Khrulev Institute. Military Academy of Logistics named after

KHRULEV Andrey Vasilievich, Soviet statesman and military leader, army general (1943). Andrei Vasilyevich Khrulev was an extraordinary organizer and an extremely able-bodied person. He was always at the peak of the most important events - this was the case during the period of changing political regimes, during the formation years of the young Soviet state, the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, and also after it, when the entire economic life of the country was subject to restoration. A.V. Khrulev proved himself to be a talented, sensitive, insightful and strong-willed leader, demanding of himself and his subordinates, who managed to achieve enormous success, primarily in matters of organizing the military economy and rear of the Red Army.

The future army general was born into a large family of blacksmith Vasily Vasilyevich Khrulev, who before moving to the village worked for a long time as a hammerman in factories in St. Petersburg. Andrey grew up as a hardworking and smart boy. In 1903 he successfully graduated from the zemstvo school. But I didn’t have the chance to study further. Need forced me to go to work in St. Petersburg. He worked as an apprentice and then as a journeyman for more than eleven years in a goldsmith's workshop. During these same years, he graduated from evening general education courses, and in 1911, from the evening school of government foremen. Then he became a mechanic at the Okhtinsky Powder Plant.

In the difficult days of 1917, the young and energetic worker Andrei Khrulev took part in the storming of the Winter Palace and the suppression of the rebellion of A.F. Kerensky - P.I. Krasnov, and in February 1918 he was sent to the Mogilev province to conduct propaganda work. In March of the same year, he returned to Petrograd and joined the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, until June he worked as a party organizer at his native plant, then was appointed chairman of the district revolutionary guard committee. Since March 1918, Khrulev was the commissar of the Porokhovsky district commissariat of Petrograd. In August 1918, he volunteered to join the Red Army and was enlisted as a Red Army soldier in the 1st Soviet Regiment in Petrograd. In January - August 1919 - commandant of the revolutionary guard of the Porokhovsky district of Petrograd.

At the end of 1919 A.V. Khrulev was sent to the south of the country to fight the White Guards A.I. Denikin, in September 1920 took part in the defeat of the troops of General P.I. Wrangel, at the end of 1920 - beginning of 1921 he fought with the armed forces of N.I. Makhno in Ukraine. At that time, he already held the positions of assistant chief and then head of the political department of the 11th Cavalry Division of the 1st Cavalry Army.

After the war, from May 1922, he served as the head of the political department and military commissar of the 14th cavalry division of the North Caucasus Military District, from October 1922 he was the military commissar of the 4th cavalry division, and from May 1924 - commander and Commissioner of the 44th Territorial Cavalry Regiment of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade.

Command and political composition of the 1st Cavalry Army in the village of Labinskaya (from left to right): S.M. Budyonny, O.I. Gorodovikov, N.K. Shchelokov, S.K. Timoshenko, A.V. Khrulev.

In 1925, he graduated from the Military-Political Academic Courses of the Higher Political Staff of the Red Army. The certification for cadet Khrulev says: “Works diligently. In military subjects, he revealed military knowledge and abilities. In party terms, he is consistent. Corresponds to the position of military commander and division commander.” Upon completion of the course, he was appointed military commissar of the 10th cavalry division of the Moscow Military District (MVO). In 1928-1930 A.V. Khrulyov is the deputy head of the political department of the Moscow Military District. However, his organizational talent was especially evident in rear work. Since July 1930, Andrei Vasilyevich has been the head of the Central Military Financial Directorate, since December 1934 - the financial department, and since March 1936 - the Administration of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In 1936 - 1938 He successively held the positions of head of the Construction and Apartment Directorate of the Red Army and the Kyiv District Military Construction Directorate. In this position, corps commissar A.V. Khrulev, as noted in the certification dated May 17, 1940, “... showed himself to be a leader closely connected with the masses... skillfully directing the entire team of builders to implement the construction plan for the district... A strong-willed leader, proactive, energetic and demanding of himself and his subordinates.”

In October 1939 A.V. Khrulev, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 04370, was appointed head of the newly created Red Army Supply Directorate. While in this position, he enthusiastically takes on the obligations assigned to him, although initially his job responsibilities were not clearly regulated. According to Andrei Vasilyevich’s recollections, he worked in this position for about six months, without receiving any instructions as to what the head of the Supply Department should do, and without, in essence, having any authority. In general, the situation in the area of ​​organizing the rear of the Red Army in the pre-war period was critical, and the supply system was not worked out. Before the outbreak of hostilities in 1941, logistics support consisted of supplying troops by service with various types of materiel, as well as sanitary and veterinary support, and organizing transportation by rail. The Logistics Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army performed the functions of planning the accumulation of reserves. The Supply Department, reporting directly to the People's Commissar of Defense, was in charge of supplying the troops with food, baggage and clothing, and also controlled housing and maintenance issues, while the construction business was allocated to a department subordinate directly to the government. The Directorate of Military Communications, part of the General Staff, planned and carried out the transport of troops and materiel, mainly by rail. The fuel supply department also rested with the Chief of the General Staff. Weapons and technical support services were scattered across military departments. Such disunity had an extremely negative impact on the supply of troops during peacetime and, even more so, during combat operations. This circumstance clearly made itself felt during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. Then the supply of the active armies was established only in January - February 1940 thanks to the colossal efforts of A.V. Khruleva.

Having studied the experience of organizing quartermaster service in the tsarist army, Andrei Vasilyevich was inclined to the need to introduce the position of Chief Quartermaster of the Red Army. The range of issues subject to the responsibility of the chief quartermaster of the old Russian army included food, baggage and clothing supplies, housing and maintenance allowances, related financial issues, as well as providing the army with fuel. A.V. Khrulev spoke about the need to centralize the functions of supply authorities, as well as to grant the Chief Quartermaster of the Red Army the right to publish governing documents, thereby maximizing his powers.

In February 1940, the XVIII Party Conference took place, one of the most important tasks of which was to strengthen the rear and combat capability of the Red Army. After long discussions regarding the introduction of the position of Chief Intendant, A.V. Khrulev was appointed to it in August 1940. He immediately ordered the establishment of the positions of quartermasters of military districts.

In the first half of 1941 A.V. Khrulev organized a large-scale inventory of military equipment located in the troops. Under his leadership, new standards for clothing and food supplies were developed. The chief quartermaster paid great attention to the creation of reserves of property in case of war and their proper placement. Thus, when the government was considering the question of where to concentrate mobilization reserves, L.Z. Mehlis insisted on their accumulation in the border areas. A.V. Khrulev spoke about the need to place them beyond the Volga. I.V. Stalin accepted the point of view of L.Z. Mehlis, which caused the disorder in supply at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

Since the entry of A.V. Khrulev to the post of Chief Quartermaster of the Red Army, the matter of centralizing the supply of the army gradually but confidently began to move forward. The organization of centralized rear control was carried out through trial and error, which was practically eliminated in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. One of the reasons for the difficulty of solving this problem was the mutual misunderstanding in matters of organizing the rear between Andrei Vasilyevich and G.K. Zhukov, who was a supporter of the idea that army supply issues should be concentrated in the General Staff. It took a lot of work for A.V. Khruleva to convince the general. He appealed to the fact that the headquarters should be engaged in operational work, in the same case, if supply functions are concentrated in the central body of military command, defeat in the war is inevitable. While in the position of Chief Quartermaster, A.V. Khrulev, together with his staff, prepared proposals for the reorganization of rear structures. On August 1, 1941, on the basis of the Resolution of the State Defense Committee of July 31, 1941, Order No. 0257 of the People's Commissariat of Defense was issued, establishing the organizational chart developed by the Chief Quartermaster. From that time on, the entire supply of the army was in charge of the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army, who was also the head of the Main Logistics Directorate created at the same time. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense A.V. was appointed to this position. Khrulev. In November 1942, he was awarded the rank of Colonel General of the Quartermaster Service. He led the rear of the Red Army throughout the Great Patriotic War. There was a headquarters under the chief of logistics. Subordinate to him were the Directorate of Military Communications, which was previously part of the General Staff, the Road Directorate, the Inspectorate, the Main Quartermaster Directorate, the Fuel Supply Directorate, the Sanitary and Veterinary Directorates.

By the Decree of the State Defense Committee of June 9, 1943, the Main Logistics Directorate was abolished and instead of the post of Chief of Logistics of the Red Army - Head of the Main Logistics Directorate, the position of Chief of Logistics - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense was established. General A.V. was again appointed to this position. Khrulev. This rear management scheme was retained, with some changes, until the end of the war, and proved to be very successful.

The Chief of Logistics of the Red Army was responsible for organizing the supply of weapons, military equipment and all types of materiel to the fronts; laying and repairing communication lines; delivery of military reinforcements to the fronts; ensuring the evacuation of the wounded and sick from the territory of hostilities, managing the sanitary and veterinary services and setting up medical institutions; construction and distribution of military warehouses and bases between fronts, military districts and much more. Under his direct control, full-fledged rear control bodies were created, which from the moment of their formation were involved in active activities at the fronts. General A.V. Khrulev personally checked the implementation of logistics support measures for all fronts and individual armies. He demanded the same from the rear headquarters and the supply and support departments subordinate to him, and maintained constant close contact with all the people's commissariats and departments carrying out orders for the needs of the front. Knowing in detail the state of affairs in the subordinate services and troops, as the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army, he made timely and correct decisions, combining the interests of the army and the national economy. At the same time, he regarded the provision of the army not only as an economic supply function, but also as an operational-strategic task. “Front-line military leaders remember with great gratitude the attention and care with which A.V. Khrulev to the needs of the troops, his constant desire to provide the active army with everything necessary for battle and victory over the enemy,” Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. later noted. Eremenko. With the increase in the scope of operations, the rear became more and more mobile and productive. For example, complex and important tasks were carried out by the rear of the Red Army in the battles for Leningrad and Moscow. With the onset of freeze-up on Lake Ladoga, the ice route “Road of Life” began operating. She played a major role in supplying Leningrad and the Leningrad Front in the winter of 1941-1942. In 1942, a pipeline with a total length of 35 km was laid across Lake Ladoga to supply fuel to the besieged city. Hundreds of thousands of tons of petroleum products were transported through it. The rear authorities under the leadership of A.V. Khrulev provided the troops with everything they needed during the defensive battle, the preparation of the counteroffensive and the offensive of the Red Army near Moscow. Having studied the state of rear services in the active army, A.V. Khrulev promptly helped eliminate shortcomings, allocated the necessary material resources and controlled their delivery to the front. The rear forces, in difficult conditions, acted with enormous effort, successfully ensuring supplies for the advancing troops.

During the Great Patriotic War, Andrei Vasilyevich was entrusted with the most complex and most important areas. So, in 1942-1943. At the same time, he also performed the duties of People's Commissar of Railways. According to the memoirs of A.V. Khrulev, on the night of March 25, 1942, he received a decision to appoint him People's Commissar of Railways. Literally immediately the former People's Commissar of Railways L.M. called. Kaganovich, who asked to come urgently. The transfer of official powers lasted 15 minutes. Such urgency was dictated by the need for the clearest possible coordination of the activities of the supply departments, the Office of Military Transport and the People's Commissariat of Railways, the main tasks of which were: coordination of transportation, development of the road network and the country's transport fleet.

Military equipment to the front. Photo 1943

As People's Commissar of Railways, Andrei Vasilyevich, first of all, took up the task of putting the locomotive fleet in order. Under his leadership, locomotive columns of a special reserve of the People's Commissariat of Railways were created, which were used as additional means of transporting trains and cargo.

A.V. Khrulev often traveled to troops in order to personally familiarize himself with the work of rear structures on the ground. An example of the initiative of the chief of logistics is the fact that he created a commission in September 1941 to check the medical care and nutrition of the trains of Red Army soldiers traveling through the Moscow railway junction. The reason for the creation of the commission was a letter reporting serious shortcomings in the supply of troops. Based on the results of the inspection, Instructions were issued for providing personnel to units traveling by railway trains.

Logistics agencies and the selfless activities of the personnel of rear formations, units and institutions largely contributed to increasing the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Motherland appreciated the activities of the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army. In September 1943 A.V. Khrulev was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st degree, and in November he was awarded the military rank of Army General. The entire course of the war showed that the rear of the Red Army fully coped with the enormous tasks assigned to it. Thus, in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR dated August 25, 1946, it was especially noted: “In the Great Patriotic War, the personnel of the rear services - quartermasters, road workers, military communications workers, supply services, doctors and veterinarians successfully coped with the tasks assigned to them to support the front . The personnel of the rear services adequately fulfilled their duty to the Motherland.”

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.I. Kalinin hands A.V. Khrulev
Order of Suvorov 1st class. 1943

The enormous organizational work of A.V. Khrulev carried out comprehensive support for Soviet troops in the Far East in preparation for and during the defeat of militaristic Japan, and to provide assistance to the people's revolutionary forces and the population of China and Korea. The fighting of Soviet troops took place in Northeast China, North Korea, the Sea of ​​Japan and Okhotsk, on Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. The total area of ​​this theater of military operations reached 1,500 thousand square meters. km. The network of railways and highways was poorly developed here, which created great difficulties for the advance of troops, as well as for rear formations, units and institutions. Despite this, the rear services of the center, fronts, armies, formations and units in a short period of time were able to carry out enormous work in preparing the theater of military operations, ensuring regroupings and concentration of troops, and creating reserves of material resources.

