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How the Minsk agreements are being implemented.

Minsk Protocol. It provided for a ceasefire in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. The protocol came into force in the evening of the same day, but in reality military operations continued.

On February 12, 2015, the second Minsk agreement was officially titled “Declaration of the President Russian Federation, the President of Ukraine, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of a set of measures to implement the Minsk agreements.” The heads of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany deliberated for 16 hours. The new agreement (unofficially called “Minsk-2”) included 13 points. Here are the main ones:

- immediately cease fire in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions starting from February 15, 2015;

— both sides are obliged to withdraw all heavy equipment to equal distances so that a security zone with a width of 50 to 140 km for different weapon systems arises;

— begin preparations for local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the law “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions”;

— pardon and amnesty those who participated in the battles in the DPR and LPR;

— restore full control of Ukraine over the country’s state border;

- withdraw all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under the supervision of the OSCE.

In April 2015, the OSCE stated that the parties to the conflict in eastern Ukraine had not fulfilled at least one of the points of the Minsk agreements - the withdrawal of heavy weapons. Observers heard explosions and found unexploded ordnance on the streets of Shirokovo. The OSCE also reported that intense fighting is taking place in the territories adjacent to the DPR.

Officially, the Minsk agreements expired at the end of 2015, but the leaders of the Normandy Four, Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande, Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroshenko, during telephone conversations decided to extend the validity of the Minsk agreements until 2016.

Leaders Western countries They have said many times that they are ready to lift economic sanctions from Russia if the Minsk agreements are implemented. For example, in February 2016, German Chancellor Angela Merkel noted that she would prefer “the lifting of sanctions today rather than tomorrow,” but she is waiting until the conditions for resolving the situation in Ukraine are met. But Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that setting such conditions is pointless. “To link EU sanctions with the final decision, bringing the Minsk process to its logical conclusion today is meaningless, because, I repeat, this ball is not on Russia’s side,” he said in February 2016. He added that, in his opinion, the implementation of the Minsk agreements today depends primarily on the Ukrainian authorities.

Was signed on September 5, 2014 PROTOCOL following consultations of the Tripartite Contact Group regarding joint steps aimed at implementing the Peace Plan President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and initiatives of Russian President V. Putin (1). Was signed on September 19, 2014 MEMORANDUM on the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol following consultations Trilateral Contact Group regarding steps aimed at implementing the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and the initiatives of the President of Russia V. Putin A (2).

Was signed on February 12, 2015 A set of measures to implement the Minsk agreements(3) and accepted (not signed) Declaration of the President of the Russian Federation, the President of Ukraine, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the Set of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, adopted on February 12, 2015 (4).

A comparison of documents approved on September 5 and 19, 2014 (Minsk-1) and February 12, 2015 (Minsk-2) is given below.

Minsk-1 and Minsk-2: generalities and differences

Removal of obligations (obligations existing in Minsk-1 and absent in Minsk-2):
1. Stopping of units and military formations of the parties on the contact line as of September 19, 2014 (2.2).
2. A ban on the placement of heavy weapons and military equipment in the area limited by the settlements of Komsomolskoye, Kumacheve, Novoazovsk, Sakhanka, with OSCE monitoring (2.5).
3. A ban on the installation of new mine-explosive engineering barriers within the boundaries of the security zone. Obligation to remove previously installed mine-explosive barriers in the security zone (2.6).
4. Prohibition from the moment of adoption of this Memorandum of flights of military aircraft and foreign unmanned aerial vehicles aircraft(UAVs), with the exception of UAVs used by the OSCE monitoring (observation) mission, along the entire line of contact of the parties in the zone of cessation of the use of weapons to a width of at least 30 km (2.7).
5. Deployment of an OSCE monitoring (observation) mission in the zone of stopping the use of weapons as part of groups of Organization observers within 24 hours from the date of adoption of this Memorandum. It is advisable to divide the above zone into sectors, the number and boundaries of which should be agreed upon in preparation for the work of the OSCE monitoring (observation) mission (2.8).

