Points of view on industrialization in the USSR. Industrialization policy

After the civil war, the Russian economy, to use modern “Obama” language, “was torn to shreds.” Truly torn and ruined. And the NEP only somewhat stabilized the problem of providing the country's population with food and consumer goods, but it caused a sharp increase in class contradictions in the countryside due to the growth in the number of kulaks and aggravated the class struggle in the countryside to open kulak uprisings.

Therefore, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) party set a course for the development of the country’s industrial production in order to gain the opportunity to independently solve the national economic problems facing Russia, which had been destroyed by many years of war. Moreover, an accelerated solution. That is, the party set a course for the industrialization of the country.

Stalin said:
« We are 50-100 years behind advanced countries. We must cover this distance in ten years. Either we do this or we will be crushed. This is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the USSR dictate to us.”

Industrialization is the socio-economic policy of the Bolshevik Party in the USSR, from 1927 to the end of the 30s, the main goals of which were the following:

1. Elimination of the technical and economic backwardness of the country;

2 . Achieving economic independence;

3. Creation of a powerful defense industry;

4. Priority development of a complex of basic industries: defense, fuel, energy, metallurgical, machine-building.

What paths of industrialization existed by that time and which ones were chosen by the Bolsheviks?

From statements Stalin regarding industrialization:

1. “History knows different ways of industrialization.
England industrialized due to the fact that it plundered the colony for tens and hundreds of years, collected “additional” capital there, invested it in its industry and accelerated the pace of its industrialization. This is one way of industrialization.

Germany accelerated its industrialization as a result of the victorious war with France in the 70s of the last century, when it took five billion francs in indemnity from the French and poured them into its industry. This is the second way of industrialization.

Both of these methods are closed to us, because we are a country of Soviets, because colonial robberies and military seizures for the purpose of robbery are incompatible with nature Soviet power.

Russia, old Russia handed out enslaving concessions and received enslaving loans, thus trying to gradually get out onto the path of industrialization. It's there third way. But this is the path of bondage or semi-bondage, the path of turning Russia into a semi-colony. This path is also closed to us, because we did not wage a three-year civil war, repelling any and all interventionists, so that later, after defeating the interventionists, we would voluntarily go into bondage with the imperialists.

There is a fourth way left industrialization, the path of one’s own savings for the cause of industry, the path of socialist accumulation, which Comrade repeatedly pointed out. Lenin, as the only way to industrialize our country.
(“On the economic situation and policy of the party” vol. 8 p. 123.)

2. “What does it mean to industrialize our country? This means turning an agricultural country into an industrial country. This means placing and developing our industry on a new technical basis.

Nowhere else in the world has it happened that a huge backward agrarian country has turned into an industrial country without robbing colonies, without robbing foreign countries, or without large loans and long-term credits from outside. Remember the history of industrial development in England, Germany, America, and you will understand that this is exactly the case. Even America, the most powerful of all capitalist countries, was forced to spend 30-40 years after the civil war in order to develop its industry through loans and long-term credits from outside and the plunder of neighboring states and islands.

Can we take this “tested” path? No, we cannot, because the nature of Soviet power does not tolerate colonial plunder, and there is no reason to count on large loans and long-term credits.

Old Russia, Tsarist Russia, went to industrialization in a different way - by concluding enslaving loans and issuing enslaving concessions to the main branches of our industry. You know that almost the entire Donbass, more than half of the St. Petersburg industry, Baku oil and a number of railways, not to mention the electrical industry, were in the hands of foreign capitalists. This was the path of industrialization at the expense of the peoples of the USSR and against the interests of the working class. It is clear that we cannot take this path: it was not for this that we fought the yoke of capitalism, it was not for this that we overthrew capitalism in order to then voluntarily go under the yoke of capitalism.

There is only one path left, the path of one’s own savings, the path of saving, the path of prudent management in order to accumulate the necessary funds for the industrialization of our country. There are no words, this task is difficult. But, despite the difficulties, we are already resolving it. Yes, comrades, four years after the civil war we are already solving this problem.
(“Speech at a meeting of workers of the Stalin railway workshops of the October road” vol. 9 p. 172.)

3. “There are a number of accumulation channels, of which at least the main ones should be noted.

Firstly. It is necessary that the surplus accumulation in the country is not dissipated, but collected in our credit institutions, cooperative and state, as well as through internal loans, in order to use them for the needs, first of all, of industry. It is clear that investors should receive a certain percentage for this. It cannot be said that in this area things are at all satisfactory for us. But the task of improving our credit network, the task of raising the authority of credit institutions in the eyes of the population, the task of organizing the business of internal loans undoubtedly faces us as the next task, and we must solve it at all costs.

Secondly. It is necessary to carefully close all those paths and cracks through which part of the country's surplus accumulation flows into the pockets of private capital to the detriment of socialist accumulation. To do this, it is necessary to pursue a pricing policy that would not create a gap between wholesale prices and retail prices. It is necessary to take all measures to reduce retail prices for industrial and agricultural products in order to stop or at least minimize the leakage of surplus savings into the pockets of private traders. This is one of the most important issues of our economic policy. From here comes one of the serious dangers both for the cause of our accumulation and for the chervonets.

Thirdly. It is necessary that within the industry itself, in each of its branches, certain reserves should be set aside for the purpose of depreciation of enterprises, for the purpose of their expansion, for the purpose of their further development. This matter is necessary, absolutely necessary, it must be moved forward at all costs.

Fourthly. It is necessary that certain reserves accumulate in the hands of the state, necessary to insure the country against all kinds of accidents (shortfalls), to feed industry, to support agriculture, to develop culture, etc. It is now impossible to live and work without reserves. Even a peasant with his small farm cannot now manage without certain supplies. Moreover, the state of a great country cannot do without reserves.
(“On the economic situation and policy of the party” vol. 8 p. 126.)

Funds for industrialization:
Where did the Bolsheviks get funds for industrialization?

1. Funds were withdrawn from agriculture and light industry;

2. Funds came from the sale of raw materials (Oil, gold, timber, grain, etc.);

3. Some treasures of museums and churches were sold;

4. The private sector was taxed up to the complete confiscation of property.

5. By reducing the standard of living of the population, due to rising prices, the introduction of a card distribution system, individual government loans, etc.

6. Through the enthusiasm of workers building for themselves new world without exploitation of man by man.

7. Through powerful propaganda and agitation of new forms and new, collectivist methods of labor organization.

8. By organizing the advanced Stakhanov movement both in industrial production and in agriculture.

9. By introducing state awards for labor achievements.

10. Through the development of a system of free social benefits and state guarantees for working people: free education and free medicine for all groups of the population, free nurseries, kindergartens, pioneer camps, sanatoriums, and so on and so forth.
*

And again the words Stalin regarding the foundations of industrialization in the USSR:

“So, is it possible to industrialize our country on the basis of socialist accumulation?
Do we have sources of such accumulation sufficient to ensure industrialization?
Yes, it's possible. Yes, we have such sources.