After the war A.V. Khrulev continued to lead the rear of the Soviet army. Since March 1946, he held the position of Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces - Deputy Minister of the USSR Armed Forces for Logistics (since 1950, Deputy Minister of War).

In 1951-1953 He was Deputy Minister of Construction Materials Industry of the USSR. In October 1953, he was transferred to the reserve, but continued to hold leadership positions in the civil service. So, in 1953-1956. A.V. Khrulev was Deputy Minister of Road Transport and Highways of the USSR in 1956-1958. Deputy Minister of Construction of the USSR. In April 1958, Andrei Vasilyevich was again returned to the Armed Forces and enrolled in the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In addition to extensive and fruitful practical activities during the period of military and civil service, the merits of A.V. Khrulev also includes a number of relevant published works on issues of organizing the rear and logistics. In addition to the above, he was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the second convocation. For his services to the Motherland, he was awarded two Orders of Lenin, four Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov 1st class, medals and foreign awards. Andrei Vasilyevich died on June 9, 1962, and, as one of the prominent government and military figures, was buried on Red Square.

Maria Konevskaya,
junior researcher
Research Institute of Military History of the VAGS of the Russian Armed Forces

8th People's Commissar of Railways of the USSR March 25 - February 26
Predecessor	Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich
Successor	Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich
Birth	September 18 (30)(1892-09-30 ) village Bolshaya Alexandrovka, Yamburg Uyezd, St. Petersburg Governorate, Russian Empire
Death	the 9th of June(1962-06-09 ) (69 years old) Moscow, USSR
Burial place	Necropolis near the Kremlin wall
The consignment	CPSU
Awards
Military service
Years of service	1918-1951
Affiliation	USSR USSR
Type of army
Rank
Battles	The Great Patriotic War
Andrey Vasilievich Khrulev on Wikimedia Commons

Education

Biography

Service in the Red Army. Civil War

Interwar period

During the Great Patriotic War

Awards

Memoirs of contemporaries

Andrei Vasilyevich was distinguished by his high ability to work, inexhaustible energy, and always promptly resolved all issues that arose.
And there were a lot of them. …. there was a colossal flow of cargo, in particular weapons and ammunition. And all these transportations had to be planned and coordinated.
Andrei Vasilyevich managed to focus the work of VOSO in such a way that his boss I.V. Kovalev, together with his apparatus ..... throughout the war, reliably provided the GAU with transport.

During the Patriotic War, General Khrulev was the head of the rear of the Red Army. A most talented organizer, whom Stalin and all the generals appreciated.

So, one day Stalin’s assistant Poskrebyshev called him. “Here,” he says, “an encrypted message arrived from Khrushchev. He reports that the troops of the Stalingrad Front have restored the bridge across the Volga. Did your units seem to be doing this?” Khrulev asked Poskrebyshev to hold Khrushchev’s telegram and wrote a report on how everything really happened. And Poskrebyshev reported both papers to Stalin together. And he gave Khrushchev a good infusion over the phone for lying.

So Khrushchev took revenge on Khrulev for this incident for many years. He kept it in the shade for a long time and did not let it grow. Khrulev was appointed Deputy Minister of Highways and Highways. Khrushchev thought for a long time what kind of pig he could put in front of him. He decided to raise the Astrakhan floodplain. And he sent Khrulev there as an authorized representative.

He died soon after. Where to bury? The military is in favor of the Kremlin wall, Khrushchev is categorically against it. I delayed it to the last minute. The deceased lies in the House of the Soviet Army. It is already necessary to take it out, but the issue is not resolved. If in the grave, then it must be taken to the Novodevichy cemetery, if in the wall, then it must be cremated. And literally a few hours before the funeral, Khrushchev gave in, changed his mind, and allowed the burial on Red Square.

Somehow it happened that in our army the rear guards were like second-class soldiers. Combat commanders always demanded a lot from them, but after battles, honors and awards for home front workers were often passed over. Even in the memoirs of famous commanders, not too much is said about the activities of rear guards during the Great Patriotic War. Probably for the first time in Russian military history, only the famous writer, former front-line intelligence officer, Hero of the Soviet Union Vladimir Karpov openly said in his new documentary work “Army General Khrulev” that without well-organized logistics support, there might not have been a victory in May 1945. Probably, with this book the writer will receive blows from critics from literature and history. Only Vladimir Karpov, through his writing, always tried to defend historical truth and undeservedly offended military leaders. He openly points out that it was the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army, Army General Andrei Khrulev, and his logisticians who ensured all the victories of our marshals. But at the same time, in his homeland, the famous general, whom his contemporaries called a great statesman, turned out to be unfairly offended and almost consigned to oblivion.

HIS PLACE IS IN THE FRONT ROW

For more than five decades, there has been a legend among military and civilian historians about one photograph, which depicts all the top Soviet military leaders - front commanders, heads of the General Staff, participants in the gala reception in honor of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War in the Kremlin. While photographing military leaders in the first row on both sides of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Generalissimo Joseph Stalin, Marshals Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Konev, Govorov began to sit down according to their merits and honors... And suddenly Stalin noticed that the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army, Army General Andrei Khrulev, was stationed in where something in the third row. Unexpectedly, Stalin called Khrulev, and when he approached, he told the commanders standing around him that without this general there would have been no victories in the last war. After this, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief personally indicated to Andrei Khrulev a place for photographing in the first row of marshals not far from him.

The writer Vladimir Karpov managed to find this historical photograph in the archives. Sitting third to the left of Stalin in the row of marshals is Army General Andrei Khrulev. Almost all marshals have impressive medal bars, with two and three Stars of Heroes, but Khrulev only has shiny buttons on his uniform jacket. He was nominated for the title of Hero of Socialist Labor in 1943, but was never given the title. But this military leader, for his deeds during the Great Patriotic War, is more worthy than anyone else of the highest state awards. But apparently those military and civilian officials who offered Stalin the lists of those awarded did not think so. But still the thought creeps in that maybe there is nothing offensive in this for a rear official, even one of the highest rank, like General Andrei Khrulev. Well, he provided the troops with everything they needed, well, he worked selflessly for victory, what’s heroic about that? There were many such officials during the war. After all, he himself did not lead troops into battles, nor did he risk his own life. All this is true. Only this is too superficial an opinion due to, perhaps, the deliberate suppression of the truth about the activities of Andrei Khrulev during the war. Too much of his adherence to principles made him powerful enemies, and those who tried very hard to hide the truth about the general and his activities in the name of victory.

This is probably why the general remained known for his deeds and exploits only among military rear officials. In academies and schools, students and cadets carefully study his work in solving the most difficult state problems during the war, which were beyond the capabilities of even the all-powerful head of the NKVD of the USSR, Lavrentiy Beria.

Here, for example, is what the current Chief of Logistics of the Russian Armed Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General Vladimir Isakov, said specifically for NVO about the role of General Andrei Khrulev in the Great Victory: “It was under the leadership of Andrei Vasilyevich Khrulev that in the first days of the Great Patriotic War the such a logistics support system that gave our soldier everything he needed to achieve victory in 1945. Having extensive experience in military, administrative and economic activities, the ability to deeply and comprehensively analyze major problems, in the first days of the war he presented to the country's leadership the most compelling and serious arguments about the need to create a single centralized rear. This gave the combined arms headquarters and commanders the opportunity to pay great attention to issues of direct command and control of troops. The price of all responsibility in that period and in those circumstances was life itself. In the shortest possible time, in the most difficult economic conditions, Khrulev created such a system of rear provision of troops, which later fully justified itself." There is no doubt about the objectivity of Army General Vladimir Isakov. In combat conditions in Afghanistan, he worked as deputy chief of logistics of the famous 40th Army. He was seriously wounded. So he knows the work of military logistics from the very bottom and can competently assert: the logistical principles laid down by Khrulev during the Great Patriotic War have not lost their relevance for the current Russian army. And you shouldn’t retreat from them, but on the contrary, you just need to improve them.

CHIEF OF REPORT

From documentary sources it is now well known what the situation prevailed in the first weeks and months of the war in the Kremlin, the General Staff, and the Ministry of Defense. Despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army, a military disaster moved like a heavy roller from the western borders of the USSR to Moscow. In one day, the now famous victorious military leaders surrendered a dozen cities. Military headquarters lost control of the troops. The head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Lev Mehlis, who was appointed to strengthen the Western Front as a member of its Military Council, strengthened it so much that without trial or investigation, in front of the formation of the commanders of the headquarters of the 34th Army, he shot the major general for the loss of material artillery and allegedly cowardice and two days of drunkenness Goncharov's artillery. And then, on the instructions of Mehlis, the army commander, General Kachanov, was shot by a tribunal verdict. They were subsequently rehabilitated.

And in this atmosphere of general nervousness and suspicion, the head of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Andrei Khrulev, proposes to Stalin and the State Defense Committee to completely reorganize the logistics support of the Red Army. Appoint 7 logistics chiefs of seven fronts, form appropriate logistics support structures, organize the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army with a headquarters, military communications department, highway department, and inspection. The proposal was accepted by the State Defense Committee. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Lieutenant General of the Quartermaster Service Andrei Khrulev is appointed Chief of the Logistics. The main quartermaster department, fuel supply department, sanitary department, and veterinary department are subordinate to him.

Thus, in August, for the first time in the Red Army, as Khrulev personally proposed to Stalin, a coherent system of logistics support for troops was created. Combatant commanders freed themselves from economic burdens and completely switched to leading and controlling troops. A mistake in this innovation could cost Khrulev his life. But he calculated and verified everything correctly, based on the experience of providing troops in the tsarist army. And I was not mistaken.

The new rear structure showed itself very effectively already at the beginning of the battle near Moscow, and then in October during the evacuation of the capital. The activities of General Khrulev during that period were very closely monitored by the head of GlavPUR, Lev Mehlis. Back in 1935, he accused Khrulev of being involved in a conspiracy between the military and Tukhachevsky against Soviet power. But then Marshal Kliment Voroshilov stood up for Khrulev, who knew him from working together in Petrograd in 1917, and then from his service in the First Cavalry Army. Mehlis's expectations were not met. Khrulev's logisticians and he personally provided the troops near Moscow with everything they needed. During the October panic in the capital, Khrulev directly organized the evacuation of the General Staff, the Academy of Sciences, state food reserves and much more to Kuibyshev.

In an atmosphere of general nervousness, extremely delicate situations arose. Thus, by order of the Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee Shcherbakov, warm army hats, mittens, and padded jackets began to be distributed from warehouses. Khrulev opposed this. Naturally, Shcherbakov complained to Stalin. Then a member of the front’s military council, Bulganin, again complained to Stalin about Khrulev that there was no warm clothing and the troops could not fight normally. Enraged, Stalin began to threaten Khrulev with arrest and execution. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not throw threats to the wind. However, Khrulev reported with complete composure that Bulganin’s troops had already received 200 thousand complete sets of warm uniforms and the general simply did not know what he had at the front. After this, Stalin harshly reprimanded Bulganin. Naturally, such disputes multiplied the number of ill-wishers and envious people of Khrulev himself. There were even more of them when, in February-March 1942, a catastrophic situation arose on the country's railways.

All railways were clogged with freight trains, trains, and wagons. The Yaroslavl, Northern, and Kazan railways literally stopped. And this happened during the counter-offensive of our troops. Stalin's all-powerful close associate, People's Commissar of Railways Lazar Kaganovich, did not report to the State Defense Committee about the impending railway disaster on a nationwide scale. The manifold increase in transportation along steel highways created traffic jams hundreds of kilometers long. There seemed to be no way to solve this problem. And with the improvement of the weather, German aviation would simply destroy all of our railway transport, which at that time was the only means of transporting troops, weapons, supporting the activities of industry, and the entire national economy.

In mid-March, Stalin urgently summoned General Khrulev from the front and included him in a special commission to examine cases at the People's Commissariat of Railways. It included the most prominent figures of that time: People's Commissar Kaganovich himself, members of the State Defense Committee Beria, Malenkov. In turn, the People's Commissar of the NKPS Kaganovich did not accept any advice and only cursed furiously, accusing the other members of the commission of incompetence. Seeing this situation, Stalin proposed that the party's Politburo appoint Khrulev as People's Commissar of the NKPS, leaving him with his previous military position. Within a few days, a solution was found to clear the railway traffic jams. From the hundreds of steam locomotives evacuated from the territory occupied by the Germans in reserve, special maneuverable locomotive columns of 30 cars each were created. They, often under fire from enemy aircraft, prevented a major railway disaster in the country, which directly played into the hands of the German command. This proposal of Khrulev turned out to be so effective in the operation of transport that throughout the war, 86 special columns of the special reserve of the NKPS were formed, which included 1940 steam locomotives. They ensured, if necessary, the fastest possible delivery of troops and weapons during all front-line operations. Probably for this one thing alone, Khrulev should have been awarded the highest state awards. But instead of orders, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin, the Politburo, and the State Defense Committee entrusted the Chief of Logistics with tasks that others could not handle. It is not possible to list all the non-combat labor exploits of Khrulev and his rear personnel who ensured victories on the battlefields. Here are just the most grandiose ones.