Comment: With the exception of the last paragraph, the obligations lifted refer to obligations primarily or exclusively on the part of the de facto authorities in the occupied territories and Russia.

New obligations (obligations that were absent in Minsk-1 and appeared in Minsk-2):
1. Carrying out constitutional reform in Ukraine with the entry into force by the end of 2015 of a new constitution, which assumes decentralization as a key element (taking into account the characteristics of individual regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, agreed upon with representatives of these regions), as well as the adoption of permanent legislation on a special status certain districts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions in accordance with the measures specified in the note, until the end of 2015. (See note.) (3.11).
Note:
Such measures in accordance with the Law “On the special procedure for local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions” include the following:
- exemption from punishment, prosecution and discrimination of persons related to the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
- the right to linguistic self-determination;
- participation of local government bodies in the appointment of heads of prosecutorial bodies and courts in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
- the opportunity for central executive authorities to conclude agreements with relevant local governments regarding the economic, social and cultural development of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
- the state provides support for the socio-economic development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
- assistance from the central authorities to cross-border cooperation in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions with the regions of the Russian Federation;
- creation of people's militia units by decision of local councils in order to maintain public order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
- the powers of deputies of local councils and officials elected in early elections appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by this law cannot be terminated early.
2. Intensify the activities of the Trilateral Contact Group, including by creating working groups to implement relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. They will reflect the composition of the Tripartite Contact Group (3.13).
3. ...leaders approve the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, adopted and signed in Minsk on February 12, 2015 everyone who also signed Minsk Protocol of September 5, 2014 and Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014 (4.3).
4. Germany and France will provide technical support to restore a segment of the banking system in conflict-affected areas, perhaps by creating an international mechanism to facilitate the implementation of social transfers (4,4).
5. They also support trilateral negotiations between the European Union, Ukraine and Russia in order to develop a practical solution to Russia's concerns in connection with the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (4.6).
6. Leaders will remain committed to implementing the Minsk agreements. To this end, they agreed to create a monitoring mechanism in the Normandy Format, which would meet at regular intervals, usually at the level of senior officials representing foreign ministries (4.8).

We often hear both in the press and in everyday life about the Minsk agreements. It’s probably worth dwelling on their essence and the significance of this agreement both in world politics and for the residents of Ukraine, the DPR and the LPR.

The Minsk agreements were signed more than 3 years ago - first on September 5, 2014, and then supplemented on February 12, 2015. They were developed during negotiations between Vladimir Putin and French President Francois Hollande, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Petro Poroshenko in Minsk.

And despite the fact that the agreements were supposed to be implemented by the end of 2015, they are still being delayed. Who is “torpedoing” them? Let's figure it out (taking into account one important circumstance - on the one hand, Kyiv must fulfill “Minsk”, on the other, Donetsk and Lugansk, and Russia is only one of the guarantors of the agreements in this agreement).

It is necessary to understand that the Minsk agreements were written based on the assumption that, by implementing them, the Kiev regime will change in such a way that it will become acceptable to the population of Donbass (following the example of Spain and Portugal). Actually, this opinion persists even now, at the same time it is obvious that Kyiv cannot and does not want to move towards democratization. And even the formal implementation of the agreements, if it leads to the degeneration of the regime, will lead to its radicalization (which is what we see at this time), which will have tragic consequences for Donbass.

MINSK AGREEMENT – A STALAME SITUATION FOR Kyiv

It is beneficial for Kyiv to maintain this situation, because to get back 3 million residents of Donbass who are sharply opposed to the post-Maidan government and do not recognize Ukraine - big problem, with which it is not known what to do next. It is unrealistic to carry out a clean-up; you could end up with a guerrilla war. And it’s also impossible to pretend that 1/10 of the country lives by its own laws and does not recognize the flags of Ukraine, this is how it should be.