I could refer to such a fact as the expropriation of landowners and capitalists in our country as a result of October Revolution, the destruction of private ownership of land, factories, factories, etc. and their transfer to public ownership. It hardly needs proof that this fact represents a fairly substantial source of accumulation.

I could further refer to such a fact as the cancellation of the tsarist debts, which removed billions of rubles of debt from the shoulders of our national economy. We should not forget that in leaving these debts we had to pay annually several hundred million in interest alone, to the detriment of industry, to the detriment of our entire national economy. Needless to say, this circumstance brought great relief to our accumulation.

I could point to our nationalized industry, which has recovered, which is developing and which provides some profits necessary for the further development of industry. This is also a source of accumulation.

I could point to our nationalized foreign trade, which provides some profit and therefore represents a certain source of accumulation.

One could refer to our more or less organized state internal trade, which also produces a certain profit and thus represents a certain source of accumulation.

One could point to such a lever of accumulation as our nationalized banking system, which gives a certain profit and feeds our industry to the best of our ability.

Finally, we have such a weapon as state power, which manages the state budget and which collects a small amount of money for the further development of the national economy in general, our industry in particular.

These are basically the main sources of our internal accumulation.
They are interesting in the sense that they give us the opportunity to create those necessary reserves, without which the industrialization of our country is impossible.”
(“On the economic situation and policy of the party” vol. 8 p. 124.)

For, according to Stalin, the rapid pace of development of industry in general and the production of means of production in particular represents the main beginning and key of the country's industrial development, the main beginning and key of the transformation of our entire national economy on the basis of advanced socialist development.

At the same time, we cannot and should not curtail heavy industry for the sake of the comprehensive development of light industry. And light industry cannot be developed sufficiently without the accelerated development of heavy industry.
(“XV Congress of the CPSU(b)” vol. 10 p. 310.)

The result of industrialization was:

1. Creation of a powerful industry in the country;
From 1927 to 1937, over 7 thousand large industrial enterprises were built in the USSR;

2. The USSR took 2nd place in the world in terms of industrial production after the USA;

3. The USSR created its own powerful defense industry, new to Russia;

4. In the USSR, on the basis of powerful industrial production, industrial science also began to develop powerfully, determining the technical level of technologies developed and used in industrial production;

5. The USSR became the birthplace of technical astronautics, creating in the country a new, global industry of production, space, significantly ahead of the United States in this direction.

The results of the industrialization of the USSR turned out to be stunning not only for the inhabitants of the USSR, but also for the whole world. After all, former Tsarist Russia in an unusually short time became a powerful, industrially and scientifically developed country, a power of global importance.

As you can see, Stalin turned out to be right in making from a completely collapsed Russia, from Russia plows and bast shoes, an advanced industrial power with the shortest working day in the world, the best in the world free education, advanced science, free medicine, national culture and a powerful social guarantee of the rights of the country's workers

However, in today's Russia, everything is done differently from how Stalin did it in the USSR, and we have a Russia with barely glimmering industrial production, completely collapsed agriculture, dead science, a poor population barely making ends meet, but with countless billionaires of its own.

So who was right in choosing the path of Russia's development, the Bolsheviks or the current democrats? In my opinion, the Bolsheviks! After all, not a single word of Stalin about the industrialization of Russia is still outdated.

V. Ovchinnikov

By the end of the 1930s. The USSR became one of the few countries capable of producing any type of industrial product available to humanity at that time. The country truly gained economic independence and independence. Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 was largely due to a more powerful industrial base than Germany and the whole of Europe. This base was created in the USSR under the leadership of Comrade Stalin during the first five-year plans.

Industrialization is the creation and development of large industry, primarily heavy industry, the transformation of the entire national economy on the basis of large-scale industrial production. Industrialization is not a stage unique to socialist construction. It is a prerequisite for the modernization of the country. However, by the mid-1920s, it became necessary for the USSR for a number of reasons.

Firstly, by 1925 The recovery period has ended. The Soviet economy, in terms of its main indicators, has reached pre-war levels. In order to ensure the growth of industrial production, it was necessary not so much to re-equip existing factories as to build new modern enterprises.

Secondly, it was necessary to decide more rationally problems of locating the country's economic potential. In the Central Industrial Region, which occupied only 3% of Russia's territories, 30% of industrial production and 40% of the working class were concentrated. The country still remained agrarian and peasant. The village was overpopulated. Unemployment grew in cities, which increased social tension.

Thirdly, the incentive to speed up industrialization was economic and political isolation of the country in the international arena. Being in a hostile capitalist environment, the USSR was under constant threat of war. The agricultural country had no chance to survive in the event of a military clash with industrialized powers.

The decision to begin industrialization was made at the XIV Congress of the CPSU(b) in December 1925. Actually, industrialization was discussed at the congress only in general outline. Here the main task of industrialization was formulated: to ensure the economic independence of the USSR, to transform it from a country importing equipment and machinery into a country producing them. Issues of the pace, sources and methods of its implementation were not considered at the congress. After the congress, heated debates broke out on these issues. Two points of view emerged: the left, led by L.D. Trotsky demanded “super-industrialization” at the expense of the peasantry, and the right, led by N.I. Bukharin advocated softer reforms and the development of a market economy.

The sources of industrialization were named at the April (1926) Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: income from state enterprises, internal loans from the population, strict economy and frugality in production, socialist competition. Supporters of “super-industrialization” according to Trotsky were subjected to severe criticism from the Stalinist leadership.

Solving such a complex problem was impossible without switching to long-term planning. In December 1927, the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) adopted directives for the preparation of the first five-year plan. The decisions of the congress emphasized the need for balanced development of all sectors of the national economy, maintaining proportionality between accumulation and consumption.

At the suggestion of G.M. Krzhizhanovsky (chairman of the State Planning Committee), two versions of the five-year plan were developed - the starting (minimum) and optimal. The optimal numbers were approximately 20% higher than the starting one. The optimal plan option was taken as the basis. When assessing the first five-year plan, historians unanimously note the balance of its tasks, which, despite their scale, were quite realistic for implementation. The plan provided for an increase in industrial production by 180%, agricultural production by 55%. National income was planned to increase by 103%. Labor productivity in industry was supposed to increase by 110%, real wages by 71%, and peasant incomes by 67%. During the years of the first five-year plan (1927/28 - 1932/33), it was planned to build 1,500 industrial enterprises, mainly in heavy industry. Among them are such giants as the Dneproges, Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants, the Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk tractor plants, the Turkestan-Siberian Railway (Turksib), etc.