NON-BATTLE FEATURES

The rear officials created strategic multi-month fuel reserves in huge oil pits in the Urals. If the Germans had managed to capture the Caucasus fields or cut the Caspian waterway, then the Red Army would have been able to counterattack the enemy using these reserves. During the Battle of Stalingrad, rolling railways were built and the troops were provided with everything they needed. Without millions of tons of ammunition, weapons, food, uniforms, our troops would probably hardly have stood on the Volga, and then defeated the group of Field Marshal Paulus and drove the tanks and motorized infantry of Colonel General Manstein across the snowy steppes.

The Hero of Russia, combat general-colonel Gennady Troshev, spoke very clearly about the work of the rear of the Russian army in a conversation: “A soldier needs the rear not only in war, but also in everyday life. You can’t feed a soldier three times a day, you can’t wash him, you can’t cure him - this "Not a soldier. If you don't lubricate the tire of a car, the car won't move. We remember the home front when we want to eat, when our field uniform is completely worn out. And we must always remember the home front." I note that this was noted by a general who served in the army for 38 years and fought in Chechnya. Retired colonel and Hero of the Soviet Union, writer Vladimir Karpov, also responded in a conversation about the Home Front and the rear people. By the way, while a prisoner, in 1942 he dug the same oil pits for strategic fuel reserves that Lieutenant General Khrulev proposed to create. From these pits he voluntarily ended up in a penal company and became a legendary scout in foot reconnaissance. Personally participated in the capture of 79 “languages”. “I have the right to speak about this service because it provided me with everything I needed during the war. Then I was even lower than a private, I was one of the convicted prisoners transferred to the penalty box. And the rear service,” the world-famous man told NVO writer, - did not differentiate between penal prisoners and soldiers of the Red Army. We were supplied with everything necessary, like the personnel units. This is the humanity of the rear service and General Khrulev personally. That's why I wrote a book about General Khrulev and the rear soldiers, about the great importance of the rear in the matter victory."

DETRACTIVES

But, obviously, there were figures in the country who held a different opinion about the activities of the rear officials and Khrulev. As the general's popularity and authority grew, their number grew. Things obviously didn’t work out for Khrulev with the all-powerful People’s Commissar of the NKVD Lavrenty Beria. As the writer Vladimir Karpov says, in February 1943, Stalin summoned the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army and People's Commissar of Railways Andrei Khrulev and asked how long it would take to transfer the troops of the Don Front and several armies of the Stalingrad Front to Kursk and Ostashkov. At that time, preparations were already underway for the famous battle of Kursk. Previously, Khrulev had already calculated that 75 thousand wagons would be required to transport troops. In addition, the troops were located far from the railways, which had been completely destroyed during recent fighting. A gigantic amount of work lay ahead, which Khrulev intended to complete in 2-3 months. Stalin was clearly not satisfied with such terms. And he appointed Beria as the representative of the State Defense Committee for the transportation of troops to Kursk, and Malenkov to Ostashkov. Stalin allocated only two weeks for this operation. Beria did not accept all of Khrulev’s precisely calculated objections. He began to shout and threaten that the NKVD would do everything without the NKPS. As a result, Beria's adventure ended in complete failure. In March, mud began on the roads, and the bulk of the troops were still near Stalingrad.

At that time, Khrulev, seeing the lack of confidence in himself and Beria’s obvious adventure, refused the post of People’s Commissar of the NKPS and remained the head of the rear of the Red Army. But, despite this, in March he received an order to withdraw Rokossovsky’s troops from Stalingrad to the Kursk region. He cleared up all the congestion on the railways. Previously invented and created locomotive columns played a huge role in this. On time, 75 thousand cars were delivered to the positions of the troops of the legendary Rokossovsky. They promptly created a defense in depth. It is no coincidence that the writer Vladimir Karpov in his book asks the question, what if Khrulev’s rear people had not managed to ensure this concentration? The answer is not difficult to find. The small Soviet troops would be attacked by prepared, fully mobilized German divisions, equipped with the latest tanks. In this case, our country could well find itself in the situation of 1941, and the Germans would again rush to Moscow or to the Volga to Stalingrad. So General Khrulev took a direct part in creating an effective defense on the Kursk Bulge, where our troops won one of the greatest and decisive battles of the Second World War.

NO REWARDS

And then there were other battles and battles in which the rear troops comprehensively provided for the troops - they supplied millions of tons of ammunition, returned millions of wounded to duty, established crossings of large and small rivers, and at the same time they themselves died from fascist bullets and shells. Well, their chief, General of the Army Khrulev, this title was awarded to him in 1943, probably only after the General Staff Marshals Vasilevsky, Antonov, and even the representative of the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zhukov, visited Stalin’s carpet more than all other military leaders. For comparison: Zhukov visited there 127 times throughout the war, and Khrulev 113 times. And this is not counting numerous telephone conversations and instructions with distributions. However, our illustrious commanders do not have a count of the highest orders, and Khrulev has only a few. Two Orders of Lenin and two Orders of Suvorov, 1st degree. The rest are for length of service, or from the Civil War. The writer Vladimir Karpov quite rightly exclaims that “the Supreme Commander turned out to be greedy in relation to his intendant.” But surely without this military leader and wise statesman the path to victory over Nazi Germany would have been completely different. During the war, Stalin relied on Khrulev, trusted him, it’s a pity that he did not reward him according to his deserts.

But the battles died down and completely different laws began to rule peaceful life. In 1947, Khrulev’s long-time ill-wisher, Marshal Bulganin, became Minister of Defense, who maintained close relations with other “friends” of the chief quartermaster Beria and Mehlis. How could these figures forget the reprimands that Stalin himself inflicted on them after Khrulev’s fair reports.

The first blow was dealt to Khrulev in 1948. In broad daylight, the army general’s wife, Esther, disappeared in the central military trade building near the Kremlin. The Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces was not even informed for what sins she was sentenced to 10 years in the camps. And then Bulganin, already in the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, after the death of Stalin, dismissed Khrulev from the Armed Forces. Only in 1957, the new Minister of Defense, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, who knew Khrulev well and highly valued him, reinstated him in the army. However, this time Khrulev became not the head of the Logistics, but a military inspector of the group of general inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Only after the death of Khrulev was he really given the highest honors in our country. As the writer Vladimir Karpov points out, at the request of Anastas Mikoyan, the general was buried not as previously expected - at the Novodevichy cemetery in the capital, but on Red Square near the Kremlin wall.

During the Great Patriotic War, the greatest difficulties fell on the shoulders of General Khrulev. And he solved them with honor. It is probably no coincidence that Army General Isakov answered NVO’s question that he considers Khrulev the founder of the Logistics of our Armed Forces, including the modern one. “The principles that he laid down in 1941,” said quartermaster Vladimir Isakov, who provided troops in the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya, “are still alive today.” True, there was a period when in 1951-1956. The structure of the Home Front changed. But in 1956 they again returned to the rear system developed by Khrulev.

Today, the rear organization is being improved. By 2005, an interdepartmental logistics support system will be fully formed in Russia. There will be one rear for all law enforcement agencies. This will result in significant savings in public funds. In market conditions, uniform purchase prices for military products and weapons are already being established. Price transparency, control, competitive bidding eliminate bribery and overspending. And all this will have a better impact on the supply and armament of the army.

Army General A.V. Khrulev

The head of the rear of the Soviet army left the table, greeting Professor M. M. Zagyu, the luminary of the quartermaster service, who received the rank of general from the Emperor.

A big soldier’s thank you, Andrey Vasilievich! From the heart. I bow from the waist,” the guest excitedly shook hands with the owner of the office.

For what, Comrade General?

For that true miracle that appeared to me in my declining years. I will never forget to my death that already in the second year of the last world war the Russian army lacked everything, absolutely everything. And now our army has plenty of everything. And for this, from the old soldier, the deepest thanks to you...

The veteran’s admiring surprise from the point of view of a specialist was quite understandable: the Soviet army, this huge, complex military machine, constantly inflicting crushing blows on the aggressor, was indeed amplely supplied with food, fodder, fuel, uniforms, ammunition, and various military-technical equipment - and this in conditions maneuverable war, with a constantly changing front line! The number of wounded who were completely cured in hospitals and returned to duty reached 70% - a value previously unheard of...

The administrative and economic miracle seemed especially grandiose in comparison with the order that reigned during the First World War. The main reasons for the poor supply then were, firstly, the strategic mistakes of the military-political leadership in assessing the nature of the future war, which is why they did not bother to create the necessary reserves of material resources in advance, and secondly, theft and corruption, which mercilessly corroded the state apparatus. They stole in the tsarist army on a large scale and boldly, with daring and courage stemming from the confidence in complete impunity.

The roots of the bad tradition were deep. No wonder Tsar Peter I, the creator of the regular armed forces, shouted “Thief! Thief!" attacked his closest associate, Prince Menshikov, with a club he made with his own hands. And a century later, Tsar Alexander I spoke about his dignitaries: “They would steal my battleships if they knew where to hide them...”

During the Crimean War, thefts, taking on a truly Homeric character, captured the imagination of foreigners and had a direct impact on the course of hostilities. It got to the point that next to the new fortress, using the money stolen during construction, it was possible to erect another one of the same kind.

The system adopted in the tsarist army allowed officers to have almost no control over the money allocated for feeding personnel and purchasing fodder for horses. In 1914, the dragoon captain Krym-Shamkhalov-Sokolov, in response to the request of the sergeant S. M. Budyonny to give money for food for the starving soldiers, cursed dirtyly, and then threw three rubles and shouted: “Here, buy them a cart of firewood, let them gnaw!” »

Unfortunately, such cases were far from isolated. As for the honest officers - and without them there would have been neither victory in the gigantic Battle of Galicia, nor the famous Brusilov breakthrough - they, not without reason, suspected the command, which was losing confidence, of deliberately losing battles and operations. After all, defeat, retreat, disorderly evacuation - this is the whirlpool in which it is easiest to hide traces of particularly large thefts.

The soldiers, in turn, were also not always distinguished by their thrifty attitude towards military property and willingly exchanged, for example, high-quality yuft boots (there were no tarpaulin boots at that time) for food and alcohol. Even rifles purchased abroad, whose bladed bayonets served as an excellent bargaining item, were dismantled. Under these conditions, both General Zagyu and even General Goretsky himself, who headed the quartermaster service, people who were undoubtedly decent and personally crystal honest, could only somewhat reduce the damage caused by the system with their high professionalism.

After 1917 the situation changed dramatically. The new government showed that it has the most effective medicine for treating an old disease - hot iron, and most importantly, it is determined to use it without hesitation. Honest officers, perked up, joined the Red Army in their thousands.

At the same time, in August 1918, Andrei Vasilyevich Khrulev began military service. He joined the ranks voluntarily, as an ordinary soldier, although for his less than 26 years he had experience of underground revolutionary activity in St. Petersburg, where he came to work from his native village Bolshoi Alexandrovich as a child. The punishment for being “illegal” was 8 months in prison and exile - albeit not far away, to Estonia.

The mechanic of the Okhtinsky plant managed to be a member of the Porokhovsky district committee of the RSDLP (b), deputy chairman of the district council of workers' and soldiers' deputies, chairman of the special department of the region under the Petrograd Cheka, commandant of the revolutionary guard of the region, and even for some time headed the financial department of the Cheka. Without hesitation, he went to any area of ​​work and coped with everything thanks to his natural intelligence and remarkable energy.

The nugget’s talent turned out to be in demand in a new field: at the end of February 1920, A.V. Khrulev was already the commissar of the 2nd Cavalry Division of the 1st Cavalry Army. His personal courage and organizational skills were highly appreciated by both Army Commander S. M. Budyonny and member of the Military Council K. E. Voroshilov, whom A. V. Khrulev knew from underground work since 1912.

Cavalry battles, in which up to 40 thousand sabers took part on both sides, difficult campaigns and rapid raids behind enemy lines. Fighting in the North Caucasus against Denikin's troops, then on the Polish front, near Lvov and in the Crimea, against Wrangel, the liquidation of gangs in Ukraine and Belarus. Yes, it is dangerous, yes, it is not easy. But what lies ahead is the complete victory of the world revolution and the beautiful blue cities where happy people of the near future live and work.

The young commissar thought so, and so did the political instructor Esta Gorelik, who served in his division. They fell in love with each other and united so as not to part, sharing everything destined by fate.

However, Andrei Vasilyevich was never a groundless dreamer and understood well that a bright future will not come on its own, it must be built, and built today. He created 12 clubs, 16 main and 54 mobile libraries in the division, despite the battles and campaigns. And he also understood that words must be backed up by deeds, by caring for people, for each specific person. What is it like in the conditions of devastation that replaced the civil war?

This means that everything must be protected, saved, carefully preserved. Saving begins with small things, he instilled in soldiers and commanders - with a button, with a cartridge, with cleaning boots. Andrei Vasilyevich carefully ensured that the horsemen were well fed, dressed, shod, and had proper living conditions.

In 1924, military reform began, associated with the transition to a territorial police system with the goal of significantly reducing the Armed Forces and saving budget funds. At the very beginning, Andrei Vasilyevich went to the North Caucasus to accept the post of commander of the 44th cavalry regiment. He had to command the unit for a little less than a year, but even during this time he tried to delve as deeply as possible into the details of the organization of combat training and the intricacies of the headquarters service.