In addition, part of Ukrainian society still maintains a militant attitude and longs for victory; to calm this public, it is beneficial for Kyiv to maintain the front line. After all, if the front line in Donbass disappears, then militant nationalists will either go to clear Donbass and the conflict will flare up again, or the attention of nationalists will switch to Crimea, which Kyiv does not need at all, because there are no visible ways to return the peninsula.

In general, it is much preferable for Kyiv to maintain the situation in its current form, that is, not to implement the Minsk agreements, although they were approved by the UN.

ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MINSK AGREEMENT

Immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides to equal distances

Ukraine: Initially, the conditions were met. Then the shelling began.

DPR and LPR: Completed.

Ensure effective monitoring of the ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE.

Ukraine: In general, they are fulfilled.

DPR and LPR: In progress.

On the first day after the withdrawal, begin a dialogue on holding local elections in Donbass in accordance with Ukrainian legislation “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions,” as well as on the future regime of these areas on the basis of this law.

Ukraine: Not implemented.

No later than 30 days from the date of signing the document, adopt a resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine indicating the territory to which the Special Regime applies (in fact, to give Donbass a special status).

Ukraine: Not implemented

DPR and LPR: Impossible to implement without Ukraine.

Provide an amnesty prohibiting the prosecution of persons in connection with events in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions.

Ukraine: Not implemented

DPR and LPR: Impossible without Ukraine

Ensure the release and exchange of all hostages and illegally detained persons on the basis of the “all for all” principle.

DPR and LPR: Impossible without Ukraine.

Ensure safe access, delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian aid.

Ukraine: Performed only on its territory.

DPR and LPR: In progress.

Restoration of socio-economic ties, including payment of pensions, benefits and other payments.

Ukraine: Not implemented.

DPR and LPR: In progress.

Restoration of full control over the state border by Ukraine throughout the conflict zone, which should begin on the first day after local elections and end after a comprehensive political settlement.

Ukraine: Not implemented due to the fact that Kyiv does not want to implement the previous points (on amnesty, special status and local elections).

DPR and LPR: Impossible to fulfill, since Ukraine does not comply with the previous points

The withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under the supervision of the OSCE.

Ukraine: Insists that Russian troops are present in Donbass.

DPR and LPR: they talk about the absence of Russian troops. The OSCE doesn't find them either.

The entry into force by the end of 2015 of the new constitution of Ukraine, which provides for decentralization (agreed with representatives of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions).

Ukraine: Not implemented

DPR and LPR: Impossible, without the participation of Ukraine

THE MINSK AGREEMENT HAS TURNED INTO A FARCE

Initially intended to be a hope for ending the senseless fratricidal war in Donbass, the Minsk agreements turned into a farce, never becoming a victory for either diplomacy or common sense. And if previously they instilled faith in the inhabitants of the self-proclaimed Republics, today the mention of them only causes irritation among people. It is worth talking about something that is already hackneyed and painful, plunges into bewilderment, but at the same time requires attention and analysis - at least from the perspective of human morality.

In the beginning there was a "cauldron"

The anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in the eastern regions of Ukraine, announced and launched in April 2014, actually ended the split in the country that began after the Maidan coup. And at the same time, it marked the beginning of the inglorious end of the Ukrainian army, which, from being called upon to defend the people, within a few months turned into an army of murderers and punitive forces.

At the same time, armed units are organized by Ukrainian nationalists and radicals: these were trained in advance by overseas instructors in summer camps, so they only had to be given weapons.

In parallel with this, units of yesterday’s troops are sent on “business trips” to the East. internal troops(part of the National Guard), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SBU. At the same time, army units are already shelling the peaceful cities of Donbass with all their might and... suffering direct combat losses as a result of fire contacts with units of the Donbass people’s militia.

Well, what does this have to do with the Minsk agreements? Yes, the most direct one - because it is the “cocktail” of all the above-mentioned units that will subsequently end up in the Ilovaisk meat grinder, which served as the starting point for the agreements.