Already in 1929, the country's leadership began to call for speeding up the pace of industrialization. Stalin puts forward the slogan “Five-Year Plan in Four Years!” Planned targets are revised upward. The country was obliged to produce twice as much as initially planned in non-ferrous and ferrous metals, cast iron, cars, agricultural machinery, etc. In a number of industries (coal and oil mining), the growth rate was even higher. The November Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1929 approved new target figures for the five-year plan. The course is set for a “great leap”. This was partly due to the desire of a significant part of the workers to put an end to acute socio-economic problems and ensure the victory of socialism in the USSR through the revolutionary methods of the “Red Guard attack”. It should be recalled that by the end of the 1920s, the generation that grew up during the revolution and civil war came to production. Revolutionary methods and rhetoric were close and understandable to him. The conviction of the Bolshevik-Stalinists that in economics it is possible to act in the same way as in politics played a role - to organize and inspire the masses with lofty ideas and throw them into a decisive battle for the implementation of bright ideals. And so it happened.

When talking about the reasons for overestimating the first five-year plan targets, one should also keep in mind foreign policy aspects. At the end of the 1920s, the countries of the capitalist world, after stabilization, experienced a severe crisis. The imperialist countries are preparing for a new major war. In these conditions, the Kremlin believed that an industrial breakthrough was needed. I.V. Stalin said that in these conditions “...to slow down the pace means to fall behind... We are 50 to 100 years behind the advanced countries. We must cover this distance in ten years. Either we do this or we will be crushed.”

The Trotskyists and other saboteurs, expelled from power, sabotage industrialization so that the USSR would fall behind technically before the war and, on the crest of a wave of future war defeats, the Trotskyists could return to power. In 1928, a trial was held in the so-called “Shakhtinsky case”, organized on the eve of the adoption of the five-year plan, the meaning of which was, firstly, to exclude the Trotskyist element from production, and secondly, to show doubting workers the inadmissibility of skepticism regarding figures five-year plans. In 1928-1929 A broad campaign was launched against “bourgeois pest specialists.” Under the pretext of belonging to “alien classes,” they were removed from their positions or even deprived of civil rights and repressed. At the same time, the creation of a “new technical intelligentsia” from workers and peasants took place. Lacking sufficient experience and knowledge, these engineers supported the radical changes brought about by industrialization because they benefited most from them.

The country was literally gripped by industrial fever. Manufacturing giants were built, cities arose (for example, Komsomolsk-on-Amur). In the east of the country, a new coal and metallurgical base has grown - the Ural-Kuzbass with the main centers in Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk. Entire industries appeared that did not exist in pre-revolutionary Russia: aviation, tractor, electrical, chemical industries, etc. The USSR was truly turning into a country that not only imported, but also produced equipment.

The implementation of industrialization revealed a number of problems. Firstly, it became obvious that it was impossible to carry out large-scale industrial construction using the planned sources. At the beginning of the 1930s, the rate of industrial development began to fall: in 1933 it amounted to 5% versus 23.7% in 1928-1929. Lack of funds led to the “freezing” of almost a quarter of enterprises under construction. There was a shortage of building materials, and transport could not cope with the increased volume of traffic. Socialist enterprises, due to outdated equipment and poor labor organization, produced small profits. The standard of living of the population was low, so domestic loans were not so effective. Low level new working intelligentsia, the constant expansion of the working class at the expense of low-skilled peasant youth did not allow increasing labor productivity and reducing production costs. There was a catastrophic shortage of funds.

Trotskyists believed that industrialization should be carried out at the expense of the peasantry. Although in 1927 Trotskyism was ideologically and organizationally defeated, this point of view was still preserved. In 1928, the Trotskyists organized an attack on the peasants, demanded the confiscation of grain from them, and to make this easier, drive them into collective farms, i.e. carry out collectivization of agriculture in a short time.

In the conditions of the “great crisis,” Western countries began vying to offer the USSR favorable conditions buy equipment from them. Large-scale import of equipment was not included in the five-year plan, but the country's leadership did not want to miss the opportunity. In 1931, Soviet purchases amounted to a third of world exports of machinery and equipment, and in 1932 - half. The state received funds for the purchase of equipment from the sale of bread. Agriculture is becoming the main source through which it was possible to carry out technical re-equipment of industry. To obtain additional funds, the government began issuing loans, implemented issue of money, which caused a sharp increase in inflation.

In search of funds, the state goes to extreme measures. In 1927, Prohibition was repealed and wide sale of alcohol. The source of obtaining currency for the purchase of equipment becomes sale of art treasures abroad from the largest museums of the USSR (Hermitage, Kremlin, Tretyakov Gallery etc.) At this time, the creations of the greatest artists and jewelers, the rarest collections, were exported from the USSR ancient manuscripts, books and weapons. This measure was justified because it allowed the creation of a defense industry. Otherwise, having lost the impending war, our Motherland would have lost not part of its cultural values, but all of them.

The shortage of funds worsened unprofitability of enterprises. Initially, it was meant that the purchased equipment would make a profit in a year or two. However, the lack of qualified personnel, poor labor organization and low discipline did not allow these plans to be realized. The equipment was idle and deteriorating. The percentage of defects was high: at some enterprises in Moscow it reached 65%. It is no coincidence that in the second five-year plan the slogan “Personnel who have mastered technology decides everything!” appears.

The transfer of funds for the creation of heavy industry led to the emergence of serious imbalances in the national economy: Light industry almost did not develop. In addition, the heaviest industry was dominated by enterprises related to military production.

Industrial development of new areas required not only large investments, but also increasing labor resources. During the years of industrialization, this problem was solved in several ways. Firstly, through Komsomol and youth calls for volunteers for five-year construction projects; secondly, through wage supplements and the provision of various benefits to persons working in difficult conditions.

Intensive industrial construction has led to sharp increase in urban population. The number of the working class during the years of the first five-year plans increased from 9 to 24 million people. And this, in turn, aggravated the food problem in the cities and led in 1929 to the introduction of the rationing system. The housing problem is also becoming more acute.

During the first five-year plan, centralized planning was sharply strengthened and a transition to administrative methods of economic management took place. This is explained by the fact that the scale of the tasks and the extreme limitations of material and financial resources forced us to count every penny, every machine. In order to concentrate maximum forces and resources, tasks, resources and forms of remuneration are strictly regulated. As a result, over the years of the first five-year plans, the number of administrative staff increased more than 3 times, which created the basis for the establishment of a command-administrative system in the country.

The first five-year plan was completed in 4 years and 3 months. The second five-year plan (1933 - 1937) was approved at the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in early 1934. It retained the trend towards the priority development of heavy industry. The main economic task was defined as the completion of the reconstruction of the national economy based on the latest technology. Since ultra-high growth rates can be achieved only at the first stage of any process, the rate of average annual growth decreased compared to the first five-year plan from 30 to 16.5%. Light industry was expected to develop at a faster pace, and capital investments in it increased several times.

In order to increase labor productivity, it was decided to revive material incentives. I.V. Stalin declares “war on equalization.” Payment is introduced depending on working conditions, output and category of the worker. Income inequality becomes a socialist virtue.