Things were going well in the regiment, but Andrei Vasilyevich felt that the previous knowledge gained at the zemstvo school and at evening general education courses in St. Petersburg was no longer enough. Therefore, when the opportunity arose to enroll in the Military Academic Courses for senior political personnel, I did not refuse.

He always greedily sought knowledge, absorbed it like a sponge, and studied with great pleasure. I was especially attracted to political economy; I read thick textbooks at once, like adventure novels.

The year flew by unnoticed, and now I’m back in the troops. Commissioner of the division, corps, deputy head of the political department of the Moscow Military District. At all positions, along with his ebullient energy, tirelessness and resourcefulness, his concern for people was clearly manifested - not in the abstract, but visibly, through attention to their material support.

Such qualities, along with obvious administrative talent and economic knowledge, did not escape the attention of K. E. Voroshilov, who at that time became the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. In July 1930, A.V. Khrulev was appointed head of the Central Military-Financial Directorate of the Red Army.

It was a time of important economic changes. The country was preparing to become an advanced industrial power, and its army was equipped with modern military equipment. The role of financial activity in the development of the Armed Forces naturally increased.

The Central Military Financial Directorate was responsible for implementing the general financial policy in the People's Commissariat of Defense, drawing up and executing its estimates, paying for military supplies to industry, and satisfying units and formations with various types of monetary allowances.

The appointment of Andrei Vasilievich coincided with the transition to a centralized financing system. The budget accounts of the central departments of the People's Commissariat were closed, all loans were opened to the accounts of the Central Military Financial Directorate and were used in accordance with its estimates, which made it possible to maneuver funds, managing them from one center.

But these were only the first steps, and the new chief was constantly working to improve the military-financial service. Soon he proposed a number of changes aimed at ensuring strict planning and savings in financial spending. At the same time, the rights of unit commanders to use their own funds were expanded, and the heads of the main departments of the People's Commissariat were given the opportunity to independently conclude contracts with suppliers on the basis of an approved plan and within the limits of the allocated amounts. At the same time, independent financial services were created at all levels of the Armed Forces, subordinate directly to unit commanders.

Understanding that it is possible to fulfill the intended tasks only by relying on honest and qualified employees, Andrei Vasilyevich paid great attention to the selection and placement of personnel. Everyone who knew him personally noted a deep, innate sense of justice. He reacted instantly to abuses and violations of financial discipline, and responsibility came quickly. It was dangerous for thieves and corrupt officials to be around such a person.

Purposeful work led to the improvement of financial bodies, and by 1933 they already had every opportunity to eradicate mismanagement, could exercise strict control over the ruble, and pay more attention to budget planning and inspection activities. On January 30 of the same year, Adolf Hitler, the leader of the Nazi Party, became Chancellor of Germany. And a little later, on July 15, on the initiative of N. Chamberlain in Rome, the so-called “Pact of Four,” directed against the USSR, was signed between the governments of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Public protests did not allow its ratification and thwarted the formation of a powerful anti-Soviet coalition, but nevertheless, the enemies of the Soviet Union did not abandon their intentions.

But two years earlier, J.V. Stalin, having determined the likely timing of a future war, uttered the phrase that later became famous: “We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. Either we will run this distance in 10 years, or we will be crushed.” Measures were outlined to dramatically expand the mobilization capabilities of the national economy, and, if necessary, transfer the entire economy to a war footing. The country's defense potential has grown steadily.

Andrei Vasilyevich Khrulev more than once told his subordinates: “We need to plan the expenditure of public funds in such a way that every ruble is a contribution to improving and strengthening defense.” His merits were noted by awarding him the military rank of “Corps Commissar” in March 1935, although not everyone approved of his independence and toughness in defending budget expenditure estimates.

Suspicious, vindictive, and confident in his own infallibility, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, L. Z. Mehlis, took the strict framework of financial discipline extremely painfully and responded with a whole series of insidious intrigues and loud accusations. There was also a loss of political vigilance, and failure to take sufficient measures to eliminate sabotage, and the use of official position, and, of course, communication with the enemies of the people.

For the time being, everything worked out well, and when an intelligent, energetic leader was needed to restore order in another area of ​​work, they could not find a better candidate than A.V. Khrulev. In August 1936, he was appointed head of the construction and housing department of the People's Commissariat of Defense. He quickly mastered a new business, launched a large-scale construction of barracks and residential buildings for officers - the deployment of the Armed Forces was being prepared on the basis of universal conscription, and a great many such facilities were required, as well as airfields for the rapidly growing aviation. But it seems that new successes have angered the enemies even more.

Mekhlis accused Andrei Vasilyevich of participating in Tukhachevsky’s conspiracy. The arrow seems to have hit its target this time. The corps commissar felt the storm clouds gathering, but, overcoming the heaviness in his heart, he worked even harder than before. But now - removal from office, transfer to the reserve. It's not hard to guess what's next.

He was expecting arrest, but received... an order to head the military construction department of the Kyiv district.

Say thank you to Voroshilov,” Mehlis said with frightening frankness at the meeting. - He covered for you and did not let me treat you as I should have done. But I will try to do everything possible to make my wish come true.

Andrei Vasilyevich arrived in Kyiv late in the evening and went straight from the station to the department, where he found several employees who were late. The conversation began, casual and long. By the end, its new boss clearly understood the state of affairs, and also formulated fundamentally new tasks for high-speed construction and the organization of special installation departments.

The trust of his subordinates was won in the shortest possible time here too: to Khrulev on official and personal issues. Usually impulsive with bursting energy, in difficult situations he became calm and balanced, conveying faith in his abilities to his subordinates. Andrei Vasilyevich knew how to listen to a person, carefully understand the details of the issue, and accept good advice. At times, irritated by mistakes and omissions, he could stage a noisy scolding, but always without personal attacks, much less insults. They were not offended by such outbursts and looked at them as a parental scolding.

Important military infrastructure facilities were growing quickly, things seemed to be going well, but at the beginning of September a telephone call rang in the office of the corps commissar. S.K. Timoshenko, at that time the commander of the Kyiv Special Military District, briefly conveyed the order to urgently arrive in Moscow. And nothing about the reasons for the call.

Andrei Vasilyevich walked around the office in anxious thought. There are no complaints about his service, but the tireless Mehlis continues to undermine him, like a Stakhanovite miner at the face.

Fears dissipated only after a meeting with K. E. Voroshilov. They went to the Kremlin together.

There is an intention,” said Stalin, “to create a Red Army supply department headed by a supply chief and appoint you to this position.”

A searching look, a pause. And then from Andrei Vasilyevich, instead of “I will do my best to justify your high trust,” a whole series of specific questions unexpectedly followed about the tasks and methods of work of the new department. A long conversation took place, during which Stalin expressed the idea that the title “supply chief” no longer corresponds to modern times. Later, the correctness of this remark was confirmed by practice.

Experience, both life and work, gave some idea of ​​the nature of the upcoming activity, but still where to start? After all, we have never encountered problems of such scale and complexity before.

If Mehlis knew who the new chief of supply of the Red Army met immediately after his appointment to the post! With K.E. Goretsky himself, general of the tsarist army and chief quartermaster during the First World War! Andrei Vasilyevich listened carefully to the advice of the luminary, who found himself completely in line with the requirements of modern war. Moreover, he achieved enrollment as a scientific consultant on the management staff. Sometimes they would sit in the office for hours. Goretsky helped solve one or another complicated issue and talked about the history of the rear of the Russian army. Andrei Vasilyevich himself, at every opportunity, opened the books of his scientific consultant, as well as F.A. Maksheev, N.N. Yanushkevich and other experts in the quartermaster service. The theory of the rear was comprehended in the course of hard work - the danger was getting closer and closer to the borders of the USSR.

On September 1, 1939, World War II broke out. On the same day, at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a law on universal conscription was adopted. The deployment of a massive cadre army began, and with it the mobilization of industry for the needs of the Armed Forces.

Andrei Vasilyevich demanded from the management officers who went to the units not only to check, but above all to teach people how to organize the military economy, how to properly set up accounting and reporting, in order to use everything that the country gave as efficiently as possible. And she gave a lot to her defenders! But it was all the more important to instill in soldiers and commanders a sense of responsibility for property and frugality. The shortcomings of the past, both in the highest levels of management and in departments, could and should be eradicated...

In 1940, immediately after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, Andrei Vasilyevich ordered the supply authorities of the North-Western Front and the Leningrad District to collect the military property remaining in the combat areas, put it in order and completely preserve it. And this enormous work, which required the creation of special workshops, was completed in the shortest possible time.

Analyzing the fresh experience of the recent war, the chief of supply of the Red Army came to the conclusion that another large industrial order was necessary. Uniforms, equipment, camp kitchens and bakeries, workshops for repairing equipment, weapons and other quartermaster property - all this will be required in the future in volumes hitherto unprecedented. First, he convinced Voroshilov with his arguments, and then together they convinced Stalin himself.

Andrey Vasilievich took up the task of placing orders. In his dealings with contractors, he was demanding and persistent, but at the same time patient and flexible. Thus, the management of one of the factories stubbornly refused to make camp kitchens, citing the lack of scarce red copper. “Make it out of cast iron!” - the Red Army supply chief neutralized their arguments.

In July 1940, Andrei Vasilyevich’s merits were awarded the Order of Lenin, and the apparatus headed by him was reorganized into the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army. At the same time, he received a new military rank - “Lieutenant General of the Quartermaster Service.” On his shoulders lay responsibility for food, clothing, baggage, household supplies, housing and maintenance support, and for trade in the troops. The Yaroslavl Military Economic School and the Military Economic Academy were subordinate to him.

Having acquired vast experience in a short time, Lieutenant General Khrulev looked far ahead. In the first half of 1941, a wide inventory was carried out among the troops. As a result of large-scale, difficult and painstaking work, it became completely clear how much and what kind of property is available in units and warehouses, what is missing, what and in what volume should be ordered by the industry. An important conclusion was made - mobilization deployment can be achieved.

During the same period, on the initiative of the chief quartermaster, the mechanized troops began to receive automobile camp workshops for repairing shoes and saddlery, changes were made to the uniform, and new standards for clothing and food supplies were developed. The total calorie content of a Red Army soldier's daily ration was 3622 calories - a soldier of no army in the world had such food!

Huge reserves of materiel had to be properly deployed both strategically and operationally-tactically. The most important issue was considered back in 1940. The command of the Red Army adhered to a completely justified and, as subsequent events showed, correct point of view - to place supplies beyond the Volga.

The logical decision nevertheless provoked a decisive protest from Mehlis. He demanded that material assets be accumulated in the border areas, as close as possible to the potential enemy. The head of the Main Political Directorate perceived rational arguments as sabotage and defeatist.

But at least short fur coats, felt boots and other winter property should be left behind the Volga, military experts said.

How do you know when the war will start? - Mehlis asked suspiciously, hinting at betrayal more than transparently.

In the end, Stalin, succumbing to the persuasion of the head of the Main Political Directorate, accepted his point of view. In 1941, when J.V. Stalin was already chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Andrei Vasilyevich once again reported to him proposals for the placement of emergency reserves, and again without success!

General Khrulev imagined the unprecedented scope of a future war and understood what the rear of the Armed Forces should be like in these conditions. The railway troops underwent a radical restructuring, the medical service received a large amount of necessary property and equipment, a wide network of medical institutions, and was strengthened with highly qualified personnel.

The chief quartermaster planned to fully equip the rear units with motor-tractor equipment and create special units of military transport aviation. And most importantly - a single rear control authority. But these problems had to be solved during the war.

That’s when Mehlis’s stubbornness took its toll. In the warehouses of the Belarusian and Kyiv special military districts, the enemy captured more than half of all stored clothing, and in the Baltic military district - 100%. On the Southwestern Front, 38,000 tons of fuels and lubricants had to be destroyed so that the enemy would not get them. In addition, 31,000 double-horse and 5,000 single-horse carts, 8,000 camp kitchens, 389 bakeries, and tens of thousands of sets of harnesses and saddles were lost throughout all districts. As for medical institutions, a total of 88,000 beds were lost,” Andrei Vasilyevich summed up the disappointing results of the first weeks of the war.

All this now had to be restored as soon as possible. And at the same time, withdraw the surviving resources from the attacks and solve the main task - to provide material resources to the troops, who were retreating with heavy fighting in some directions, while holding a stubborn defense in others. At the same time, the actions of the rear units had to more strictly correspond to the operational-tactical situation, which was complex and not always clear.

The complexity of the problem was aggravated by the fact that the rear units of the fronts and armies, intended to carry out this complex set of tasks, were deployed and brought to full strength after the attack on the Soviet Union had become a fait accompli. And for the same reason, directly during the war, they learned how to carry out these very tasks. In addition, they had to operate under enemy bombs, under the constant threat of an attack by Nazi saboteurs and encounters with enemy tanks that had broken through.

The management of rear services also failed the test. According to pre-war views, it should have been carried out by combined arms headquarters, but those, overloaded with their direct responsibilities, were unable to unravel the complex knots of military-economic work. An urgent restructuring of both the control system and the entire organizational structure of the rear of the Red Army was required.