There is no point in describing the chronology of subsequent hostilities - there is enough information about this, both reference and analytical. It is enough just to note that in less than three weeks the militia forces managed to take possession of strategic initiative and destroy the Ukrainian group. The losses were catastrophic - in fact, the Ukrainian army as a combat-ready organization ceased to exist.

Demoralized, bloodless, and almost completely deprived of weapons and equipment during prolonged battles, the units surrendered en masse. Most of the original personnel of the volunteer battalions finished their “glorious” path, which began on the Maidan, in the fields near Ilovaisk. It was on their bones and ashes, which decayed in the flames of the burning diesel fuel of the “Ilovaisk Cauldron”, that the rogues Semenchenko (Grishin) and Parasyuk would subsequently gain the glory of “commanders”.

There are many reasons for the defeat, but they boil down to one thing - the bestial attitude of the General Staff towards the entrusted troops, blatant mediocrity and irresponsibility.

Consequences: Poroshenko’s telephone call to Russian President V.V. Putin on September 3 with a request to influence the situation, oblige the Republic to cease fire and begin the negotiation process.

Minsk-1: On formalism and the principle of consistency in Ukrainian politics

In response to such “peaceful” initiatives by Poroshenko, more suitable to a cry for mercy, a decision was made to develop measures to de-escalate the conflict, and on September 5 in Minsk, in the building of the President Hotel, the Minsk Protocol was born, from the moment the signing of which the Minsk agreements trace their origins.

Now briefly what it is about and who signed it.

Three-way contact group

Their heads, Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky, were present from the Republics; the Russian ambassador to Ukraine Zurabov was part of the group as a guarantor; from Ukraine, there was... its former president Leonid Kuchma, who does not officially hold any government position.

That is, initially Poroshenko’s approach to the Minsk agreements can be considered not even formal, but devil-may-care. After all, Kuchma’s signature on the protocol, “with all due respect to him,” is de jure equal to the signature of any Ukrainian citizen, be it a pensioner (which Leonid Danilovich officially was at that time), a miner or a housewife. And the Ukrainian side did not even consider it necessary, at least for official purposes, to send to Minsk, even a minor person, from the Cabinet of Ministers or the Presidential Administration.

The conclusion suggests itself that by this official Kyiv abdicated in absentia any responsibility for improper implementation of the points of the protocol. And, as it turned out over time, not in vain. After all, the Ukrainian side actually fulfilled nothing of what was agreed upon. The fire has not ceased, individual armed formations have not been disarmed. Partly due to their lack of control by the Kyiv authorities.

Against the backdrop of the Ukrainian side’s open disregard for its obligations to resolve the conflict in Donbass, on almost all points of the protocol, the Minsk agreements, even against the backdrop of repeated working meetings of contact groups, turned out to be nothing more than a fiction, as we said above.

The proof is the further escalation of the conflict and the escalation of the armed confrontation, which led to another “cauldron” and, as expected, to the next Minsk agreements.

Minsk-2: Normandy Four, divorce in Ukrainian

The resumption of active hostilities at the end of 2014 - beginning of 2015 virtually along the entire line of contact, another large-scale defeat of the Ukrainian army in the area of the city of Debaltsevo (Donetsk region) with the subsequent transfer of this settlement under the control of the DPR in February 2015 - all this led to the need resumption of dialogue.

Traditionally, the meeting took place in Minsk, however, on February 11, 2015, negotiations were already conducted in the format of the so-called Normandy Four and with the participation of the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France, as well as individual officials of these states; the next day they were joined by the leaders of the LPR and DPR.

As a result of a very intense negotiation process, a set of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements was agreed upon and signed, consisting of thirteen points, among which, in addition to those similar to the previous ones, it was provided extra row practical activities (the text can be found at the link - http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/file/1379255).

An innovation that distinguishes Minsk agreements model of 2015, there was a requirement for both parties to the conflict to withdraw (disengage) heavy weapons under OSCE supervision and create a neutral security zone, depending on the caliber of weapons, with a depth of 50 to 70 kilometers.