As noted above, the slogan of the second five-year plan was the call “Personnel who have mastered the technology decide everything!” In the fall of 1933, factory apprenticeship schools (FZU) were reorganized into professional educational institutions for training workers in mass professions. Advanced training courses were opened at factories and factories, and conditions were created for workers to study in evening schools and universities. The main form of advanced training for workers is the technical minimum. Its delivery was mandatory for workers in all industries.

All this gave positive results, and labor productivity doubled during the Second Five-Year Plan. The results of the second five-year plan were even higher than the first. More than 4.5 thousand large industrial enterprises came into operation, including the Ural Machine-Building and Chelyabinsk Tractor Plants, dozens of blast furnaces and open-hearth furnaces, mines, and power plants. The first metro line was built in Moscow. The industry of the Union republics developed at an accelerated pace.

Industrialization led to enormous changes. During the years of the first five-year plans, the economic level of the USSR increased sharply. Modern heavy industry was created. Despite the enormous costs, the percentage of annual production growth averaged from 10 to 16%, which was much higher than in developed capitalist countries. By the end of the 1930s. The USSR became one of the few countries capable of producing any type of industrial product available to humanity at that time. The country truly gained economic independence and independence. Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was largely due to a more powerful industrial base than Germany and the whole of Europe. This base was created in the USSR under the leadership of Comrade Stalin during the first five-year plans.

Introduction.

1. The state of Russia after the revolution, the civil war.

2. Reasons for industrialization, Stalin and his role in industrialization.

3. The essence of industrialization of the five-year state plans, economic programs.

4. Results of industrialization in the USSR.

List of used literature.

Introduction

The task of implementing industrialization, that is, creating a developed industry, Soviet Russia inherited from pre-revolutionary Russia. The first steps in this direction were made in the second half of the 19th century. Industry grew at a high rate at the beginning of the 20th century. The First World War and the Civil War, the devastation of the times of “war communism” threw the country’s economy far back. With the end of the restoration period (1925), the need arose again to complete the long-begun and tragically interrupted process. At the end of 1925, a course was taken towards industrialization, which included measures to ensure the economic independence of the USSR, priority development of heavy and defense industries, and bridging the gap with Western countries. Difficult questions arose about how to achieve these goals.

By 1927, two main approaches had emerged. The first approach, substantiated by prominent economists: capital for financing industrialization will provide the development of private entrepreneurship, attracting foreign loans, and expanding trade turnover; the pace of industrialization should be high, but at the same time focus on real opportunities, and not on political needs; industrialization should not lead to a sharp drop in the living standards of the population, the peasantry first of all. The second approach, originally formulated by the leaders of the left opposition: it is not possible to finance industrialization from external resources; it is necessary to find funds within the country, pumping them into heavy industry from light industry and agriculture; it is necessary to accelerate industrial growth, to carry out industrialization rapidly in 5-10 years; it is criminal to think about the cost of industrialization; the peasantry is an “internal colony” that will pay for all the difficulties.

1. The state of Russia after the revolution, civil war

Revolutionary events of 1917, Civil War and capitalist intervention against the young Soviet republic caused enormous damage to the industrial and economic potential of the country. Industrial production for the period 1918-1921. decreased fourfold. In general, the work of industry was characterized by a sharp decline in the most important quantitative characteristics of development.

During three years of war and internal turmoil, about 4 thousand bridges were destroyed. Events of 1918-1921 caused incomparably more damage to the country than the First world war. The four-year hard times of war plunged the country into a state of chaos and complete stagnation, into a state that can only be defined as a systemic economic catastrophe.

The situation the country found itself in posed a real threat. Coming from capitalist states potential danger was not a myth, a figment of the sick imagination of the authorities. Finding themselves face to face with a hostile capitalist environment, the leadership of the Soviet Republic turns its gaze to the only real support - the Red Army. The concept of the relationship between power and the main military force was succinctly and clearly formulated by V.I. Lenin at the XI Party Congress: “We really must be on our guard, and in favor of the Red Army we must make certain heavy sacrifices... Before us is the whole world of the bourgeoisie, which is only looking for forms to strangle us.” Subsequently, the thesis of capitalist danger became the most important justification for many major domestic and foreign policy actions undertaken by the leadership of the Soviet Union.

V.I. Lenin paid great attention to the development of the domestic economy. Already in the years Civil War The Soviet government began developing a long-term plan for the electrification of the country. In December 1920, the GOELRO plan was approved by the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and a year later it was approved by the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The plan provided for the rapid development of the electric power industry, tied to territorial development plans. The GOELRO plan, designed for 10-15 years, provided for the construction of 30 regional power plants (20 thermal power plants and 10 hydroelectric power stations) with a total capacity of 1.75 million kW. The project covered eight main economic regions (Northern, Central Industrial, Southern, Volga, Ural, West Siberian, Caucasian and Turkestan). In parallel, development was carried out transport system countries (reconstruction of old and construction of new railway lines, construction of the Volga-Don Canal).

The GOELRO project laid the foundation for industrialization in Russia. Electricity production in 1932 compared to 1913 increased almost 7 times, from 2 to 13.5 billion kWh.

Until 1928, the USSR pursued a relatively liberal “New Economic Policy” (NEP). While agriculture, retail trade, services, food and light industry were largely in private hands, the state retained control over heavy industry, transport, banks, wholesale and international trade. State enterprises competed with each other, the role of the USSR State Planning Committee was limited to forecasts that determined the directions and size of public investment.

From a foreign policy point of view, the country was in hostile conditions. According to the leadership of the CPSU(b), there was a high probability new war with capitalist states, which required thorough rearmament. However, it was impossible to immediately begin such rearmament due to the backwardness of heavy industry. At the same time, the existing pace of industrialization seemed insufficient, since the gap with Western countries, which experienced economic growth in the 1920s, increased. A serious social problem was the growth of unemployment in cities, which by the end of the NEP amounted to more than 2 million people, or about 10% of the urban population. The government believed that one of the factors hindering the development of industry in the cities was the lack of food and the reluctance of the countryside to provide the cities with bread at low prices.

The party leadership intended to solve these problems through a planned redistribution of resources between agriculture and industrialization, in accordance with the concept of socialism, as stated at the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) and the III All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1925. The choice of a specific implementation of central planning was vigorously discussed in 1926-1928 Proponents of the genetic approach (V. Bazarov, V. Groman, N. Kondratiev) believed that the plan should be drawn up on the basis of objective patterns of economic development identified as a result of an analysis of existing trends. Adherents of the teleological approach (G. Krzhizhanovsky, V. Kuibyshev, S. Strumilin) ​​believed that the plan should transform the economy and be based on future structural changes, production capabilities and strict discipline. Among the party functionaries, the first were supported by N. Bukharin, a supporter of the evolutionary path to socialism, and the latter by L. Trotsky, who insisted on immediate industrialization. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I. Stalin, initially supported Bukharin’s point of view, but after Trotsky was expelled from the party’s Central Committee at the end of 1927, he changed his position to the diametrically opposite one. This led to a decisive victory for the teleological school and a radical turn away from the NEP.