General Khrulev, who in July 1941 also became Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, was ready for it. Neither long conversations with K.E. Goretsky, nor a deep understanding of the experience of logistics support for the Russian army from the wars of the distant past to the latest military conflicts were in vain for him. He outlined his carefully thought-out proposals to A.I. Mikoyan, who was in charge of army supply issues at the State Defense Committee. He immediately reported them to Stalin, and the very next day there was an order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to prepare a draft corresponding decision.

The work, in which officers of the General Staff and the best logistics specialists participated, began to boil. Soon, the draft resolution of the State Defense Committee on the organization of the rear of the Red Army in wartime was ready. Stalin signed it on July 30, immediately upon presentation. And a little later, in August, he signed an order on the organization of the Main Logistics Directorate of the Red Army, the logistics departments of fronts and armies.

Now General Khrulev was in charge of the organization of the rear of the Red Army, its structure, transportation of troops and reinforcements, the supply of all types of material to the fronts, and the evacuation of the wounded and sick. He carried out his work in close contact with A.I. Mikoyan, who headed the Committee for Food and Clothing Supply of the Red Army, and his deputy A.N. Kosygin.

The committee included leading representatives from the relevant People's Commissariats. In turn, they nominated the greatest specialists from various sectors of the national economy to the Main Directorate of Logistics, thanks to which the army received everything it needed significantly faster. Soon, a coherent system of supplying troops with weapons, ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants, technical and many other types of military equipment was established. Delivery issues were promptly resolved, and the evacuation of the wounded and sick was organized.

Andrei Vasilyevich did not forget about the protection of rear areas, or the restoration of unusable or the use of captured property - everything went into action. In his work, he constantly relied on the headquarters headed by the remarkable specialist General M.P. Milovsky and therefore always, at any time of the day or night, knew how the troops were provided, how plans for orders and deliveries were being carried out by industry and agriculture. Accurate and timely information helped make the right decisions.

The rear quickly gained strength, reached the estimated capabilities and even blocked them, which even made it possible... to come to the aid of industrial enterprises that found themselves in an extremely difficult situation during the evacuation. Automotive parts of the rear delivered fuel, cotton, wool, leather and tobacco raw materials to enterprises from suppliers. The working battalions procured firewood and peat for defense factories, carried out loading work, helped in installing equipment, expanding production areas, producing carts, flasks, pots and many other absolutely necessary war products.

Andrei Vasilyevich has noted more than once: the army, by its nature, is a consumer. But otherwise, she could be left without a sufficient amount of urgently needed funds, the need for which was steadily growing.

New formations and units were formed, hundreds of thousands of people's militias became operational, and everyone had to be provided with uniforms, equipment, and regular food. During the difficult days of the Battle of Moscow, through the efforts of the rear, the formation of the cavalry corps of General P. A. Belov, who later distinguished himself in battles, was completed in the shortest possible time. At the same time, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered A.V. Khrulev to allocate at the disposal of three armies concentrated in the capital area, two motor transport battalions and one horse-drawn battalion.

It's easy to say, but where to get cars? They are not in reserve.

The task seemed impossible and yet was solved. General Khrulev immediately called Kosygin, and with his permission, highway department officers, together with representatives of district councils of deputies, conducted a raid on garages and workshops of evacuated departments and enterprises, collecting cars, spare parts, and tires left due to malfunctions. A lot of abandoned vehicles were also found on the roads of the Moscow region.

Just two days of hard work, and all the necessary transport was assembled. True, here’s the problem, almost every car needed major repairs. But Andrei Vasilyevich prepared the next move in advance. By his order, an automobile repair plant had already been set up on Shlyuzovaya Embankment, and the automobile battalions were ready within the specified period.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief appreciated the ingenuity of the chief of logistics and, almost on the same days, on his recommendation, introduced designated limits on the consumption of ammunition and fuels and lubricants by troops. At first, a whole stream of complaints poured into Moscow, but soon the commanders and commanders realized that the new system did not at all limit the capabilities of the troops, but only taught them to calculate them, forced them to treat material resources with care, and accumulate the necessary funds for important operations in advance. And indeed, the state, even with all the capabilities of the Soviet Union, is by no means a bottomless barrel.

Moscow prepared for defense thoroughly: almost one and a half thousand water wells alone were equipped. Fortunately, they were never used, but the bypass railway, built back in August on the initiative of Khrulev, who foresaw such a development of events, and at the same time the reconstructed Moscow railway junction played a truly exceptional role in the battle for the capital.

An important factor in victory in the ensuing battle was warm uniforms. “The Nazis, hoping for a lightning war, found themselves on the eve of the cold in summer uniforms,” Andrei Vasilyevich said to the leaders of the textile industry at an extended meeting with Kosygin. - The Soviet people will dress their troops in good quality overcoats, short fur coats, hats and padded jackets. Everyone will be provided with felt boots.”

Behind these words stood hard work and the solution of complex administrative and economic problems, reminiscent of long equations with many unknowns. But millions of sets of winter uniforms and warm clothes collected by the population were delivered to the troops on time. And the delivery of material resources in war is not an easy task in itself.

If communications are often called the “nerve of the army,” then supply and evacuation routes can well be considered its blood vessels. What, if not destructive blood clots, deserve comparison with traffic jams, especially during important operations? General Khrulev thought about this for a long time, because a special resolution of the State Defense Committee “On the organization of road service on highways and dirt roads” appeared back in July 1941!

The main enemy of timely delivery was mud, which disabled dirt roads for a long time. It was this that caused a noticeable deterioration in supplies on the Volkhov, Leningrad, Kalinin and Western fronts. And then General Khrulev again flashed his resourcefulness, proposing the formation of horse-drawn transport battalions.

Here's the news! - said the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. - In the age of technology and suddenly a bag of oats, wagons, sleighs...

But there was no other way out, and the first 76 horse-drawn battalions of 250 carts or sleighs each were formed in record time. It soon became clear that the horse helps out even where tracked vehicles sometimes fail. Moscow was bombarded with requests for horse-drawn convoys, followed by formations of reindeer teams in the North and camel teams in the Caspian steppes, and in the Caucasus mountains, mountain-pack-donkey companies proved themselves to be excellent.

At the beginning of 1942, Andrei Vasilyevich went to the Volkhov Front, where a difficult situation arose with the evacuation of the wounded. Due to the lack of special sanitary trains, they could not be sent for treatment even to the nearest regions - Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, Gorky...

General Khrulev personally assessed the situation on the ground, determined that up to 10,000 hospital beds could be placed in the Borovichi area, and immediately ordered the rear headquarters to supply the necessary medical equipment. The order was carried out clearly and quickly, so that the need for both evacuation and scarce ambulance trains naturally disappeared.

On the way back, Andrei Vasilyevich stopped at the headquarters of the North-Western Front to find out the situation and needs of his troops. The command post was located in the rest house of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, not far from Valdai. It was already quite late when Khrulev arrived there and met with the commander, General P. A. Kurochkin.

They were talking, discussing pressing supply issues, and a member of the Military Council, A.M. Pronin, entered. He brought for approval the decision of the military tribunal in the case of the chief of front rear services, General N.A. Kuznetsov. The chief quartermaster became interested in the essence of the issue. It turned out that Kuznetsov was accused of a criminal attitude towards providing troops by another member of the front’s Military Council, the powerful N.A. Bulganin. The tribunal did not dare to disobey him and handed down the most severe sentence.

Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov is a very educated general, a conscientious person, hardworking and efficient,” Andrei Vasilyevich expressed bewilderment. - What exactly is his fault?

The front commander, after thinking about it, refused to approve the execution sentence:

I didn’t put Kuznetsov on trial and didn’t talk to the tribunal. And let this decision be approved by Bulganin himself, who started the case.

The man's life was saved. N.A. Kuznetsov was demoted. Later, he headed the rear of the army, and then excelled in higher positions and finished his service with the rank of lieutenant general.

Bulganin cursed for a long time when he learned that the reprisal against the unwanted person by someone else’s hands did not take place. He himself, being a politician to a much greater extent than a military man, did not approve the tribunal protocol, because he perfectly understood how dangerous it was to leave signatures on such documents. So General Khrulev acquired another enemy, just as irreconcilable and malicious as Mehlis, but much more sophisticated, able to bide his time. What exactly Kuznetsov did not please him with remained a secret, known only to the chief quartermaster. Andrei Vasilyevich never opened it, except that, complaining, he talked about the problems that honest rear workers are having because of their refusal to satisfy the dubious demands of some representatives of the command and people in power.

However, at that time, General Khrulev’s thoughts were not occupied by a powerful ill-wisher, but by the supply crisis hanging over besieged Leningrad. The organization of supplying the city as a whole was entrusted to A.I. Mikoyan, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief entrusted the solution of practical issues to the chief of logistics of the Red Army. Andrei Vasilyevich went to the Northern capital.

What shall we do, comrades? - he asked the representatives of the command of the Leningrad Front, the leadership of the city and region who had gathered for the meeting.

A common opinion was quickly developed: transport aviation should not be neglected under any circumstances, but the route through Lake Ladoga should be considered the main supply artery.

General Khrulev established a clear system of control over the loading of wagons and the movement of goods, giving preference to food. He especially put a lot of effort into organizing the movement of material along the ice route across Lake Ladoga, the “Road of Life,” or, according to official documents, “Military Highway No. 102.”

It was a complex organism - or apparatus - numbering 19 thousand people. Four road maintenance regiments, a rifle security regiment, three bridge-building, 9 motor transport and two auto repair battalions, 8 hospitals - this is a list of only the main structures that were part of it.

Road workers continuously cleared and repaired the route - at times enemy aircraft destroyed up to 6 square kilometers of ice - built bridges, constructed detours, and in some places diverted the route to the side. Day and night, in any weather, often under the blows of enemy aerial bombs, a continuous stream of more than three thousand trucks transported to the besieged city what its defenders and residents needed so much to continue the work of the enterprise.

In turn, besieged Leningrad provided the country with weapons and ammunition, unique equipment for power plants, valuable surgical instruments, serums, vaccines, equipment for hospitals; the role of the besieged city in supplying medical equipment was extremely large.

The ice route operated clearly and uninterruptedly, but with the onset of the warm season, the sun's rays would do what was beyond the power of Hitler's aviation. Andrei Vasilyevich found a way out here too. He proposed building 10 metal barges and four rail ferries with a carrying capacity of 1,000 tons each. Skeptics insisted that this was unrealistic. However, the task was completed by the forces of Leningraders, at the cost of their heroic efforts at shipyards, piers and piers, in the workshops of factories and factories, in research institutions and institutes.

But water transport itself is not all that is required to ensure cargo flow. It was necessary to build piers with berths, equip marinas and access roads, restore destroyed locks and dams, clear the basin of mines and obstacles, create ports and organize their work... A feat of labor. It was he who allowed the troops of the Leningrad Front to withstand the heavy battles of the summer campaign of 1942 with honor.

The water artery did not lose its significance even later, when Operation Iskra was completed and the blockade was broken. In the summer of 1943, ships delivered almost 80 thousand tons of various cargo to the city; They were also useful during the laying of a telephone and 6 strands of power cable to supply electric current to Leningrad from the Volkhov hydroelectric station.

Still, the capabilities of the ice track in winter and the water artery in summer had their limits. How to increase cargo flow for the city and the front? Yes, it’s very simple: use pipelines, not cars and barges, to deliver fuel!

The State Defense Committee made a corresponding decision, entrusting the overall management of construction to A. N. Kosygin, and the work began to boil - of course, with the very active participation of General Khrulev. It was he who helped to find both the necessary specialists and the pipes themselves, on the spot, in Kolpino. The complex task was solved through the joint efforts of the front, representatives of the fleet, relevant ministries and departments. Less than a month later, the structure, unique at that time, was ready, and a continuous flow of petroleum products began flowing into the besieged city.

Andrei Vasilyevich carefully studied and summarized the experience gained, as if foreseeing its value in the near future. In a series of responsible tasks replacing one another, under conditions of inhuman stress, he suddenly remembered: how does the architect Lev Vladimirovich Rudnev, the author of the project for the famous building of the M. V. Frunze Academy, feel? After all, he lives permanently in Leningrad.

It turned out that the academician was really in the besieged city and categorically refused to leave it, wanting to share all the difficulties with the Leningraders. Meanwhile, his physical condition cannot be called anything other than grave! Then General Khrulev began to personally persuade the stubborn architect, spent a lot of time and, in the end, achieved success...

Unconquered Leningrad is steadfastly defending itself, and a brilliant victory is won near Moscow. During the autumn-winter campaign of 1941-1942, the rear did a tremendous amount of work, without which the successes of the troops would have been impossible. A.I. Mikoyan personally became convinced of this when he went to check with General Khrulev in the area of ​​stubborn fighting.

The activities of supply agencies can be checked by examining documents and schedules, or you can do it the way Napoleon did it: go to the final link - the soldier - and see how he is dressed, shod and fed. And not at a drill review, but on the line of combat contact with the enemy! Anastas Ivanovich and Andrei Vasilyevich walked along the trenches of the front line, talking with junior officers and soldiers. We saw: they are well provided with winter clothing, they receive hot food in a timely manner.