WHY ARE THE MINSK AGREEMENTS NOT IMPLEMENTED?

The Minsk agreements in the form in which they were signed will certainly not be implemented.

From the first day, the Ukrainian side was not very keen to implement them, and the further it went, the more and more violations there were.

Let's look at the reasons why the probability of implementing the Minsk agreements in the long term tends to a confident zero.

What if not everything is so neglected and the agreements have at least a small chance?

1. The Ukrainian economy is slowly but surely creeping towards default.

No one is even going to give the money needed to restore the economy “peacefully.” According to the most conservative estimate, Ukraine needs at least 50 billion. Europe will not give that kind of money. The IMF won't give that kind of money either. What to do?

There are two options - either admit your own powerlessness and resign, or... send half of the population to war, and put the other half on the machines, issuing dry rations (to both), which the United States is ready to share with Ukraine from year to year.

2. No one needs half of Donbass

Kyiv, even if we ignore the fact that there is no money for the restoration of Donbass, needs control over the entire territory, including Donetsk, Lugansk and the border. And Kyiv does not need any compromise heads of autonomies in Donetsk and Lugansk. If Kyiv accepts Donbass, it will be done exclusively in such a status that it will be possible to appoint Taruta, Saakashvili, or Yarosh himself as head of the region.

All the talk about decentralization, autonomy, and so on and so forth is a lie to the ears of those who are especially gullible.

What kind of return to Ukraine could there be?

We must not forget that during the year of shelling, Donbass not only accumulated hatred towards Kyiv, but also armed itself. And he armed himself very well. The volume of weapons in the armies of the LPR and DPR is approximately comparable to the weapons of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And the number of personnel is also almost equal.

Remember other conflicts in the post-Soviet space - Abkhazia, Ossetia, Karabakh, Transnistria. Which one resolved itself in a short time?

Now keep in mind that Donbass is ten times larger than Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria.

So what is the likelihood of pushing the LPR and DPR back into Ukraine, and even on Kyiv’s terms, and in a short time? The answer is clear to everyone.

3. Washington is quite comfortable with an armed conflict on the Russian border.

When the USSR sent troops into Afghanistan, Washington supported the Mujahideen because it made it possible to inflict military and economic damage on the USSR, drag the Union into an unpopular war, and cause moral harm Soviet power and undermine the regime.

After the collapse of the USSR, a conflict arose in Russia with Chechnya - Chechen militants Washington also supported. With approximately the same motive.

The conflict with Georgia was also supported by Washington.

So why on earth now, in Donbass, will Washington contribute to the peace process?

The peace process in southeastern Ukraine is not at all in the interests of the United States. But a military conflict, preferably a protracted, long-term one, is in the interests of the people. Because this is the same way that Russia is drawn into an unpopular conflict as a guarantor of the Minsk agreements. And is it worth believing that Washington will simply allow the conflict to end by signing some kind of Minsk agreements?

Now let's try to answer the following question: Is anyone, besides Russia, generally interested in ending this conflict?

Yes, we are interested.

Donetsk and Lugansk are interested in ending the conflict. Europe also needs peace.

But Europe does not control Kyiv. Modern Europe does not even fully control itself. What kind of end to the conflict in Ukraine with the participation of Europe can we talk about?

In order for Europe to effectively contribute to resolving the conflict, it must distance itself from the United States on the one hand and issue a loan of 50 billion (minimum) to Ukraine on the other. How realistic is this? It seems that the probability of this is from zero to minus one.

AFTERWORD

And what conclusion comes to mind when looking at this system of equations?

Do the Minsk agreements resemble a real solution to the conflict and fundamental agreements between the parties?

Who are generally satisfied with these Minsk agreements, except Russia and Europe, which actually pushed them through, but who have absolutely no ability to control Kyiv?

So is there really no solution to the conflict in southeast Ukraine?