2. Reasons for industrialization, Stalin and his role in industrialization

The decision on industrialization was made in 1925 at the XIV Party Congress. Its task is to make the USSR an industrially independent country and allow it to confront the Western capitalist powers on an equal footing. Collectivization provided funds for the development of industry (primarily heavy industry), which simplified the confiscation of grain from the peasants. Many of them fled to the cities and were ready to work for meager wages. The free labor of prisoners was actively used. Masterpieces of art were sold abroad (mainly in the USA) for pennies. There was almost no Western investment due to the USSR's refusal to pay tsarist debts.

Stalin's industrialization was a process of accelerated expansion of the industrial potential of the USSR to reduce the gap between the economy and developed capitalist countries, carried out in the 1930s. The official goal of industrialization was to transform the USSR from a predominantly agricultural country into a leading industrial power. Although the main industrial potential of the country was created later, during the seven-year plans, industrialization usually refers to the first five-year plans.

The beginning of socialist industrialization as an integral part of the “triple task of a radical reorganization of society” (industrialization, collectivization of agriculture and cultural revolution) was laid down in the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy (1928-1932). At the same time, private commodity and capitalist forms of economy were eliminated.

During the pre-war five-year plans in the USSR, a rapid increase in production capacity and production volumes of heavy industry was ensured, which later allowed the USSR to win the Great Patriotic War. The increase in industrial power in the 1930s was considered within the framework of Soviet ideology one of the most important achievements of the USSR. Since the late 1980s, however, the question of the actual scale and historical significance industrialization became the subject of debate concerning the true goals of industrialization, the choice of means for its implementation, the relationship of industrialization with collectivization and mass repression, as well as its results and long-term consequences for the Soviet economy and society.

3. The essence of industrialization of the five-year state plans, economic programs

In 1929-1932 The first five-year plan took place, and the second was held in 1933-1937. Old enterprises were reconstructed and hundreds of new ones were built. The most important construction projects are the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (Magnitka), the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station (DneproGes), the White Sea-Baltic Canal (Belomorkanal), the Chelyabinsk, Stalingrad, Kharkov Tractor Plants, the Turkestan-Siberian Railway (TurkSib), etc. The plans were inflated, the deadlines were excessively compressed. , enterprises were put into operation unfinished, which later led to long-term stagnation. Product quality was low.

The enthusiasm of the masses, inspired by the ideas of socialist construction, played a major role. In 1935, the Stakhanov movement began (its founder was miner A. G. Stakhanov) for exceeding plans. The government, demanding that everyone follow the Stakhanovites, doubled production standards. Product quality has decreased.

Nevertheless, during the first five-year plans, a powerful industry was created that made it possible to withstand a future war. However, this was often done contrary to the recommendations of economists; haste led to overexertion of forces. The standard of living has fallen compared to the NEP era.

The main task of the introduced planned economy was to build up the economic and military power of the state at the highest possible pace, at initial stage this boiled down to the redistribution of the maximum possible amount of resources for the needs of industrialization. In December 1927, at the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, “Directives for drawing up the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR” were adopted, in which the congress spoke out against over-industrialization: growth rates should not be maximum, and they should be planned so that failures. Developed on the basis of directives, the draft of the first five-year plan (October 1, 1928 - October 1, 1933) was approved at the XVI Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (April 1929) as a set of carefully thought-out and realistic tasks. This plan, in reality much more intense than previous projects, immediately after its approval by the V Congress of Soviets of the USSR in May 1929, gave grounds for the state to carry out a number of measures of an economic, political, organizational and ideological nature, which elevated industrialization to the status of a concept, the era of the “great turning point”. The country had to expand the construction of new industries, increase production of all types of products and begin producing new equipment.

First of all, using propaganda, the party leadership ensured the mobilization of the population in support of industrialization. The Komsomol members in particular received it with enthusiasm. There was no shortage of cheap labor, since after collectivization, a large number of yesterday’s rural residents moved from rural areas to cities due to poverty, hunger and the arbitrariness of the authorities. Millions of people selflessly, almost by hand, built hundreds of factories, power plants, laid railways and subways. Often I had to work three shifts. In 1930, construction began on about 1,500 facilities, of which 50 absorbed almost half of all capital investments. A number of gigantic industrial structures were erected: DneproGES, metallurgical plants in Magnitogorsk, Lipetsk and Chelyabinsk, Novokuznetsk, Norilsk and Uralmash, tractor factories in Volgograd, Chelyabinsk, Kharkov, Uralvagonzavod, GAZ, ZIS (modern ZIL), etc. In 1935 the first stage of the Moscow metro with a total length of 11.2 km opened. Engineers were invited from abroad, many well-known companies, such as Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG and General Electric, were involved in the work and supplied modern equipment, a significant part of the models of equipment produced in those years in Soviet factories, were copies or modifications of Western analogues (for example, the Fordson tractor assembled in Volgograd). In order to create our own engineering base, a domestic system of higher technical education was urgently created. In 1930, universal primary education, and in cities it is compulsory for seven years. Attention was also paid to the industrialization of agriculture. Thanks to the emergence of the domestic tractor industry, in 1932 the USSR refused to import tractors from abroad, and in 1934 the Kirov Plant in Leningrad began producing the Universal row crop tractor, which became the first domestic tractor exported abroad. During the ten pre-war years, about 700 thousand tractors were produced, which amounted to 40% of their world production.

In 1930, speaking at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin admitted that an industrial breakthrough is possible only by building “socialism in one country” and demanded a multiple increase in the five-year plan targets, arguing that the plan could be exceeded for a number of indicators.

To increase incentives to work, pay became more closely tied to productivity. First of all, the drummers at the factories were simply better fed. (In the period 1929-1935, the urban population was provided with ration cards for essential food products). In 1935, the “Stakhanovite movement” appeared, in honor of the mine miner A. Stakhanov, who, according to official information of that time, on the night of August 30-31, 1935, completed 14.5 norms per shift.

Since capital investment in heavy industry almost immediately exceeded the previously planned amount and continued to grow, money emission (that is, the printing of paper money) was sharply increased, and during the entire first Five-Year Plan the growth of the money supply in circulation was more than twice as fast as the growth in the production of consumer goods, which led to rising prices and shortages of consumer goods.

To obtain foreign currency necessary to finance industrialization, methods such as the sale of paintings from the Hermitage collection were used.

At the same time, the state moved to a centralized distribution of its means of production and consumer goods, and the introduction of command-administrative management methods and the nationalization of private property were carried out. A political system emerged based on the leadership role of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), state ownership of the means of production and a minimum of private initiative.

The first five-year plan was associated with rapid urbanization. The urban labor force increased by 12.5 million, of whom 8.5 million were rural migrants. However, the USSR reached a share of 50% of the urban population only in the early 1960s.