But there was much more reason for concern than for joy. The situation in railway transport was rapidly deteriorating and threatened with serious supply disruptions. The situation could have been even worse without the railway troops, whose existence was barely maintained during the difficult months of 1941. Then the idea came to someone’s head, not burdened with military knowledge, to disband them to compensate for the huge losses and transform them into ordinary rifle units. There were also would-be theorists who supported the idea with a “scientific” basis: the army is now withdrawing, and therefore the task of building railway lines does not arise.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief refused a hasty decision and ordered a special commission to study the issue. However, her meeting did not promise anything good. After all, L.Z. Mehlis was appointed chairman, interested in eliminating the railway troops and thereby weakening the position of the hated chief quartermaster. The sophisticated head of the Main Political Directorate assembled a commission on the very day when Andrei Vasilyevich himself was not in Moscow.

Everything went as planned. Only the head of military communications, subordinate to Khrulev, Lieutenant General Kovalev, categorically refused to vote for disbandment, calling such a decision defeatist. Mehlis picked up the phone and complained about the stubborn man to Stalin.

Why do you consider the liquidation of the railway troops defeatism? - asked the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, inviting the general to the phone.

Because we are preparing a counterattack near Moscow and later we will prepare for an offensive, and it is impossible to attack without railway troops and recovery means, which are a weapon of offensive operations,” Kovalev answered.

That's right, said Stalin. - Pass the phone to Mehlis.

“You are a defeatist, Mehlis,” he heard. - The commission too. Dissolve the commission, save the troops!

Mehlis was put to shame, and the winter counteroffensive once again emphasized the importance of the railway troops. But the main role, not only in the supply of material and reinforcements, but also in ensuring operational-strategic maneuver, belonged to the People's Commissariat of Railways (NKPS). And there the situation was far from brilliant.

The loss of almost half of the most developed railway network, a shortage of fuel, electricity, steam locomotives, a fleet of freight cars and repair facilities disorganized the usual rhythm and destroyed the well-functioning order of work. The administrative confusion resulted in terrible traffic jams that clogged the railway lines. Train traffic was blocked, and the average daily loading of wagons was reduced by more than half.

The People's Commissar of Railways staged a spectacular showdown, but the method of “administrative pumping” no longer worked. In such conditions, railway transport required a leader whose main advantage would not be the ability to intimidate subordinates, but the ability to quickly find the right solutions.

One day in March 1942, after one of the meetings of the State Defense Committee, Stalin asked Khrulev to stay.

You will have to be the People's Commissar of Railways,” he said. - This issue has been resolved. The objectives are clear. - And, noticing the confusion, he explained: “I am aware of how difficult and responsible your job as chief of logistics of the Red Army is.” But supplying the fronts is, first of all, supply. Therefore, combining two positions in one person - the People's Commissar of Railways and the Chief of Logistics - will make it possible to most reliably resolve the issue of supplying the active army with everything that is necessary to defeat the enemy. As People's Commissar of Railways, you will become closer to the entire national economy, which is in close contact with railway transport and largely depends on it...

“You did well, Cinderella. Here’s your reward - a list of new assignments.” It is unlikely that Andrei Vasilyevich at that moment had any associations with the fairy-tale heroine of Perrault, although the situation was similar. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief resolutely rejected all his attempts to refuse a new, yet another post.

General Khrulev made the way back from the Kremlin in anxious thought. On the one hand, to the numerous responsibilities requiring incredible effort were added concerns about the five-million (!) army of railway workers, on the other hand, the idea of ​​his scientific consultant K.E. Goretsky, who had dreamed of concentrating management since the First World War, was finally being implemented. strategic rear and transportation in the same hands.

The workers of the People's Commissariat of Railways, where Andrei Ivanovich now resided permanently, reacted to the appearance of a new boss with due understanding. Having entrusted the current work in the Main Directorate of Logistics to his deputy, General Vinogradov, he concentrated his efforts on solving the immediate task - eliminating huge traffic jams on the railways. First of all, you should listen carefully to the opinions of experts.

L. M. Kaganovich, who previously held the post of People's Commissar of Railways, could not stand other people's advice, and simply... forgot about the locomotives evacuated from the western regions of the country. Now special groups were formed from these locomotives, with the help of which, to everyone’s surprise, they managed to eliminate the congestion in the shortest possible time.

The next, larger task was in line. It was necessary to bring the work of all railways into line with the pulse of the times. Developing the idea of ​​groups of locomotives and relying on leading employees of the People's Commissariat, General Khrulev on May 6, 1942 began forming the first 11 locomotive columns of the NKPS reserve.

Subsequently, the number of these structures with a detailed organization increased to 87. According to the staff, each of them was supposed to have 30 locomotives, and in total the total locomotive fleet numbered almost two thousand cars. The columns played a huge role in all major operations of the war and, one can say without exaggeration, carried victory from Stalingrad to Berlin.

Railway workers acquired the skills of driving trains under enemy air strikes and artillery fire, delivering important cargo to the right place and at the right time, despite the destruction of the tracks. General Khrulev valued his subordinates: 22 workers of locomotive columns were awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, hundreds were awarded orders and medals. He did not forget about material incentives - a whole system of incentives was developed, and the salary of railway workers was increased. Andrei Vasilyevich combined educational and patriotic work with genuine concern for people; Even such a seemingly trifle as supplying train crews with bed linen did not escape his attention.

The railway workers responded with heroism, and not only labor heroism. Thus, an enemy fighter appeared at one of the sites, specifically hunting for Soviet locomotives. Having studied the locomotive's habits, the drivers placed machine-gun crews in the tenders, lured it to a seemingly defenseless target and boldly entered into battle. They won. During interrogation, the pilot of the downed plane said that he learned to disable steam locomotives at a special school for aerial snipers near Berlin.

Soon the rear of the army and railway transport merged into a single system, departmental partitions disappeared by themselves. The confusion in the movement of trains was eliminated with the help of newly created departments of transportation planning and cargo control for the defense industry, whose trains were on par with military ones.

General Khrulev's office gradually turned into a place of continuous meetings: with leaders of various branches of industry, agriculture, heads of subsidiaries of the Armed Forces, members of Military Councils and chiefs of front logistics. The efforts of the national economy and the People's Commissariat of Defense merged here into a single stream. The rear of the army, in unity with railway transport, acquired new opportunities and colossal power. Despite enormous difficulties and an even more increased workload, Andrei Vasilyevich successfully managed the leadership of two most important departments.

The summer of 1942 was preparing new difficult trials. But even earlier, in March, General Khrulev received intelligence information about possible enemy attacks in the direction of the North Caucasus and Stalingrad, assessed it from a military-economic point of view and made serious conclusions. It is necessary to create oil reserves in the Urals, to look for and build bypass supply routes!

To this end, he sent an operational group of People's Commissariat workers to Central Asia, tasking them with raising the capacity of the railway between Iletsk and Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea at all costs. There were no rails, no sleepers. And then the People's Commissar of Railways decided to dismantle the lightly loaded section of the Kokand-Namangan road, 91 kilometers long.

The authorities of Uzbekistan, at his request, involved three and a half thousand people in the work, explaining that their labor was needed to defeat the enemy. People came with their own transport - camels, horses, donkeys. The titanic work - 35 additional sidings alone were built - was completed in a month and a half. Shipments of petroleum products have tripled!

At the same time, in cooperation with the People's Commissariat of the Navy, it was also possible, at a record pace, to organize the transportation of fuel across the Caspian Sea to Guryev, for which its port was equipped with all the necessary facilities. At the same time, for the first time, an equally bold and successful experiment was carried out on the mass transfer of empty tanks by sea, afloat, following a tug.

The railway from Kizlyar to Astrakhan was built at the same time and under the same difficult conditions. Its construction, on the initiative of Khrulev, began back in 1941, but then, for unknown reasons, it was stopped by Kaganovich. Now everything had to start again, but in a more complex environment.

Labor heroism, operational management and advanced track-laying methods made it possible to open traffic along the 350-kilometer highway as early as August 4, 1942. We made it on time, because six days later the fascist troops took Maykop. Army Group A completed two-thirds of the plan for the gigantic strategic operation, and the Nazi command had no doubt about its successful completion.

Maikop is oil taken from the Soviet army and can now power the engines of the Wehrmacht. But its main reserves are ahead, in Baku. One more throw...

On September 2, the enemy, having completed the regrouping, began crossing the Terek. That’s when the importance of the Kizlyar-Astrakhan railway was felt, thanks to which the Soviet troops defending the Caucasus had the opportunity to receive everything they needed for victory!

Hitler's war machine stalled, each next kilometer was more difficult for it than the previous one. A little more - and the angry Hitler will remove Field Marshal List from the post of commander of Army Group A as having failed to cope with the task, and Colonel General von Kleist, who replaced him, will, in disbelief, look with despair at the death of his best motorized formations in fiery hell near the Elkhot Gate.

Hitler's campaign to the Caucasus for Baku oil failed, but a gigantic battle off the banks of the Volga flared up in full force. General Khrulev managed to prepare for it in advance. A ferry crossing near Astrakhan, a unique floating railway bridge, and a rock railway along the right bank of the Volga to Baskunchak - Urbal were already in operation. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief set the task for its construction back in the summer, foreseeing the scale of the grandiose battle near the great Russian river.

The work was carried out, as always, with the utmost effort, on a wide front, from 16 points in 19 directions simultaneously. The assembled rail sections were transported from the Baikal-Amur Mainline (its construction began before the war), as well as from the second tracks of nearby roads, where there was no heavy traffic. The pace of construction reached 8-10 kilometers per day, and this despite the fact that almost everything was done by hand, and the enemy, realizing the significance of the work, tried to disrupt it with air strikes.

In August, the highway came to life, and trains with ammunition, fuel, and food moved along it one after another, with a distance of only 800-1200 meters! The enemy bombed, disabling tracks, wagons, and steam locomotives, but along a dirt road, laid 300 meters parallel to the railway, repair and restoration teams in cars drove along, accompanying each train. Each of them had a set of traveling tools and spare parts for rolling stock, as well as everything necessary for sealing holes in tanks.

The consequences of the raid were quickly eliminated, and the team accompanied the train to the station bordering the area of ​​​​responsibility of another unit. There she handed over the train to her neighbor and received from him a train traveling in the opposite direction. The movement of the teams was continuously monitored by the duty officer of the headquarters.

Thus, in a short time, a large, constantly operating unloading area was created, which served as a material base for victory in the defensive battle and preparation for the upcoming counter-offensive. That’s when the role of the railway troops, which were almost liquidated by the would-be strategists in 1941, was revealed in all its brightness!

Day and night, in any weather, often under enemy bombs, railway soldiers saved tracks, bridges and trains, and at critical moments they went into battle like infantry.

Cargoes arriving by rail were delivered by automobile units to armies, divisions, and regiments. General Khrulev constantly kept his finger on the pulse of a most complex organism, or rather, two synchronously working organisms - Logistics and Transport.

At the end of the autumn of 1942, all soldiers and officers received new winter uniforms. The following spring it was replaced by a summer one, also new. This order, established at the beginning of the war, existed until its last day.

The medical service also successfully coped with its tasks. The number of wounded who were treated and returned to duty - and these are experienced soldiers and experienced officers - reached 7096! At the same time, the mortality rate in hospitals decreased to 2%, while for the enemy, according to intelligence data, this figure did not fall below 10. It is not for nothing that such a military leader as A.I. Eremenko, who himself was wounded more than once and understood a lot about hospital work, praised the organization of the medical service.

Claims to the work of the rear addressed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief were received only from two members of the Military Councils of the fronts: N. A. Bulganin and L. Z. Mehlis. But since General Khrulev knew the state of affairs with material support on their fronts better than they themselves, ill-wishers with enviable consistency hit the mark. It got to the point that Stalin made it a rule to forward Bulganin’s complaints against General Khrulev without resolutions... to General Khrulev himself.

As for Mehlis, after the May catastrophe of 1942 in the Crimea, the cause of which was his violent military-hysterical activity, he was demoted, demoted and largely lost influence, but still, at every opportunity, he tried at least a little, but harm the chief quartermaster.

Once, during a meeting with a group of commanders and members of the Military Councils of the fronts, Stalin asked if they had any complaints about logistics support. Everyone was silent, and only Mehlis said:

I think the rear works very poorly. The commissariat does not fully provide the troops with food. Measures should be taken to improve the functioning of rear services.

Stalin immediately summoned General Khrulev.

Well, the fronts are complaining about you. “You’re not working well, you’re not providing for the troops,” said the Supreme Commander-in-Chief when the chief of logistics entered the office.

Who is complaining and what is they complaining about? - asked Andrei Vasilyevich.

Who do you think could complain? - Stalin asked with a barely noticeable grin.

The only one who can complain is Mehlis,” the chief quartermaster immediately solved the riddle.

A general burst of laughter followed.

It would be desirable to hear specific complaints from Comrade Mehlis,” Andrei Vasilyevich continued when the laughter died down. - What products are not given to you? Maybe they don’t provide uniforms, or don’t provide medical and sanitary equipment, or something else?

“You always don’t give us bay leaves, vinegar, pepper and mustard,” Mehlis said offendedly to another burst of laughter...

This happened in May 1943, shortly before the Battle of Kursk. Preparations for it began in February.