Today it is already obvious that the Ukrainian authorities will not implement the Minsk agreements in the form in which they were concluded, and are considering several options for abandoning them. Among them there are both those that one way or another consolidate the status quo, and those that threaten with tragic consequences. What can Donbass expect from Kyiv in the foreseeable future?

The state does not have any systematic vision of how to solve the problem and how to build a prosperous future for Donbass as a whole. This situation is due to the fact that at the central level there is no such systemic vision regarding the entire country, because power is divided between various groups of influence, and within the framework of the existing balance, they solve, first of all, their corporate tasks and do not see the whole picture in in general. As a result, the country is constantly moving in different directions, and as a result has been marking time for 26 years.

The UN department specializing in the coordination of humanitarian missions reasonably noted that the fighting in Donbass is not going to end. The confrontation between Ukraine and Donbass is only gaining strength, and there is still a long way to go before it ends.

This state of affairs seriously worries the international Organization. A UN report recently presented to the public called Kyiv's ongoing war against the Donbass republics one of the bloodiest conflicts in the world since the end of World War II.

But besides the report, perhaps there should be some practical actions from the UN?

Residents of Donbass do not see them, but see only support from the West for the aggressive government of Ukraine, which is sad.

Where Ukraine is going, according to experts, is not clear even to the authorities themselves.

Under the pressure of such small but systematic attacks, the Ukrainian side demonstrates its inability to negotiate with literally every step it takes. Yes, such a diplomatic battle is proceeding at a snail’s pace, but the state of affairs now does not allow us to hope for a quick solution.

In one old book there are these lines:

“The battle of eagles in the heavenly heights is swift and beautiful. Having folded its mighty wings, the eagle falls like a stone towards the enemy. But imagine a fight between moles in the underground depths. The mole might have to dig the ground for a month to get closer to the enemy. So it is in war. Often the situation is such that there is only one outcome - to fight like a mole..." (https://tech.wikireading.ru/10061).

The LPR and DPR have no other option but to slowly and methodically turn the situation in their favor until quantity turns into quality. And then the Minsk agreements will become a Minsk “cauldron” for the junta.

Now their main weapon is endurance, endurance and more endurance. Because in the war of nerves, the one who fails first loses.

And Minsk will be used as a smoke screen to continue the war. Europe and the United States will continue to insist on their words to follow the Minsk agreements and at the same time encourage the Kiev regime with military assistance - both non-lethal and lethal. It's like putting out a fire with gasoline.

A set of measures to implement the Minsk agreements

1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation starting from 00:00. (Kiev time) February 15, 2015.

2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides to equal distances in order to create a security zone at least 50 km wide from each other for artillery systems with a caliber of 100 mm or more, a security zone 70 km wide for MLRS and 140 km wide for Tornado-S MLRS , "Hurricane", "Smerch" and tactical missile systems "Tochka" ("Tochka U"):

For Ukrainian troops: from the actual line of contact;

For armed formations of certain regions of Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine: from the contact line in accordance with the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.

The withdrawal of the above heavy weapons must begin no later than the second day after the ceasefire and be completed within 14 days.

This process will be facilitated by the OSCE with the support of the Tripartite Contact Group.

3. Ensure effective monitoring and verification of the ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE from the first day of withdrawal, using all necessary technical means, including satellites, UAVs, radar systems, etc.

4. On the first day after the challenge, begin a dialogue about the modalities for holding local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions,” as well as about the future regime of these areas on the basis of this law.

Immediately, no later than 30 days from the date of signing this document, adopt a resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine indicating the territory to which the special regime applies in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions” based on the line established in the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.

5. Provide pardon and amnesty by enacting a law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

6. Ensure the release and exchange of all hostages and illegally detained persons on the basis of the “all for all” principle. This process must be completed by the fifth day following the withdrawal at the latest.

7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian assistance to those in need on the basis of an international mechanism.

