the lack of intelligence, its general unpreparedness for battle.

Photos and maps, as well as a number of information, will be gleaned from the blog of enthusiasts exploring the history of the last battle of the 6th company.