How long will it take you to transport the troops of the Don Front, as well as a number of armies of the Stalingrad Front, to Kursk and Ostashkov? - the Supreme Commander-in-Chief then asked General Khrulev.

Andrei Vasilyevich instantly made complex calculations in his mind. To complete the strategic transfer, about 75,000 wagons, or one and a half thousand military trains, are needed. And if we take into account the state of the practically destroyed Povorino-Stalingrad line, the state of loading and unloading stations, the distance of troop groups from them, then...

It will take two to three months to complete this transportation,” he replied.

You don't want to defeat Hitler! - Stalin exclaimed. “We need to transport troops as quickly as possible in order to defeat the Germans near Kursk before the spring thaw and deliver a crushing blow on the Western Front.” To do this, it is necessary that all transportation of troops from Stalingrad be carried out within a maximum of three weeks.

Do what you want with us, but such a transportation cannot be carried out in such a time frame,” General Khrulev said with conviction. - Allow me, Comrade Stalin, within 24 hours, together with the military communications authorities and representatives of the General Staff, to consider the issues of a detailed plan for these transportations and report to you my final thoughts.

The Supreme Commander agreed. But the next morning, L.P. Beria and G.M. Malenkov called Khrulev one after another. It turns out that they had already been appointed authorized by the State Defense Committee for the transportation of troops, one to Kursk, the other to Ostashkov, to eliminate the enemy’s Demyansk group. Obviously, Stalin was bribed by their commitment to complete the task... within two weeks! In reality, they could not offer anything other than threats and brutal pressure.

Soon the administrative bacchanalia they created completely paralyzed the work of the People's Commissariat of Railways. Under these conditions, Andrei Vasilyevich asked to be released from the management of railway transport and received consent. But already at the beginning of March, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief realized that the transportation of troops from Stalingrad was a complete failure. Then he ordered General Khrulev, together with Malenkov, to go to the headquarters of K.K. Rokossovsky to organize the concentration of troops near Kursk.

Eliminating the chaos caused by militant amateurism on the railways and roads was not easy. A lot of time was wasted, the rest was wasted catastrophically quickly, while, according to intelligence data, the concentration of enemy troops was proceeding very intensively.

It was literally necessary to unravel the complex knots in railway transport at a feverish pace. At the same time, General Khrulev continued to solve problems of logistical support for the troops, not only direct ones, but also indirectly related to him - from the construction of a plant for the production of aviation diesel engines to the organization of the collection of medicinal chamomile in Dagestan. There were 17 vegetable warehouses alone with a total capacity of almost 110 thousand tons of potatoes and more than 26 thousand tons of cabbage, equipped with railway access roads! The estimated cost of the work is 19,856,000 rubles, the savings are 3,590,000, and at the same time, despite organizational improvisation, there was not a single economic fraud, not a single case of theft!

Once upon a time, the French king Louis XIV and his finance ministers, successively father and son Louvois, with the help of government commissioners, the scaffold and the Bastille, managed to overcome theft in the army. Their persistent, irreconcilable struggle against embezzlers lasted almost half a century.

General Khrulev did not have such time. Historical circumstances required that such problems be solved as quickly as possible. He understood perfectly well that robbers not only cause direct harm, but are also a desirable target for enemy reconnaissance.

In addition, if the robber has sufficiently high capabilities, then the damage from his activities is such that entire detachments of the enemy’s best saboteurs can only silently envy. Therefore, no matter who the robber was, the manager of a small warehouse or the head of the front rear, he could be sure of the inevitability of retribution and the absence of leniency.

Typically, the cases of those guilty of theft were tried by a military tribunal, and most often they were given the opportunity to atone in the ranks of the penal battalions. In addition, the transparency of business transactions and the system of control, not only direct, from the rear services, but also the command, political bodies and special departments, made fraud a very dangerous and almost certainly hopeless occupation. The probability that four dishonest representatives of all these lines of leadership would end up in one unit and would even be able to find a common language with the higher command was mathematically negligible. But still she existed!

One day, a certain officer Ryzhenkov went to a club for a holiday dedicated to the anniversary of the reserve artillery regiment. He entered the hall, and then the unit commander, not embarrassed by those present, attacked him with obscene language and dirty threats. The offended officer's hand automatically rushed to the holster. The roar of a shot and the sound of a heavy body falling almost merged into one...

The investigation established that the murdered man was a seasoned plunderer, the soldiers of the unit entrusted to him had not received their due allowance for months, as if the worst pages of the history of the Russian army during the Crimean War had come to life, and Ryzhenkov did not want to put up with the disgrace. He tried to attract the attention of the command, and therefore became the object of persecution and bullying. The officer was warned about the inadmissibility of independent use of weapons in the future, continued his service and left it many years after the war with the rank of colonel.

In general, such cases were very rare...

The huge, complex logistics mechanism worked without failures, and soon Andrei Vasilyevich managed to organize the work of the People's Commissariat of Railways, which was confidently sliding into the abyss of administrative chaos after the short leadership of Beria. About one and a half thousand trains with a total number of 72,000 cars passed along the restored railway tracks - that’s how accurate the figure was immediately named by General Khrulev in a conversation with Stalin! And although some of the precious time was lost, now the concentration of the main group proceeded steadily.

Arriving cargo was immediately delivered to their destinations along military roads, where points of technical and medical assistance, food, fuel supply and storage areas for faulty vehicles were organized. It was in those days, on the initiative of the chief of logistics, that the resolution of the State Defense Committee established the basic principle of supply - “from top to bottom”, in which responsibility for the delivery of all types of material resources to lower levels was assigned to the superior commander.

Timely delivery of goods was encouraged - drivers received bonuses. Return flights of empty vehicles were used to evacuate the wounded. The driver who delivered 300 wounded to the rear was nominated for the medal “For Military Merit”, and 600 - for the Order of the Red Star.

In total, at the beginning and during the Battle of Kursk, 132 rifle divisions, 19 tank and mechanized corps, two air armies, as well as many units and formations of other branches of the military were provided with everything necessary, from shag and cigarettes to spare parts for complex equipment. Soviet soldiers and officers met the enemy's attack in new, brand new uniforms!

The enemy was hit by a continuous shower of air bombs, shells, and bullets - there were no interruptions in supplies. Motor transport switched to the so-called “shuttle” method of delivery, when vehicles were sent on a journey not in columns, but, when ready, in groups of two or three. At the same time, downtime and losses from enemy air strikes were reduced, and the circulation of transport increased. This method required experienced, independent, proactive drivers, but by the summer of 1943 there were many of these in the Soviet army.

Even during the period of preparation for the battle on the Kursk Bulge, by a decree of the State Defense Committee, the Main Directorate of Logistics was abolished, but the post of Chief of Logistics of the Red Army - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense - was officially established. Now 11 departments were subordinate to General Khrulev, from financial to veterinary, dealing with almost the entire range of logistics and medical support. He was also in charge of two academies - Logistics and Supply of the Red Army and Military Transport Academies, Andrei Vasilyevich skillfully used their intellectual potential both to solve practical issues and to develop the theory of rear services.

The victory at Kursk was pleasing: General Khrulev felt a new surge of strength. He still managed everything and even more than before: he monitored the supply and restoration of railways, organized the use of captured vehicles and grain procurements in the liberated territories, thus bringing food sources closer to the troops, and controlled all types of food supplies. At the same time, Andrei Vasilyevich took energetic measures to explore and develop oil fields in the Trans-Urals and Siberia. On August 25, 1943, Stalin, having completed the analysis of the lessons of the recent past, gave instructions to form a “second Baku” there, thus laying the foundations of the energy power of modern Russia. But the main thing remained the management of logistics support for entire series of rapid and deep offensive operations.

The trouble came from an unexpected, unofficial side. The son of the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin killed his young girlfriend with a pistol shot - her father, a diplomat, received a new appointment, and the girl was going to go abroad with him - and then shot himself. While sorting through the suicide's papers, investigators discovered a notebook with strange diagrams and notes.

It turned out that the young man, imagining himself as the head of the country, was drawing out the structure of the future government of the USSR, placing his friends and acquaintances in various positions. There was also a place among them for the eldest son, Andrei Vasilyevich. And although the consequences of the incident for the family of General Khrulev were more unpleasant than tragic, Beria once again reminded that he was not asleep.

Relations with the powerful People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, already not brilliant, deteriorated further as the Soviet army advanced and the occupied territories were liberated. The NKVD troops, which were entrusted with protecting the rear, did not always cope with their responsibilities. Therefore, soldiers and officers of the rear services, people, as a rule, no longer young and not the healthiest, had to increasingly take up arms and engage in unequal battles with gangs of Ukrainian nationalists, detachments of the Polish Home Army, and Nazi saboteurs.

Terror acquired a special character. Hospitals, columns, warehouses and headquarters of rear institutions were subjected to merciless attacks. Andrei Vasilyevich, of course, complained to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who blamed the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, which made Beria's irritation and hostility increase even more. But even if he had been filled with a sincere desire to help, he would hardly have been able to provide reliable protection for the huge logistics mechanism of the Soviet army.

General Khrulev realized this and took on the task of organizing the protection of the rear units himself, while the complexity of the tasks of material supply increased literally in geometric progression. The advancing troops no longer required a thousand, but tens of thousands of tons of various cargo. But, as you know, the dimensions of the railway gauges of Eastern European countries and the main lines of the USSR do not coincide!

It was necessary to resolve issues of using waterways, provide assistance to the local population, and carry out the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to restore the coal industry in Poland and the oil industry in Romania. The sight of the burning Ploiesti mines left an indelible impression even on experienced officers who had seen everything. (By the way, then they not only restored the production of petroleum products in the shortest possible time, but also deployed two field pipelines to supply the troops with fuel. That’s when the experience of Leningrad came in handy!)

Neither General Khrulev nor his subordinates knew either sleep or rest. Of course, the tankers who went on a raid behind enemy lines were heroes; But weren’t the heroes of the rear soldiers who followed them into the breakthrough in ordinary trucks with shells and fuel? And what kind of skill and effort did the material support of such an operation as the Vistula-Oder require, when on a front of 500 kilometers an avalanche of 2.2 million people, 34 thousand artillery pieces, 6.5 thousand tanks and 4.8 thousand aircraft? The pace of advance sometimes reached 30 kilometers per day.

“Europe has not seen anything like this since the fall of the Roman Empire!” - wrote General von Mellenthin, a participant in those events.

And next in line was the preparation of the next gigantic offensive operation, the Berlin one, which was destined to put an end to the war against fascism.

Soviet troops marched through Germany, whose people, as it turned out, were put under the threat of starvation by the Nazi regime. “Hitlers come and go, but the German people remain,” Stalin said back in 1941, making it clear that an irreconcilable struggle is being waged only against the bearers of criminal ideology.

The population of the cities, especially children, was provided with immediate assistance. And on April 25, when Soviet troops were just approaching the capital of the Reich, from Moscow

An order came from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to provide the population of Berlin with food and medicine. Three million inhabitants! Again solving an equation with many unknowns, this time in the area of ​​food supply.

Field kitchens were deployed on the move, almost immediately following the combat units. At first, timidly, not believing their eyes, and then more and more boldly, women, old people, and children reached out to them. And already on May 15, shops and stalls opened in the city, and the organized distribution of food to the population began, for which 24,000 and 2,700 tons of flour and pasta alone were supplied monthly, respectively.

The signing of the historic act of unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany took place on the night of May 9, after which workers of the Soviet food service pleasantly surprised foreign guests with festive table settings, delicious drinks and a variety of dishes. It was then that Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the French General Delattre de Tasigny danced for joy, trying to outdo each other with complex pirouettes.

Soon, on May 25, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief gave a reception in the Kremlin in honor of the commanders of the Great Victory. Upon completion, the military leaders were invited to St. George's Hall for a commemorative photograph. Andrei Vasilyevich was about to modestly take a seat in the third row, but Stalin called him and, telling the commanders: “Without the work of this general, your victories would not have happened,” he sat him down in the first.

The famous Victory Parade on June 24, 1945 did not happen without the efforts of the chief of logistics. Thanks to the efforts of the clothing service, the participants were dressed in a new uniform, individually sewn for each...

The war did not end for everyone, including General Khrulev. The Far Eastern campaign lay ahead; the start date was approaching. There was only one railway line leading there. Khrulev had a good idea of ​​what would happen with the massive transfer of troops along it. How to reduce the number of trains, how to relieve congestion on the highway? Obviously, in two ways: the advance creation of reserves of material resources, which Khrulev, thanks to his gift of foresight, began to do back in December 1944, and the maximum use of local resources. Thus, only in the subsidiary farms of the Trans-Baikal Front - one of three intended to participate in the upcoming strategic operation - so much agricultural products were collected that the savings in transportation amounted to 28 thousand wagons of food!

They prepared for the operation carefully, using the wealth of war experience, and yet not everything could be foreseen. For example, some of the camp kitchens of the Trans-Baikal Front had to be literally switched to liquid fuel on the fly. And in fact, where to get firewood in the sands of the desert that the formations crossed? In addition, the advance of the troops was so rapid that advanced tank units and cavalry-mechanized groups had to be supplied by air on a scale much greater than in Europe.