8. Determination of modalities for the complete restoration of socio-economic ties, including social transfers, such as payment of pensions and other payments (receipts and income, timely payment of all utility bills, resumption of taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine).

To this end, Ukraine will restore control of a segment of its banking system in conflict-affected areas, and an international mechanism may be created to facilitate such transfers.

9. Restoration of full control over the state border by the Government of Ukraine in the entire conflict zone, which should begin on the first day after local elections and end after a comprehensive political settlement (local elections in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions based on the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) by the end of 2015, subject to the implementation of paragraph 11 - in consultations and agreement with representatives of individual districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions within the framework of the Tripartite Contact Group.

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under the supervision of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.

11. Carrying out constitutional reform in Ukraine with the entry into force by the end of 2015 of a new constitution, which assumes decentralization as a key element (taking into account the characteristics of individual regions of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, agreed upon with representatives of these regions), as well as the adoption of permanent legislation on a special status certain districts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions in accordance with the measures specified in the note, until the end of 2015. (See note.)

12. Based on the Law of Ukraine “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions,” issues related to local elections will be discussed and agreed upon with representatives of individual areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions within the framework of the Tripartite Contact Group. The elections will be held in compliance with relevant OSCE standards and will be monitored by the OSCE/ODIHR.

13. Intensify the activities of the Trilateral Contact Group, including by creating working groups to implement relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. They will reflect the composition of the Trilateral Contact Group.

Note:

Such measures in accordance with the Law “On the special procedure for local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions” include the following:

Exemption from punishment, prosecution and discrimination of persons related to the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

The right to linguistic self-determination;

Participation of local government bodies in the appointment of heads of prosecutor's offices and courts in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

The opportunity for central executive authorities to conclude agreements with relevant local governments regarding the economic, social and cultural development of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

The state provides support for the socio-economic development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

Assistance from the central authorities to cross-border cooperation in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions with the regions of the Russian Federation;

Creation of people's militia units by decision of local councils in order to maintain public order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

The powers of deputies of local councils and officials elected in early elections appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by this law cannot be terminated early.

The document was signed by the participants of the Trilateral Contact Group:

Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini

Second President of Ukraine L.D. Kuchma

Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine M.Yu. Zurabov

A.V. Zakharchenko

A peace agreement prepared by the Normandy Four to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The document was called the “Set of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements.” The document consists of 13 points. We publish full version this document.

1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation starting from 00:00. (Kiev time) February 15, 2015.

— for Ukrainian troops: from the actual line of contact;

- for armed formations of certain regions of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine: from the contact line in accordance with the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.

The withdrawal of the above heavy weapons must begin no later than the second day after the ceasefire and be completed within 14 days.

This process will be facilitated by the OSCE with the support of the Tripartite Contact Group.

7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian assistance to those in need on the basis of an international mechanism.

To this end, Ukraine will restore control of a segment of its banking system in conflict-affected areas, and an international mechanism may be created to facilitate such transfers.

9. Restoration of full control over the state border by the Government of Ukraine in the entire conflict zone, which should begin on the first day after local elections and end after a comprehensive political settlement (local elections in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions based on the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) by the end of 2015, subject to the implementation of paragraph 11 - in consultations and agreement with representatives of individual districts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions within the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under the supervision of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.

Note:

Such measures in accordance with the Law “On the special procedure for local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions” include the following:

— exemption from punishment, prosecution and discrimination of persons related to the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

— the right to linguistic self-determination;

— participation of local government bodies in the appointment of heads of prosecutor’s offices and courts in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

— the opportunity for central executive authorities to conclude agreements with the relevant local governments regarding the economic, social and cultural development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

— the state provides support for the socio-economic development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

— assistance from the central authorities to cross-border cooperation in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions with the regions of the Russian Federation;

— the creation of people’s militia units by decision of local councils in order to maintain public order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

— the powers of deputies of local councils and officials elected in early elections appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by this law cannot be terminated early.

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