At the end of 1932, the successful and early completion of the first five-year plan was announced in four years and three months. Summing up its results, Stalin said that heavy industry fulfilled the plan by 108%. During the period between October 1, 1928 and January 1, 1933, the production fixed assets of heavy industry increased by 2.7 times. The first Five-Year Plan was followed by a Second, with somewhat less emphasis on industrialization, and then a Third Five-Year Plan, which took place during the outbreak of World War II.

4. Results of industrialization in the USSR

The result of the first five-year plans was the development of heavy industry, due to which GDP growth during 1928-40. amounted to 4.6% per year. Industrial production in the period 1928-1937. increased by 2.5-3.5 times, that is, 10.5-16% per year. In particular, the production of machinery in the period 1928-1937. grew at an average of 27.4% per year.

According to Soviet theorists, the socialist economy was significantly superior to the capitalist one

By 1940, about 9,000 new factories had been built. By the end of the second five-year plan, the USSR took second place in the world in terms of industrial output, second only to the USA (if we consider the British metropolis, dominions and colonies as one state, then the USSR will be in third place in the world after the USA and Britain). Imports fell sharply, which was seen as the country gaining economic independence. Open unemployment was eliminated. For the period 1928-1937. Universities and technical schools have trained about 2 million specialists. Many new technologies were mastered. Thus, only during the first five-year plan was the production of synthetic rubber, motorcycles, wristwatch, cameras, excavators, high-quality cement and high-quality steel. The foundation was also laid for Soviet science, which over time took leading positions in the world in certain areas. On the created industrial base, it became possible to carry out large-scale rearmament of the army; During the first five-year plan, defense spending increased to 10.8% of the budget.

During the Soviet era, communists argued that industrialization was based on a rational and feasible plan. Meanwhile, it was assumed that the first five-year plan would come into effect at the end of 1928, but even by the time of its announcement in April-May 1929, work on its preparation had not been completed. The original form of the plan included goals for 50 industrial and agricultural sectors, as well as the relationship between resources and capabilities. Over time, the main role began to be played by achieving predetermined indicators. If the growth rate of industrial production initially set in the plan was 18-20%, then by the end of the year they were doubled. Despite reporting the success of the first five-year plan, in fact, the statistics were falsified, and none of the goals were even close to being achieved. Moreover, there was a sharp decline in agriculture and in industrial sectors dependent on agriculture. Part of the party nomenklatura was extremely indignant at this; for example, S. Syrtsov described reports about achievements as “fraud.”

On the contrary, according to critics of industrialization, it was poorly thought out, which was manifested in a series of declared “turning points” (April-May 1929, January-February 1930, June 1931). A grandiose and thoroughly politicized system arose, the characteristic features of which were economic “gigantomania”, chronic commodity hunger, organizational problems, wastefulness and unprofitability of enterprises. The goal (i.e., the plan) began to determine the means for its implementation. Over time, neglect of material support and infrastructure development began to cause significant economic damage. Some of the industrialization efforts turned out to be poorly thought out from the start. An example is the White Sea-Baltic Canal, built in 1933 with the labor of more than 200,000 prisoners, which turned out to be practically useless.

Despite the development of new products, industrialization was carried out mainly by extensive methods, since as a result of collectivization and a sharp decline in the standard of living of the rural population, human labor was greatly devalued. The desire to fulfill the plan led to an overexertion of forces and a permanent search for reasons to justify the failure to fulfill inflated tasks. Because of this, industrialization could not be fueled by enthusiasm alone and required a number of coercive measures. Beginning in 1930, the free movement of labor was prohibited, and criminal penalties were introduced for violations of labor discipline and negligence. Since 1931, workers began to be held liable for damage to equipment. In 1932, forced transfer of labor between enterprises became possible, and the death penalty was introduced for the theft of state property. On December 27, 1932, the internal passport was restored, which Lenin at one time condemned as “tsarist backwardness and despotism.” The seven-day week was replaced by a continuous working week, the days of which, without having names, were numbered from 1 to 5. Every sixth day there was a day off, established for work shifts, so that factories could work without interruption. Prisoner labor was actively used. All this has become the subject of sharp criticism in democratic countries, not only from liberals, but primarily from Social Democrats.

Per capita consumption rose by 22% between 1928 and 1938, although this increase was greatest among the group of party and labor elites (who fused with each other) and did not affect the vast majority of the rural population, or more than half of the country's population.

The end date of industrialization is defined differently by different historians. From the point of view of the conceptual desire to raise heavy industry in record time, the most pronounced period was the first five-year plan. Most often, the end of industrialization is understood as the last pre-war year (1940), or less often the year before Stalin's death (1952). If we understand industrialization as a process whose goal is the share of industry in GDP, characteristic of industrialized countries, then the USSR economy reached such a state only in the 1960s. The social aspect of industrialization should also be taken into account, since only in the early 1960s. the urban population exceeded the rural one.

Conclusions

Industrialization was largely carried out at the expense of agriculture (collectivization). First of all, agriculture became a source of primary accumulation, due to low purchase prices for grain and re-export at higher prices, as well as due to the so-called. “super tax in the form of overpayments on manufactured goods.” Subsequently, the peasantry also provided the labor force for the growth of heavy industry. The short-term result of this policy was a decline in agricultural production: for example, livestock production decreased almost by half and returned to the 1928 level only in 1938. The consequence of this was a deterioration in the economic situation of the peasantry. The long-term consequence was the degradation of agriculture. As a result of collectivization, famine and purges between 1926 and 1939. The country lost, according to various estimates, from 7 to 13 million and even up to 20 million people, and these estimates include only direct demographic losses.

Some critics also argue that, despite the declared increase in labor productivity, in practice average labor productivity in 1932 fell by 8% compared to 1928. These estimates, however, do not tell the full story: the decline was driven by the influx of millions of untrained workers living in poor conditions. By 1940, average labor productivity had increased by 69% since 1928. In addition, productivity varied widely across industries.

List of used literature

1. Verkhoturov D. Stalin’s economic revolution. - M.: Olma-Press, 2006.

2. Industrialization of the USSR 1926-1941. Documents and materials. / Ed. M. P. Kim. - M.: Nauka, 1970.

3. History of Russia. Theories of learning. Under. ed. B.V. Lichman. Russia in the late 1920s-1930s.

4. History of Russia: Textbook for technical universities/ A. A. Chernobaev, E. I. Gorelov, M. N. Zuev, etc.; Ed. M. N. Zuev, Ed. A. A. Chernobaev. - 2nd ed. reworked and additional.. - M.: graduate School, 2006. - 613 s.

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They say about the years of Stalin's rule that he took over the country with a plow and left it with an atomic bomb. The pace of industrialization of the USSR is truly amazing. How did this happen? Industrialization could not have happened without Western money.