The amount of work involved in the logistics of the campaign looks enormous even many years later. Three front-line formations, the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla, were preparing for military operations in the Far East. They consist of 11 combined arms, one tank, three air armies, three air defense armies, and many separate formations and units. They are deployed on a gigantic area of ​​one and a half million square kilometers with a poorly developed network of roads and railways, but at the same time characterized by an extraordinary variety of natural and climatic conditions. There are steep slopes of high mountains covered with dense forests, deep rivers, and hot deserts.

General Khrulev, as always in anticipation of major operations, made efforts to develop the road network in advance. The highway from Irkutsk to Ulan-Ude did not meet the requirements of the war and was almost completely reconstructed; in the area of ​​Lake Baikal, a new route was laid along the mountain ridges. The large-scale construction was completed not in three months, as envisaged by the plan, but three weeks earlier. The last circumstance was of particular importance, because there was a catastrophic lack of time to concentrate troops.

General Khrulev, Marshal Vasilevsky and General Antonov, who replaced him as Chief of the General Staff, were intensely thinking about how to meet the specified deadlines. The answer was found together with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: we should abandon... the transportation of vehicles by rail! The Allies, extremely interested in the speedy entry of the USSR into the war in the Far East, delivered by sea not only cars, but also steam locomotives, the production of which was practically curtailed during the war.

The offensive began on the night of August 9 and was truly lightning fast. Very soon, to the problems of supplying the rapidly advancing groupings of troops, concerns about captured weapons and military property were added (in total, during the war years, 24,615 tanks and self-propelled guns, 72,204 artillery pieces, and so many small arms passed through the corresponding rear service that would be enough for almost four hundred divisions), on housing, food and medical care for prisoners of war, and not only Japanese ones.

In Mukden, Soviet troops liberated a large camp containing Americans and British prisoners in Japanese captivity. They joyfully, throwing caps into the air, rushed towards the Soviet soldiers, the Russian word “freedom” sounded. The former prisoners of war included American generals, including Army Corps Commanders Jones and Sharp Chenovich, five division commanders, and RAF Vice-Marshal Maltby.

The eldest in age and rank among them was General Parker, who, at the request of the Soviet command, assumed the duties of temporary commandant of the camp. The speed and accuracy of the organization of logistics and medical support for former prisoners of war received the most flattering assessment from senior Allied officers.

Soviet troops here, as in European countries, shared food with the local population, helped restore enterprises and establish a peaceful life. The behavior of soldiers and officers in the liberated territories was exemplary...

Victory meant a quick return to peaceful work for 8.5 million people. In addition, hundreds of thousands of cars and tractors, a lot of other equipment, as well as a large number of horses had to be transferred to the national economy - horse-drawn transport in the army was quickly replaced by mechanical ones. Demobilization, especially mass demobilization, is far from a simple process.

What about the construction of barracks, houses for officers, hospitals and medical centers, warehouses, buildings for headquarters and institutions, artillery and tank parks? After all, the military infrastructure was destroyed, like hundreds of cities and thousands of villages, like plants and factories, cultural and scientific centers, in the restoration of which, along with solving their direct tasks, the rear of the Armed Forces was most actively involved.

With the beginning of peaceful days, General Khrulev’s worries did not diminish. But these were joyful chores.

New, improved quality uniforms, shoes, and equipment were introduced, including for areas with hot and cold climates. It can be said without exaggeration that the field uniform, which since the end of the 19th century was based on the Russian national costume, designed for combat on foot in the middle zone, came close to the limit of its perfection during this period. All work was carried out simultaneously and not at the expense of reducing the combat readiness of the rear units, which were under the special attention of General Khrulev. And of course, he thought about how to preserve the invaluable experience and level of skill achieved by the rear services during the war. To do this, practice should be turned into theory! The leading role in solving a complex task requiring deep knowledge and high intelligence belonged to central departments, rear headquarters at various levels and, of course, primarily to academies.

“It would be wrong to imagine the matter in such a way that if each rear service has generalized its experience, then this can be limited. Undoubtedly, such work is important. But we mean a theoretical generalization of the entire complex of issues of logistics support for troops in war from the point of view of the interaction and interdependence of all logistics services, the organizational unity of the logistics system. This is precisely the essence and novelty of solving the problem posed by the war,” said General Khrulev. This is a truly scientific approach to posing the problem! He himself wrote articles for the magazine “Localistics and Supply of the Armed Forces” and followed similar publications, both domestic and foreign.

Meanwhile, with the end of the war, competition in the political environment intensified. At the same time, almost all the emerging groups were interested in maximally weakening and removing from the center of power the military leaders, whose popularity among the people and authority in the army aroused envy and fear.

In 1945, the Chief of the Logistics Staff, General V.M. Milovsky, an excellent specialist and a crystal clear person, did not please V.M. Molotov with something during a trip to Yugoslavia. A lightning-fast removal from office followed, which, contrary to the golden rules of subordination, Andrei Vasilyevich was not even informed about. There was no one to complain to, because Stalin was ill at that time and the duties of head of state were performed by none other than Molotov himself.

The chief of logistics hid the disgraced general in his personnel reserve, and in November, after the Supreme Commander-in-Chief returned to the Kremlin, he achieved the appointment of a colleague to the post of chief of the Academy of Logistics and Transport. Lieutenant General Milovsky became a professor and for 10 years headed this wonderful institution of higher education.

In 1947, the post of Minister of Defense of the USSR was taken by N. A. Bulganin. And in the same year - what a coincidence! - cases of removal of rear workers began to be noted only because they categorically refused to comply with the illegal demands of their superiors. But how else? Personal honesty and the ability to firmly guard state interests were perhaps the most important criteria that General Khrulev was guided by when promoting his employees through the ranks.

Andrei Vasilyevich gradually became more and more inconvenient for those who were not averse to, so to speak, “increasing the comfort of their living environment” at state expense. But besides his long-time ill-wisher, who has now become his direct superior, General Khrulev was closely watched by Mehlis, who headed the Ministry of State Control, and Abakumov, who replaced Beria in his responsible post. Lavrenty Pavlovich himself, who became Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was closely involved in the “nuclear project”, but due to his nature, old disagreements - or grievances - were not going to forget.

One January day in 1948, a telephone rang in General Khrulev’s apartment. His wife, Esfir Semyonovna, picked up the phone and heard an offer to go to the “Order Desk”: to pick up a ready-made set. Throwing a coat over her light dress, she went out into the street wearing shoes as she was and... did not return.

Her sons, Dor and Yuri, and Valery's daughter waited in vain. Feeling something was wrong, the girl went to Lubyanka on a cold night.

“Go away, girl,” the officer on duty told her, “and never come here again.” There was sympathy in his voice...

Later it turned out: a closed court session, a sentence of 10 years in prison.

N.A. Bulganin immediately took advantage of what happened to achieve the removal of General Khrulev from his post. But the triumph of Andrei Vasilyevich’s ill-wishers was still incomplete: the Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not allow him to be excluded from the list of the Armed Forces, much less deprived of the rank of general.

Having chosen a favorable moment, Andrei Vasilyevich went to see Stalin - to intercede for a dear person. The Generalissimo listened to him, gradually becoming gloomier, and then said:

Don't look for her. Forget. She'll never come back. Both you and Molotov can even get married.

These words suggest that Esfir Semyonovna was involved in the same case as V. M. Molotov’s wife, Polina Zhemchuzhnikova, accused of disclosing - or transferring - information of enormous national importance to the ambassador of the young state of Israel, Golda Meir. Most likely, there was a simple loss of vigilance in confidential “female” conversations at receptions and meetings: after all, Golda Meir was already a skilled diplomat and politician at that time.

Molotov also appealed to the head of state with a request to mitigate the fate of his wife. In response, Stalin silently placed a folder in front of him, after reading it, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich saw the nature of the information disclosed and realized that it was useless to intercede. And Polina Zhemchuzhnikova herself, assessing the significance of the carelessly disclosed information, considered the punishment fair and, upon being released, did not allow anyone to condemn Stalin.

But her arrest took place a year later than the wife of General Khrulev, and no particularly friendly, “informal” relations were noted between the two ladies. But in the same 1948, as “participants in anti-Soviet gatherings and distributors of all kinds of fabrications about Comrade Stalin,” the aunts of the leader’s daughter Svetlana were arrested.

One of them, Evgenia Aleksandrovna, was really friends with Esfirya Semyonovna and often came to her to “chat on the Kremlin,” that is, on the government telephone line. At the same time, she, without hesitation, expounded at length her own opinions about Joseph Vissarionovich - of course, from the point of view of economic and everyday life, and not high politics.

Evgenia Alexandrovna tried to visit her friend when General Khrulev was not at home: he warned that the phones were being tapped and that these conversations would not end well. And so it happened...

Meanwhile, the brutal, invisible behind-the-scenes struggle, the goal of which was power after the leader's departure, continued. The death of A. A. Zhdanov as a result of a deliberately incorrect, essentially ordered medical diagnosis, repression against a number of military leaders, the “Leningrad Affair” was practically a consequence and echo of the battle for the “Kremlin inheritance”.

The arrest and physical destruction of the brightest and most talented leader of the national economy, with whom General Khrulev worked closely during the war, soon followed. A brilliant economist, first deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Academician N.A. Voznesensky, honorably led Soviet industry through the most difficult trials, creating the material basis for the Great Victory. But it was precisely the outstanding qualities of this person, useful for the country, from the point of view of “undercover logic” that made him the most likely contender for the highest government posts. The scientific and theoretical works of Academician Voznesensky turned out to be unfinished and unclaimed, which was one of the reasons for the systemic crisis that hit the country three decades later.

Each of the groups tried to expose their opponent to attack, but they themselves feared the wrath of the leader. Apparently, J.V. Stalin understood what was happening in his immediate circle and was preparing to take his own measures, but on March 3, 1953, he passed away. The groups, breathing a sigh of relief, prepared for the decisive battle.

Did Andrei Vasilyevich realize the essence of those events? On the one hand, this can be seen from a distance of time, on the other hand, his powerful intellect went far beyond the boundaries of high military education. In any case, almost immediately after Stalin’s death, he called Beria, who had returned to his previous activities, and asked if it was time to stop the abuse of innocent people.

General Khrulev was preparing for a harsh and impartial conversation, but Lavrenty Pavlovich surprised him - he was politeness itself! This is understandable: why acquire another opponent in the last round of the struggle for power?

One way or another, Esfir Semyonovna soon returned home. The care of her husband and children allowed her to quickly regain her strength, and friendly laughter began to sound in the apartment again - the owners’ remarks were always witty and their jokes were funny, so that guests of different professions and generations felt at ease and at ease in their company. Prominent military leaders visited here, especially often K.K. Rokossovsky - he had a long-standing sympathy with Khrulev - artists of the Maly Theater, especially beloved in the family, M.I. Tsarev, I.M. Moskvitin, A.N. Gribov.

Andrei Vasilyevich himself read a lot in those years, mostly the works of his favorite writers - L. N. Tolstoy, A. I. Kuprin, A. P. Chekhov - he now had much more free time, but General Khrulev knew how use it. He fought for the release and rehabilitation of innocent victims, the number of which increased significantly during the intensification of the struggle for power,

At that difficult time, mediocrity, trying to take a more advantageous “place in the sun,” often resorted to political accusations, slander, false denunciations, anonymous letters, or even simply stole important official documents from a competitor, bringing the person to trial.

In the fate of Andrei Vasilyevich himself, who was transferred after the arrest of his wife to the post of Deputy Minister of Construction Materials, there were no changes for the better after the restoration of justice. Moreover, N.A. Bulganin, shortly after Stalin’s death, tried to exclude General Khrulev from the list of the Armed Forces.

The struggle for power ended with the arrest of Beria, after which the powerful ill-wisher managed to occupy an even higher position. Consequently, nothing good could be expected.

But in October 1957, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky became the Minister of Defense of the USSR. He valued the abilities of the chief quartermaster extremely highly and immediately, without looking back at anyone, restored Andrei Vasilyevich to the ranks of the Armed Forces. And soon another confrontation in the highest echelons of power led to Bulganin’s removal from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and his deprivation of the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

It seemed that now the remarkable mind and bright talent of General Khrulev could once again serve the Motherland. Unfortunately, his health, undermined by intense work in an extremely difficult psychological environment, no longer allowed him to occupy positions that required maximum efficiency. But even in his post as inspector-adviser of the group of inspectors general of the Ministry of Defense, Andrei Vasilyevich tried to do everything he could.

He, like no one else, understood the connection between the army and the country's economy and, like no one else, he saw thousands of threads, this connection of components. Reflecting this connection and summarizing the most valuable experience, the great intendant wrote a book that he wanted to call “Everything for Victory.” I didn’t have time to finish: on June 9, 1962, Army General Andrei Vasilyevich Khrulev passed away.

A long line of statesmen, leaders of industry and agriculture and, of course, generals and officers, both who knew him during the years of trial and who took up the baton of defenders of the Fatherland after the war, came to say goodbye to him. The funeral was going to be held at the Novo-Maiden Cemetery, but after A.I. Mikoyan appealed to the highest representatives of the authorities, the Kremlin wall was chosen as the final resting place.

Fireworks thundered, and the soldiers of the Moscow garrison marched solemnly, saluting the Great Quartermaster. His work was continued by worthy successors: Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan, army generals S. K. Kurkotkin and M. V. Arkhipov.