Interrupted program

Industrialization in the USSR did not arise out of nowhere. The process of transforming the country from an agricultural to an industrial one was launched back in Tsarist Russia, but was interrupted by the First World War and the Civil War.
The New Economic Policy (NEP), proclaimed in 1921, quickly accomplished the task of restoring the destroyed national economy, returning the country to the economic indicators of 1913. But the potential for further economic development under the dominance of the private sector was extremely low. Additional resources were required.
In December 1925, at the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a course towards industrialization was proclaimed. The leadership of the USSR set a number of tasks. These include: increasing the productivity of the national economy, accelerating the pace of industrial development, increasing defense capability, and moving from the purchase of machinery and equipment to their production.

Two ways

The Soviet leadership was faced with a dilemma: which of the two industrialization paths to choose. The first, supported by N. Bukharin, emphasized the development of private entrepreneurship by attracting foreign loans. It was supposed to maintain high rates of industrialization, but at the same time focus on the real possibilities of the national economy.
The second way, which L. Trotsky promoted, proposed to seek out internal resources, pumping them from agriculture and light industry to heavy industry. The pace of industrialization was expected to be accelerated as much as possible. Everything was given from 5 to 10 years. In this situation, the peasantry had to “pay” for the costs of rapid industrial growth.
The directives drawn up in 1927 for the first five-year plan were guided by the “Bukharin approach”, but already at the beginning of 1928 Stalin revised them and gave the go-ahead for accelerated industrialization. To catch up with the developed countries of the West, it was necessary to “run a distance of 50–100 years” in 10 years. The first (1928-1932) and second (1933-1937) five-year plans were subordinated to this task.

Threat of war

The need for industrialization was determined not only by the economic, but also by the foreign policy interests of the country. After the establishment of Soviet power, many treated the young state with undisguised hostility. According to the party leadership, there was a high probability of a new war with capitalist states.

Preparation for a possible war required a thorough rearmament of the army: such a shift in emphasis in economic policy highlighted the strengthening of heavy industry capacity. This largely explains the intensive development path chosen by the country’s leadership.
One of the first rearmament plans was proposed by M. Frunze back in 1921. The project stated the inevitability of a new big war and the unpreparedness of the Red Army for it, and therefore the military leader intended to deploy a wide network of military schools in the country, organize “in shock order” the mass production of tanks, armored cars, armored trains, artillery and airplanes.

Enthusiasts

Using propaganda, the party leadership quickly mobilized the population to participate in industrial construction projects. There was no shortage of cheap labor. Many volunteers responded to the call of the Soviet government, mostly young people. Komsomol members, despite hardships and difficult working conditions, enthusiastically took on the most complex projects.
A significant part of the volunteers were yesterday's rural residents who, fleeing hunger, poverty and the arbitrariness of local authorities, left for the cities. Millions of workers selflessly, often in three shifts, built hundreds of factories and power plants, laid thousands of kilometers of railways, and opened new mines.
In the 30s, a whole series of gigantic structures were erected: Dneproges, Uralmash, GAZ, tractor factories in Volgograd, Kharkov and Chelyabinsk, metallurgical plants in Novokuznetsk, Magnitogorsk and Lipetsk, and in 1935 the first stage of the Moscow Metro, more than 11 km long, opened.
In the same 1935, the “Stakhanov movement” arose. One of the main reasons for its emergence was the practice of tying pay to performance. Miner Alexey Stakhanov started a series of production records by completing 14.5 norms per shift.

Western aid

The leadership of the USSR in the process of industrialization still could not completely turn away from the West. In particular, the Soviet government used foreign currency to finance various projects. Sometimes, in order to obtain the required amount, it was necessary to resort to methods such as selling paintings from the Hermitage collection.
Specialists of various profiles were actively invited from abroad. Some companies, for example, Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG and General Electric, were involved in the work and supply of modern equipment. It should be noted that most of the equipment produced in those years at Soviet factories were either copies or modifications of Western models.
American architect Albert Kahn played a significant role in socialist construction. According to the agreement, Kahn's company became the main consultant to the Soviet government on industrial construction. The package of orders for the construction of more than 500 industrial enterprises was valued at $2 billion (approximately $250 billion in modern prices).
In particular, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant was built according to Kahn’s design. Or rather, it was first built in the USA, then dismantled and reassembled in the USSR under the supervision of American engineers.

Result

In the late 1930s, Stalin announced the transformation of the USSR from an agricultural to an industrial country. Over the past 10 years, the state has achieved amazing results. New industries appeared in the USSR - aviation, tractor, automobile, machine tool and chemical industries.
The growth of industrial production over the years of the first two five-year plans was 18%, and in terms of industrial output the USSR came into second place, second only to the United States. Open unemployment was eliminated in the country.
However, according to many researchers, such successes were achieved solely due to the incredible overexertion of the population. Industrialization cost the lives of millions of people, most of whom were victims of collectivization.
Initially, the enthusiasm of Soviet citizens was not enough - and then the authorities increasingly resorted to coercive measures. The standard of living of most of the population was extremely low, and many, especially peasants, lived on the brink of poverty. Factories and collective farms went on strike in the country every now and then.
However, the Soviet leadership had everything at stake. Largely due to the high pace of industrialization, the country's defense capability became stronger, which played one of the key roles in the final victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany.

Industrialization is the process of creating large-scale machine production, but at the basis of which there is a transition from an agricultural society to an industrial society. Sources of funds for industrialization can be both internal resources and loans and capital investments from more developed countries. The timing and pace of industrialization varies across countries, with Britain becoming an industrialized country in the mid-19th century and France in the early 1920s, for example. In Russia, industrialization has developed successfully since the end of the 19th century. After the October Revolution, from the late 1920s, industrialization in the USSR was carried out at an accelerated pace by limiting the standard of living of the majority of the population.

Industrialization in the USSR

Industrialization of the USSR. Video

In the 1920s, the leadership of the USSR was faced with the problem of industrializing the country, transforming it from an agricultural into an industrialized power, the majority of the population in which should no longer be individual peasants, but factory workers - the solid basis of a socialist state. According to Marxist dogmas, only large-scale factory production can ensure high labor productivity and economic efficiency, and ultimately lead to victory in competition with the capitalist world. Since the USSR was surrounded by states hostile to it, rapid industrialization became vitally necessary, since only it could ensure an acceptable level of the country's defense capability.
The choice of specific paths and methods of industrialization became the subject of heated debate in the party and state environment. The “Left Opposition” demanded an acceleration of the pace of industrialization, and the “Right Deviation” demanded evolutionary economic development, gradual accumulation of funds for the construction of new industrial enterprises. I.V. Stalin, who concentrated an increasing amount of power in his hands, used disputes about the paths of industrialization to discredit and eliminate his opponents in the highest echelons of power. By the end of the 1920s, Stalin had established himself as a leader Soviet people and decided to accelerate the industrialization of the country.
Economic authorities developed special five-year plans for the development of the national economy. The first five-year plan (1928-1932) was developed from the mid-1920s in the structures of the State Planning Committee and the Supreme Economic Council. Gosplan specialists provided for the possibility of different growth rates: a starting plan and an “optimal” plan designed for favorable conditions. In September 1928, on the initiative of Stalin and V.V. Kuibyshev VSNKh developed target figures for economic growth for the coming financial year, which were based on the “optimal” five-year plan. The main costs were to be directed toward the development of heavy industry, toward the “production of means of production.” This approach was criticized by N.I. Bukharin, but after the defeat of the “right deviation”, planned maximalism prevailed - even the “optimal” figures for industrial growth were repeatedly raised.

Adoption of the Five Year Plan

At the Sixteenth Party Conference (April 23-29, 1929), the first five-year plan was adopted. The indicators of the “optimal” option were taken as its basis, but they were also increased under pressure from departmental interests. The Fifth Congress of Soviets of the USSR (May 20-28, 1929) adopted this plan as law. If over the previous decade total capital investments amounted to 26.5 billion rubles, now it was planned to invest 64.6 billion rubles in the economy, while investments in industry increased from 4.4 billion rubles to 16.4 billion rubles. 78% of investments in industry were directed to the production of means of production, which meant the withdrawal of huge funds from economic circulation. Industrial production was supposed to grow by 180% over the five-year period, and production of means of production by 230%. 16-18% of peasant farms were supposed to be collectivized. Labor productivity was supposed to increase by 110%, wages by 71%, and peasant incomes by 67%. As a result, as the conference resolution promised, “in cast iron the USSR will move from sixth place to third place (after Germany and the United States), in coal - from fifth place to fourth (after the United States, England and Germany).”
Agriculture was to grow on the basis of the rise of individual peasant farming and “the creation of social agriculture at the level of modern technology.” Collective farms, created in large numbers, were supposed to provide the urban population and industry with cheap food and raw materials through mechanization and rational farming methods, which would not only increase labor productivity in rural areas, but also free up workers for new plants and factories. A significant role in industrialization plans was to be played by the purchase of imported industrial equipment and the invitation of foreign specialists. To obtain the necessary foreign currency, it was decided to increase the supply of raw materials (timber, oil) abroad several times.

Five-year plan at four years

In the context of deteriorating conditions on the world market for agricultural products due to the onset of the Great Depression at the end of 1929 and in 1930, the construction time for industrial facilities of the first five-year plan was again reduced, and the planned volumes of production and supplies of bread to the state were increased. Under the slogan “Five-Year Plan in Four Years!” planned targets have doubled. The country had to increase production by a third every year. To fulfill these intense plans, collectivization plans were increased, and accelerated industrial construction began. Some industries took the lead, but others could not keep up. Directors of the “Five-Year Plan” construction projects competed for resources. Chaos reigned in the economy instead of planned development. Resources were wasted, hasty construction with a shortage of qualified workers and engineers led to accidents. These disasters were explained by the “sabotage of bourgeois specialists” and secret counter-revolutionaries. In 1930, a group of engineers from the “Industrial Party” trial was convicted of “sabotage.” The task of the period was to build up priority industries and identify personnel who are capable of achieving production increases. The main attention (financing, supplies) was given to 50-60 shock construction projects. A massive import of cars from abroad was carried out for them. About 40% of capital investment in 1930 had to be frozen in unfinished construction due to ineffective planning and put into operation throughout the 1930s.
Among the most important construction projects of the first five-year plan are the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station, the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, and the Stalingrad Tractor Plant. In addition, automobile, aircraft, chemical, and electrical enterprises were built. They were built by the labor of millions of workers, most of whom had just arrived from the countryside yesterday, by the talent of both old and newly trained engineers, by the organizational energy of party and economic leaders, for whom the success of construction opened the door to career advancement. Party propaganda convinced Soviet people that, despite temporary hardships and difficulties, in a few years a happy and prosperous socialist future will be built.
The industrial breakthrough was costly for the country - the share of accumulation exceeded a third of national income. At the same time, industrialization required huge costs for the import of equipment and for maintaining a minimum standard of living for workers employed both on the construction sites themselves and in the extraction of raw materials for them. The problems of financial deficit were partially solved with the help of internal loans, increased sales of vodka, money emissions (in 1929-1932, the money supply in the USSR increased fourfold), taxes, exports of timber, oil, furs, and bread. The forced implementation of collectivization led to the devastation of the village and the famine of 1932-1933. Against this background, Stalin, speaking at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on January 7, 1933, stated that the first five-year plan had been completed ahead of schedule in four years and four months.

Results

The actual results of the five-year plan turned out to be quite modest. The optimal plan of 1929 was fulfilled for the production of oil and gas, peat, steam locomotives, and agricultural machines. Even the starting plan of 1929 was not fulfilled for the production of electricity, cast iron, steel, rolled steel, coal mining, and iron ore. Tractor production barely kept up with it. It was not possible to even come close to the increased plans of 1930. According to published data, oil production reached 22.2 million tons against the planned 40-42 million tons in 1930, steel - 5.9 million tons against the planned 12 million tons, tractors - 50 thousand units against the planned in November 1929, 201 thousand units, electricity generation 13.1 billion kW. h. with 33-35 billion planned in 1930. The main result of the first five-year plan can be recognized as the creation of the military-industrial complex - the military industry and its infrastructure, which could also serve the civilian economy. In 1930, the elimination of unemployment was announced.
The second five-year plan, adopted in February 1934 at the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU (b), was supposed to ensure the establishment of production at enterprises built during the first five-year plan, overcoming the imbalances in economic development that arose in 1930-1933. With the pressure on agriculture easing, it was planned to double industrial production. In the mid-1930s, supply to large cities was improved. The need for competent personnel stimulated the implementation of mass educational programs, including in rural areas. Real and imaginary economic successes were exaggerated and glorified during propaganda campaigns. Despite the introduction of machines, manual labor continued to predominate even in industry. The Stakhanov movement, named after the miner who exceeded production standards by 14 times, unfolded in all sectors of production. Stakhanovites and shock workers set labor productivity records for which the entire enterprise had been preparing for a long time. In 1937, it was proclaimed that basically socialism had been built in the USSR.
The unfolding Great Terror led to disruptions in the work of industry, which were officially explained by sabotage. In 1938, it was announced that the five-year plan had been exceeded. The production of cast iron increased by 2.35 times, steel - by 3 times, cars - by 8.38 times. In the 1930s, new industries were created: automobile manufacturing, aircraft manufacturing, electrical engineering, chemical industry; partial electrification of industry and cities was carried out. From a country importing equipment, the USSR turned into a country that provided its basic needs in it. By the end of the 1930s, the USSR had become an industrial-agrarian country, but the industrialization process was not yet completed. Only since the 1960s, when the majority of the population lived in cities and were employed in the industrial sector, can we talk about the country's final transformation into an industrial power.